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Chapter 1:   
 
The Federal Design Dilemma:   
The Puzzle of Intergovernmental Delegation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When policymakers craft and consider legislation, they make decisions about who 
is responsible for the implementation of the policy.  Congress delegates authority not just 
to the national executive branch agents, but also to state and local entities (Epstein and 
O‘Halloran 1999).
1
  Delegation to national and state actors is a choice about which level 
of government is responsible for the policy, or how centralized or decentralized a policy 
is.  The variety of federal delegation options offers a number of intergovernmental design 
alternatives for policymakers.  In particular, how much authority should Congress 
delegate to the states versus the national executive branch?  If the states are charged with 
more authority in implementing a law, the national executive branch receives less of that 
responsibility.  Alternatively, if more authority is centralized in the national executive 
branch, the state allocation of authority in the national law decreases.  Choosing how 
much authority to decentralize to the states versus keep at the national level is what I 
refer to as the federal design dilemma Congress faces.   
Public health scholars often refer to the variation in federal design choices as a 
―patchwork‖ of national and state authority across health policies (Institute of Medicine,
                                                 
1
 In this dissertation, I discuss authority, responsibility, and execution from the perspective of congressional 
delegation of implementation.  As a result, I use these terms inter-changeably.   
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IOM, 1988 and 2002).  This patchwork of authority is identified by the IOM as a major 
problem for public health due to overlapping authority in some areas and gaping holes in 
others. Baker et al. (2005) warns ―the division of authority among governments at the 
state, federal, and local levels has often led to inconsistency, ineffective resource 
allocation, and uncertainty about their respective roles and responsibilities.‖  Health 
policies, though, are not unique in this respect; education, social welfare, transportation, 
environmental and energy policies exhibit variation in the decentralization of authority 
across policies and over time (van Horn 1979, Wong 1994, Potoski and Woods 2002, 
Scheberle 2005).   
For example, in the 1971 Water Pollution Control amendments, an approved 
House bill centralized power with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In 
contrast, a parallel Senate bill delegated more authority to the states than to the EPA.  
Similarly, as Congress crafted the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, a contentious issue 
was the degree of state and local control over national dollars allocated to them for 
educational spending.  The House version of the bill gave states and local school districts 
―unprecedented‖ flexibility in contrast to Senators who were concerned that this 
discretion could alter the intent of national education programs (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac 2001).  In both policies, the final law included a compromise between the 
chambers over how much authority over implementation was given to the states versus 
the national executive branch.  Adjustments in state versus national executive branch 
authority in Medicaid and the State Children‘s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) have 
also occurred over time and variation in state responsibility is evident across national 
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environmental laws, such as the Clean Water and Air Acts (Holahan et al. 2003, Nathan 
2005, Lambrew 2007, Rabe 2008, Scheberle 2005). 
A look at the language of national policy debates reveals the amount of authority 
allocated to states evolves as bills progress through Congress.  In addition, state roles in 
national policy are closely monitored by legislators and can be contentious.  Political 
elites use language such as ―turn back to the states a greater measure of responsibility‖ 
(Nixon 1969), ―new concepts of cooperation, a creative federalism‖ (Johnson 1964), ―the 
greatest grab for power ever made by the federal government‖ (Ervin 1972), and ―[t]he 
only question is at what level [the policy] should be done‖ (Castle 1999).
2
  More recently, 
Senator Snowe commented on the various policy options and degree of responsibility the 
states have in national health insurance reform.  She remarked, ―I think it is clear we all 
struggle with the appropriate equilibrium [of state and national authority].‖
3
  These 
quotes demonstrate the importance of and struggle over the intergovernmental delegation 
of policy authority in policy debates.      
Whether discussing big government, unfunded mandates, federal grants-in-aid, or 
pre-emption of state regulation authority, the structure of federal delegation choices may 
be the crux of the policy debate and has even been called the ―the cardinal question.‖
4
  
Are changes in the design of federal delegation the result of random choices by national 
legislators as Graves (1964) posits or are they deliberate choices with respect to the 
                                                 
2
 All quotes were taken from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac On-line edition (various years).  Nixon 
and Johnson‘s statements were in the 1973 article entitled ―Nixon's New Federalism Debated in Senate 
Hearings‖, Ervin in 1972 ―Equal Jobs: Approval of Court Enforcement Approach‖ and Castle‘s remark was 
in the 1999 article ―New ‗Ed-Flex‘ Bill Allows States To Grant Waivers from Some Federal Regulations.‖ 
3
 Senator Snowe‘s quote is from an October 13, 2009 Finance Committee hearing on national health 
insurance reform, which will be discussed at length in Chapter 5. 
4
 Wilson (1917) remarks that the relationship between the national and state governments is the cardinal 
question that faces each generation.   
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location of policy authority?  This dissertation seeks to explain why and how national 
legislators use federal delegation in policy design.  Two major questions are addressed: 
 What does federal delegation within and across policies look like? 
 Under what conditions do national legislators choose to delegate more or 
less responsibility to the states? 
In order to maintain a degree of clarity in this project, I refer to joint-partnership 
decisions, policies, and programs as those characterized by a sharing of authority between 
the national and state levels of governance.  National programs and policies are those 
specifically at the national level and state programs and policies are those with authority 
delegated mainly to the state (or local) levels.
5
  The term federal is used more generally 
to refer to characteristics of policies or responsibilities within the entire governance 
system.  This use of the term is a departure from conventional usage, where federal 
typically refers to the national government.  I follow Peterson‘s (1995) narrowing of the 
definition to reduce confusion in this intergovernmental study of policymaking.  For 
instance, the federal delegation of authority for policies refers to the designation of which 
level (national, state, or both) is in charge of a policy.  This assignment includes 
responsibility for making rules, oversight, translating policies into action, and financing.  
Responsible parties can include national bureaucracies, independent commissions, state 
and local actors (such as their legislatures or bureaucracies), and even private entities.    
IMPORTANCE 
The structural choices Congress makes have ―important consequences for the 
content and direction of policy‖ (Moe 1989).  The federal design, or intergovernmental 
                                                 
5
 I assume local policies are subsumed into state policies. Local governments also likely play an important 
role in intergovernmental relations and the decisions of policymakers.  Narrowing the scope of the study in 
this way will miss some of the nuances of intergovernmental relations that require further study. 
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structure, of policies, therefore,  is fundamental for at least three major reasons.  First, the 
delegation of policy responsibility across levels of government yields different policy 
outcomes because different actors with different ideas about the best policy outcome are 
involved.
6
  Second, the design of federal authority delegation crucially affects policy 
winners and losers because altering the federal location of policy responsibility changes 
the scope of the issue (Schattschneider 1975) and creates opportunities for policy 
entrepreneurs to change ―the distribution of advantage‖ (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  
Policy actors may increase or decrease the scope of the policy to achieve the ends they 
specifically want (Nice 1987, Baumgartner and Jones 1993).   
Third, and from the perspective of public health and health policy, changes in the 
federal design of authority result in changes in population health outcomes for the two 
reasons listed above and their impact on the delivery of public health and health care 
programs and services.  Whether states or the federal government are the lead, the 
support, or sole actors involved in public health policy, whether states can tailor policies 
to their population, and whether national law sets a ceiling or a floor for policy alter the 
ability of public health practitioners to do their work.  These choices lay the foundation 
for which entity has power, which in turn has a direct effect on the choices made over the 
intent of programs, distribution of resources and, ultimately, on health outcomes.  
Although states were traditionally considered the core actor responsible for health policy, 
the national legislature has utilized a combination of grants-in-aid, unfunded mandates, 
and lenient judicial interpretations of the Constitution to dominate most policy areas, 
including health (Gostin 2000).   
                                                 
6
 The ―best policy outcome‖ loosely describes actors‘ preferences over policy outcomes or ideal policy 
outcome.  This terminology is sharpened in the theoretical chapter.   
6 
 
  Despite the importance of these authority alternatives, we do not yet fully 
understand why legislators choose to delegate authority for some policies more to the 
national executive branch and others more heavily to the states.  In public health 
scholarship, for instance, although the patchwork of authority is often discussed, few 
undertake research about the underlying causes of the mélange of intergovernmental 
relationships.  Because of the significance of federal delegation of authority and our 
inability to pinpoint its determinants, this dissertation addresses how Congress solves its 
federal design dilemma.    
Previous policy and political science scholars have also noted the importance of 
federal delegation.  In 1984 Ripley and Franklin wrote that virtually all policies are a mix 
of national and state actors following similar statements made by Elazar (1962).  More 
recently, Conlan and Posner observe that most domestic policies include a mixture of 
responsibilities for national and state actors (2008) and Epstein and O‘Halloran (1992) 
coin the term federal delegation (which they define in their study as delegation from 
Congress to the states).  Although details about state and local actors are not included in 
Epstein and O‘Halloran‘s (1999) study, delegation to state and local actors represents a 
significant portion of congressional choices about where to locate policy authority.  As 
detailed in Table 1-1, state actors are mentioned in 31% and local actors in 13% of 
Mayhew‘s important laws from 1947 through 1992.
7




                                                 
7
 The degree of overlap in these two categories cannot be determined from details provided in text 
accompanying their table. 
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Table 1-1:  Authority Location (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999)  
Location # Laws Mentioning 
(n=257)* 
% of Laws Mentioning 
Cabinet Departments 208 80.9 
Executive Office of the President 105 40.8 
Independent Regulatory Agencies 98 38.1 
State Level Actors 80 31.1 
Judicial Actors 41 16 
Independent Commissions 41 16 
Local Actors 34 13.2 
Government Corporations 21 8.2 
*The numbers do not add to 257 due to provisions that delegate to actors in multiple locations.  Data was 
extracted from Epstein and O‘Halloran‘s Table 5.4 (99, 1999). 
 
Krause and Bowman take a slightly different angle on the issue and provide an 
empirical account of delegation to national and state actors via the centralization and 
decentralization of policy authority in national law.  The authors find that average 
centralization varies over time (2005).  The substance centralization score, or the degree 
to which policy authority is delegated to the states, ranges from -2 (decentralized) to 2 
(centralized).  The authors demonstrate annual variation in decentralization, as shown by 
data abstracted from their study in Figure 1-1.  They find the lowest level of 
centralization occurred in 1955 and the highest in 1964.  From the 1970‘s onward, 
centralizing years (e.g., 1967, 1974, 1985, or 1990, each with scores of 1) are followed 
closely by decentralizing years (1972, 1977, or 1981 with -0.588, -0.100, -0.556, 







Figure 1-1:  Policy Centralization (Krause and Bowman 2005) 
 
Synthesizing these findings, federal design decisions are important, ubiquitous, 
and vary in interesting ways.  Previous literature, though, has bypassed how strategic 
national actors make these intergovernmental delegation choices.  For instance, 
federalism scholars provide theories of accountability, efficiency, and equity with respect 
to the structure and operations of federal governments but only rarely consider the 
strategies, incentives, and constraints of policymakers (see Peterson 1995, Volden 2005, 
and Bednar 2010 for exceptions).  Similarly, congressional scholars have illuminated 
how the strategic interaction between policymakers leads to various substantive outcomes 
but have overlooked the influence federal structures may have on those strategies and 
outcomes (e.g., see Shepsle and Weingast 1995, edited volume).  
MOTIVATING LITERATURE 
Although this project is the first theoretical and empirical investigation of national 
legislators‘ intergovernmental delegation choices, work from a variety of scholars sheds 
light on the puzzle of federal policy design.  Specifically, previous research is 











1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
Annual Mean Centralization Score from Krause and 
Bowman (2005) Figure 2
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decentralization of policies over time, the incentives political actors face when 
considering devolving policy authority to the states or centralizing authority with the 
national executive branch, and the reasons for and ways in which legislators delegate 
policy authority to another entity.   
Centralization versus Decentralization 
Explanations for variation in the decentralization of policies include party or 
ideology with Republicans or conservatives favoring decentralized policies and 
Democrats or liberals favoring centralization (empirical studies reviewed in Peterson 
1995, also see Krause and Bowman 2005).  Modernization, complexity, and 
specialization (Beer 1978, Bowman and Krause 2003) and growth of the interest group 
system (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Walker 1981) are considered culprits for the 
increasing interdependence and intergovernmental nature of national policies.  Other 
scholars cite randomness and lack of order for the reasons decentralization of authority 
varies across laws (van Horn 1979, Graves 1964).  The conventional wisdom is that 
Republicans prefer to devolve authority to the states and Democrats prefer centralization.  
This well-accepted argument appears to be based on conservative rhetoric, not on policy 
actions (Scheiber 1996).  As an example, the devolution revolution during the Reagan 
administration is described by scholars in the following way:  ―the concept of federalism 
guiding their decisions remains as inconsistent and incoherent as it ever has been‖ 
(Peterson, Rabe and Wong 1986).  In other words, empirical evidence shows Republicans 
do not consistently devolve authority to the states.     
Krause and Bowman add nuance to the conventional wisdom with a thoughtful 
view of the influence of partisan preferences on decentralization (2005).  They argue and 
10 
 
find empirically Republicans do not just devolve authority, but instead, Republicans at 
the national level are more likely to decentralize authority to the states when the states are 
more Republican and Democrats do the same when the states are more heavily 
Democratic (what they term partisan congruence).
8
  In their view, national legislators 
scan the average partisan makeup of states before choosing the degree of centralization of 
policies and then decentralize when the states, on average, are of the same majority party 
as the combined national institutions of governance.   
Scholarship in fiscal federalism, alternatively, suggests policymakers design 
authority structures to fit the situation or policy area at hand (see Oates 2005 for a review 
or Peterson 1995 for an explication of ―functional federalism‖).  Those policies best 
(often defined as most efficiently) implemented at the state level are decentralized to the 
states and those more efficiently handled by the central government are kept at the 
national level.  For instance, Peterson argues that national legislators craft decentralized 
developmental policies and centralized redistributive policies since the states are more 
competent at development than at redistribution (1995).
9
  Economic analyses similarly 
focus on the most efficient division of responsibilities in a federal system (Tiebout 1956, 
Olson 1969, Chubb 1985, Oates 2005). The classic result is that the central government 
should deal with redistributive policies and local governments should concern themselves 
                                                 
8
 In their study, the authors include controls for federal government spending growth, mean annual growth 
of state revenue from the previous year, Krehbiel‘s gridlock interval measure, and a dummy variable for 
civil rights and welfare issues (Krause and Bowman, 2005). 
9
 Peterson argues that after the 1970‘s, national legislators began to craft legislation with policy function in 
mind. He defines developmental policies as those that ―provide the physical and social infrastructure 
necessary to facilitate a country‘s economic growth‖ and redistributive policies as those that ―reallocate 
societal resources from the haves to the have-nots‖ (17, 1995).  Although Peterson‘s earlier work 
emphasizes centralization from a local to state perspective (1981), in The Price of Federalism he focuses on 
state to national concerns.  For instance, in his formulation of the functional theory of federalism he argues 
―the national government should assume the primary responsibility for redistribution, while state and local 
governments assume primary responsibility for development‖ (18, 1995).  Peterson juxtaposes this theory 
to a legislative theory of federalism (where political actors are driven by self interest instead of efficiency) 
and concludes that post-1970‘s the functional theory is most consistent with the data.    
11 
 
with developmental policies (Chubb 1985, Oates 2005).
10
  Yet, as Chubb puts it, 
federalism is not ―an efficient system for sharing the economic, political, and 
administrative responsibilities of modern government, but rather, one that, through the 
initiative of the national government, has become wasteful, cumbersome, and, as often as 
not, unsuccessful‖ (994, 1985).  Chubb‘s perspective casts doubt on intergovernmental 
delegation for reasons of efficiency. 
Policy Actors’ Incentives 
In other words, efficiency may not be the determining factor in how national 
legislators design federal policies.  In fact, many of the researchers discussing 
decentralization point to legislators‘ incentives when making policy decisions (e.g., see 
Krause and Bowman 2005, Peterson 1995, and Chubb 1985). Other scholars focus on 
these incentives and find that state and national governments have logical reasons to enter 
policy realms where the other level would more efficiently legislate.  These reasons 
include uncertainty in policy outcomes and opportunities to claim credit and shift blame 
(Volden 2005 and Bednar 2010).  Intergovernmental policies afford politicians the ability 
to take credit for successes as well as shift the fiscal burden and blame for policies 
(Weissert 2007).  Yet, Peterson finds that the theoretical story that legislators design 
policies to claim credit for successes and off-load as much of the resource burden of 
policies onto other levels of government, only matches pre-1970‘s policy design choices 
empirically (1995).  In other words, conclusions regarding the influence of actors‘ 
incentives on federal policy design are contradictory.     
                                                 
10
 The central government (a benevolent central planner) serves the role of internalizing any externalities 
that may occur through the use of fiscal stabilization schemes (such as grants) (Oates 2005). 
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Additionally, scholars have begun to parse how policy actors‘ incentives work in 
the context of federal institutions such as elections.  Nicholson-Crotty (2008) argues that 
national legislators refrain from using policy devices to infringe on state authority during 
election years because citizens have preferences over federalism (such as states‘ rights), 
but short memories.  If legislators preempted state authority through national legislation, 
citizens would punish them at the ballot box.  A concern with the logic behind this 
analysis, though, is it assumes legislators have preferences over policy outcomes, not 
federalism as their constituency does.  In addition, Nicholson-Crotty‘s defense of his 
assumption about citizen preferences over federalism is based on a study from Mikos and 
Kam (2007).  This experiment demonstrated subjects‘ a priori beliefs about federalism 
were activated when exposed to an argument about physician-assisted suicide and state-
rights (2007). This activation may have been more about morality than federalism.  The 
federalism treatment in the experiment included mention of abortion as well as other 
medical procedures.        
Delegation 
Considerations of national policymaking typically involve examinations (often 
implicitly) of policy delegation from the national government to state governments.  I 
turn now to research on the legislature-bureaucratic relationship and delegation studies.  
Work on bureaucratic delegation highlights the conflicts in interest that exist between the 
legislature (often styled as the principal) and executive agencies (e.g., Kiewet and 
McCubbins 1991).  Both theoretical and empirical investigations have concluded that 
legislators can mitigate many (but not all) of their concerns about information and agency 
policy manipulation by changing the amount of discretion afforded bureaucrats (Epstein 
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and O‘Halloran 1999), writing detailed statutes (Huber and Shipan 2002), using 
competitive or redundant bureaucratic structures (Kunioka and Rothenberg 1993 and 
Ting 2003), carefully crafting administrative procedures, involving specific interests in 
agency processes (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987 and 1989) and utilizing different 
types of oversight and monitoring mechanisms (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984 and 
Lupia and McCubbins 1994).  None of these scholars considered the importance of the 
states as potential participants in administrative procedures, agency processes, or 
oversight and monitoring.  How would their conclusions change if they had taken an 
intergovernmental perspective?   
The important variables in delegation decisions include the costs and benefits of 
the transaction between legislators and the bureaucrats under various political conditions.  
These conditions include the degree of preference conflict between legislators and the 
president, the structure of committees, the degree of uncertainty regarding policy 
outcomes, and the difference in the expertise level of the legislature and the agency 
(Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999).  In addition, the political capacity of legislators and their 
policy bargaining environment, as well as other factors outside of statutes, which 
constrain bureaucrats after policy enactment, are crucial factors (Huber and Shipan 
2002).  Incorporating the states as agents would likely change the bargaining 
environment in crucial ways.   
As uncertainty, oversight costs, and legislator risk aversion increase, the set of 
actors to whom Congress will delegate increases (Bendor and Mierowitz 2004).  As 
legislator information decreases, the delegation set decreases (Bendor and Meirowitz 
2004).  There are important tradeoffs between many of these factors, such as control 
14 
 
(amount of discretion allowed) and expertise (Bawn 1995), credible credit claiming for 
successes and reduced traceability (Arnold 1990), or oversight and cost (Epstein and 
O‘Halloran 1999).
11




Although research on bureaucratic delegation is voluminous, surprisingly little 
has been said about delegation to the states and no explanations for delegation to the 
states exist.  Huber and Shipan (2002) consider federalism as one of the possible extra-
statutory controls substituting for lower levels of policy discretion and posit national 
legislators will constrain implementation by state-level actors by including more statutory 
details.  When is it, though, that national legislators decide to involve state-level actors in 
implementation as opposed to a national entity? 
Epstein and O‘Halloran (1999) claim that when forming policies, national level 
actors must first answer the "federalism question" (whether to delegate to states or not) 
before they decide whether and the conditions of delegation to national agencies 
(emphasis from original, 153).  In their view, legislators first answer the question of 
whether to delegate to the states or not.  Once it has been decided that delegation to the 
states does not occur, their theory of delegation to national agencies is in play.  The 
authors fail to tackle the federalism question and how delegation to national executive 
branch agencies changes when delegation to the states is included and yet their empirical 
evidence (Table 1-1) reveals the commonality of the states in national law.  If preferences 
at the national and state levels matter for decentralization of authority (as in Krause and 
                                                 
11
 This study cannot incorporate every aspect of delegation as it widens the perspective to include the states 
as potential agents.  It does, however, take the first step in such a consideration.   
12
 Many gaps still remain in this area (and are not filled by this current project) including the influence of 
the president, the courts, the Congressional committee system, etc. 
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Bowman 2005), how do decentralization of authority and the preferences of the national 
executive branch influence bureaucratic delegation?  
There are three major issues with most of these arguments and their analyses.  
First, delegation scholars fail to account theoretically for the states as potential agents.  
As mentioned above, no previous scholars have incorporated the states as an option in 
models of delegation.  If delegation models were to incorporate the states, it is likely that 
the design of delegation will change.  For instance, state and national agents may offer 
benefits to Congress through competition for scarce resources (e.g., funding) and they 
may create concerns by increasing oversight challenges due to the number and 
geographic distance of the states and the possibility of collusion between national and 
state agents.   
Second, much of the research considering the states and decentralization of 
authority only obtains empirical support periodically.  As an example, that policy type 
determines which authority structure is designed has been an accepted theory for more 
than two decades.  Unfortunately, empirical scholars have had to redefine different types 
of federalism to fit with how different types of policies are delegated to the states during 
different time periods (e.g., layer cake federalism, marble cake federalism, picket fence 
federalism, and so forth).
13
    
The third concern is methodological.  All studies of decentralization of authority 
evaluate their theories using a subset of data selected because the policies deal 
specifically with state pre-emption, federalism, or specific intergovernmental content.  
These studies, in other words, select on the dependent variable leaving uncertainty with 
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 See Nice (1987) for an overview of the different types of federalism and time periods and Wright (1973) 
regarding cycles of state mandates. 
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respect to how the findings apply outside of their individual studies.  This study attempts 
to circumvent this issue by considering all significant pieces of legislation regardless of 
their intergovernmental, federalism, or states‘ rights content.  
In sum, previous literature has, for the most part, separately considered delegation 
of policy authority to the states and strategic politicians centralizing and decentralizing 
policies.  These studies have often narrowly focused on just grants-in-aid (e.g., Peterson 
1995) or confined definitions of mandates or delegation in their theories and empirics.  
Formal theoretical work has begun to combine these policy actions and political 
motivations (Volden 2005, Bednar 2010), but a broad analysis of federal design decisions 
and national policymaking has not been undertaken.  This project addresses the 
intergovernmental design choices national legislators make when crafting policies.  I 
investigate why national legislators choose one type of federal design over another and 
under what conditions they do so.         
CONTRIBUTION 
By providing an understanding of federal policy design, this dissertation will 
inform legislative behavior, federalism, and health policy literatures.  First, this project 
illuminates current models of national legislative behavior by placing congressional 
actions in a more realistic federal structure.  Congress chooses the allocation of authority 
between national and state agents and attempts to pull policy outcomes closer to its ideal 
point by delegating to the closest actor, or to both jointly.  Interestingly, if this simple 
model underlies how Congress bargains in its chambers, the Senate and the House exhibit 
extremely different situations due to their unique majoritarian thresholds (i.e., simple 
majority in the House and supermajority due to the filibuster in the Senate).  Specifically, 
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Senators must balance the authority allocation they prefer with the ability to appeal to 
members from a minority intergovernmental team in order to successfully move policy 
through the chamber.   Second, this research builds on existing literature by providing 
theoretical and empirical answers to the question of how legislators delegate in a federal 
system as well as the conditions under which we should see centralization versus 
decentralization.  Finally, I inform public health scholarship by providing insight into the 
strategies and actions of legislators as they make crucial policy design choices.  
Theoretically, I develop formal models of legislators delegating authority to 
actors at the national and state levels.  I extend current theories of delegation and 
formulate testable hypotheses.  These conjectures are analyzed empirically using a new 
policy-level dataset that encodes federal authority decisions as well as existing secondary 
data.  I ultimately argue that in making the federal delegation decision for a policy, 
legislators‘ intergovernmental context matters.  By intergovernmental context, I mean 
that legislators come from specific states and consider how their state will implement 
policy if authority is delegated to that level.  Legislators compare potential policy 
outcomes at the state and national level to their own preferences over outcomes.  Scholars 
studying legislative behavior often ignore that Congress is comprised of individual 
legislators elected from their own states; the addition of this factor changes the way we 
view delegation.  And, the addition of intergovernmental context alters ideas about who 
is pivotal in voting decisions.    
From an empirical perspective, I create the first dataset of its kind that broadly 
considers the intergovernmental delegation decisions Congress makes.  This dataset is the 
centerpiece of my dissertation and includes all significant pieces of domestic legislation 
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from 1973-2008.  Over 24,000 provisions within those laws were coded to understand 
which entity –national, state, or joint—received authority.  By carefully collecting this 
data, I am able to test, not only my theoretical explanations, but also rival arguments 
regarding decentralization and centralization of policy over time and across laws.  Thus, I 
am able to understand the federal design of authority by examining how various factors 
influence decentralization without selecting on the dependent variable.   
In this study, I find most laws include the states as an agent of implementation.  
Specifically, out of the 179 significant pieces of legislation, 102 delegated at least some 
portion of the provisions to the states.  This novel dataset allows for a more careful and 
comprehensive study of federal policy design and intergovernmental delegation than is 
found in any previous study.  I demonstrate empirically not only do most domestic 
policies involve delegation to the states, but there is a systematic explanation of variation 
in the degree of state-level authority over time.
14
   
To preview my results, I find the party difference between pivotal legislators in 
Congress and their state governors is a crucial determinant to how much authority states 
are given in national policy.  When the pivotal legislator‘s party in Congress is different 
from his state‘s governor‘s party, less authority is delegated to all states in national law.  
In addition, the party difference between pivotal legislators and the president also matter.  
Moreover, these intergovernmental structural choices are tempered by political 
uncertainty at the state and national level.  A case study brings to light the importance of 
intergovernmental delegation in the health insurance reform process and provides 
evidence supporting the mechanisms relied on in the formal models.  In addition, the 
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  Elazar (1962), Ripley and Franklin (1982), and Conlan and Posner (2008) (among others) suggest that 
the majority of domestic policies are intergovernmental—requiring state participation in implementation.  
These authors, though, do not demonstrate this as an empirical fact.  This dataset does so.  
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results of this study show that the intergovernmental context of legislators influences how 
they form coalitions to pass policy in the House and the Senate.     
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents a theory of 
intergovernmental policy design and delegation relying on two simple formal models.  
Chapter 3 describes the data collected and coded to test this theory and Chapters 4 and 6 
provide different levels of empirical analyses.  In Chapter 4, I consider the choices of 
Congress in the aggregate across time.  In Chapter 5, I detail the mechanisms at play in 
the empirical analyses through a study of the 2009-2010 health insurance reform process 
and consider the usefulness of the assumed mechanisms from the theory in Chapter 2 
through an in-depth consideration of the 2009-2010 health reform political process.  This 
case study also highlights the importance of individual legislators‘ choices and coalition 
formation in the House and Senate leading into the second empirical analysis in Chapter 
6.  In Chapter 6, I empirically examine individual legislators‘ voting behavior in the 
House and Senate to examine whether intergovernmental context matters in determining 
vote choice.  Finally in Chapter 7, I summarize the entire project and lay the groundwork 
for future research in this area. 
In the end, the motivation for this project is not on which level of government 
should have responsibility for what policies.  Instead, I focus on one step of the process: 
the intergovernmental policy decisions made by national legislators in a federal structure.  
By concentrating on the decisions of one set of policymakers, I develop and test a 
positive theory of federal delegation decisions.  This focus bypasses considerations of 
efficiency and normative issues in federal stability.   
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Throughout this dissertation, I follow the logic of the statement of Nice (1987) 
who said that beliefs about federalism are ―policy in disguise.‖  He notes that states‘ 
rights rhetoric is just that, rhetoric.  Legislators who vehemently oppose tromping on 
state authority in one policy were found to call for centralization in another and 
legislators asking for decentralization in a particular policy decide in favor of its 
centralization in later years.  Or put similarly by Stewart (2011) in writing for the 
Huffington Post about banking policy: 
Most of the time, it turns out, federalism is the ultimate lip-
service doctrine. If state's rights get you to the outcome you 
want, then you support state's rights. If not, well, federal 
power's good, too. And it's not just self-interested economic 
actors like banks who dance this dance.   
 
In other words, the guiding force behind this dissertation is that debates about 
centralization and decentralization are not simply debates about the appropriate level of 
government.  Instead, they are debates about the underlying policy itself and legislators 
are dancing ―the dance‖ as they pursue their own ideal policy ends.  This project delves 
into the ―disguise‖ and ―the dance‖ and explains when the chosen option for Congress is 
keeping authority at the national level versus giving some of it to the states.    
The support I find in this project for the theory of intergovernmental delegation provides 
an alternate empirical and theoretical explanation to literatures studying delegation, 
policy and federalism, as well as health politics.  The extensive data effort combined with 
comprehensive empirical analyses, illuminative case study and theoretical insight provide 
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A Theory of Intergovernmental Delegation 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Congress faces a federal policy design dilemma:  how much authority should be 
delegated to the states versus kept at the national level?  Our current explanations fall 
short because they neglect crucial features about the way in which Congress makes 
policy decisions.  These arguments about partisanship, policy type, or elections do not 
include strategic delegation of authority, the institutional constraints of the House and the 
Senate, and uncertainty over policy implementation.  In this chapter I provide a 
framework for understanding why Congress varies the intergovernmental architecture of 
the policies it makes and include these features in my theory.  I argue the answer to the 
design dilemma lies in understanding that Congress perceives of itself as the principal 
and the states and the national executive branch as potential agents.  Congress determines 
how much authority to delegate to the states by comparing the outcomes that would result 
from giving the states more or less authority in a policy and chooses the delegation option 
that provides the most preferred outcome, or the outcome closest to its ideal point.   
To draw out the logic of this comparison, I present two formal theoretic models.  
The first, which I refer to as the ―aggregate-level model,‖ uses a decision theoretic model 
of a pivotal legislator in Congress deciding to delegate to state and national-level agents.  
This model highlights the intergovernmental nature of delegation and provides a  
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perspective of how Congress as a whole makes federal design choices.  Congress, though, 
is made up of individual legislators representing their own states.  I provide a foundation 
for the aggregate model with an additional model of individual-level legislative behavior.  
In this ―individual-level‖ model, I demonstrate how legislators coalesce to form 
successful policy coalitions altering the degree of state responsibility in bills in the House 
and in the Senate.  These coalitions provide the key for understanding the implications of 
the initial aggregate model, because they identify who, or more accurately what, is 
pivotal.  Together, the aggregate and individual-level models produce a set of hypotheses 
about the conditions under which Congress will increase or decrease the authority 
delegated to the states in national policy and how individual legislators vote with respect 
to intergovernmental delegation.  These models, though, are short-sighted in that they 
deal only with one time period.  I conclude this theoretical chapter by informally 
discussing the impact of uncertainty over the future preferences of the implementing 
agents on delegation choices.       
There are three key components to the entire theory (the two models, plus 
informal insights):  preferences, intra-chamber congressional institutions, and electoral 
uncertainty.  The outcome of the aggregate model is straightforward—Congress prefers 
to delegate to the closest agent.  In other words, if the preference of Congress lines up 
closer to those of the national executive branch, Congress prefers to centralize authority; 
but when Congress is aligned more closely with the states, devolution to the states is the 
preferred choice.  These simple conclusions, though, result in non-intuitive results when 
played out under different circumstances.  For instance, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that Republicans devolve and Democrats centralize authority, there are 
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conditions under which Republican majorities choose to centralize authority with national 
executive branch agencies and other conditions where Democrats prefer to devolve 
authority to the states.  In addition, my theory offers an explanation for differences in 
authority delegation decisions across chambers of Congress.   
My aggregate model hinges on a pivotal legislator in Congress.  The pivotal 
legislator represents the ―outcome of how individual legislator preferences and the 
existing legislative institution [interact] to produce a single legislative preference 
ordering over the possible alternatives‖ (100, Lupia and McCubbins 1994).  Many 
scholars assume this pivotal legislator is the median legislator and assume away how 
legislative preferences are aggregated within the institutional constraints of Congress 
(e.g., McCarty and Meirowitz 2007).  The individual-level model explicitly considers 
how policy coalitions form in the House and in the Senate given the possibility of 
intergovernmental delegation and who is pivotal, or which legislator‘s ideal point will 
determine voting outcomes, in each chamber.  The focus on intergovernmental delegation 
at the individual level highlights how legislators‘ intergovernmental context and 
institutional rules of each chamber influence coalition formation and state authority 
allocation.    
This chapter proceeds as follows:  I begin by discussing the assumptions and 
elements of the aggregate model, provide its solution, and discuss the logically coherent 
hypotheses that follow.  Next, I build on the aggregate model and detail the set-up and 
solution of the individual-level model in each chamber of Congress.  This second model 
offers additional hypotheses about the choices legislators make.  Finally, I discuss the 
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importance of uncertainty about who will be in power in the states and in the national 
executive branch during policy implementation.      
FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 Before showing the aggregate model, I describe several key assumptions of both 
formal models.  These assumptions frame the discussion of the model because they 
narrow the focus to the intergovernmental aspects of federal policy design.   
Delegation 
First, I assume Congress always delegates authority for policy.
15
  There may be 
rare instances where the legislature does not delegate authority, such as in the declaration 
of the Martin Luther King Jr. Public Holiday (PL 98-144) or the Civil Rights Restoration 
Act of 1987 (PL 100-259).
 16
  For the most part, though, delegation occurs.  The reasons 
why Congress may delegate authority are wide ranging and include reliance on the 
greater expertise of specialists to evaluate alternative policies, freeing up legislators‘ time 
to engage in other activities (such as constituency service or campaigning), or shifting 
blame to the administrators of the law instead of Congress (Kiewit and McCubbins 1991, 
Weingast and Marshall 1988, Fiorina 1977)
  
 
This delegation assumption is in contrast to some scholars who assume Congress 
makes a choice about whether or not to delegate (e.g., Weingast 1984 or Epstein and 
O‘Halloran 1992).  Epstein and O‘Halloran, for instance, provide a table of twenty-five 
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 This is not to say that delegation means regulation.  Instead, delegation could mean that an agent has 
received authority for (or over) a variety of policy instruments including regulation, taxation, grants-in-aid, 
etc.   
16
 For Martin Luther King Jr. Public Holiday, the law simply states that it is a public holiday.  For the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act, the text of the law defines what is meant by ―program or activity‖ in response to 
Supreme Court decisions that ―unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age Discrimination Act 
of 1975, and title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (2) legislative action is necessary to restore the 
prior consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation and broad, institution-wide application of 
those laws as previously administered.‖  (PL 100-259, March 22, 1988). 
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acts with no executive delegation (95, 1992).  According to the authors, this table 
includes nineteen laws with no delegation and six with delegation to non-executive 
branch actors.  In this list they include the two laws mentioned above as well as Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1970 (PL 91-222),
17
 the State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of 1972 (PL 92-512), and the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1989 
(PL 101-157).     
A thorough reading of these three laws reveals delegation occurs in each case.  In 
the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, for instance, a national comprehensive labeling 
program for cigarettes was established.  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was then 
constrained in its actions with respect to this law.  The fact that the FTC‘s actions were 
limited by the law implies that the FTC was involved in some way with its execution.
18
  
In the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, the Secretary of the Treasury was put in 
charge of considering state and local applications for money and transmitting it to 
successful applicants (within specified boundaries of action) and the states (and local 
units) were given broad authority to use the money for a variety of purposes.
19
  Finally, in 
the Labor amendments, the Secretary of Labor was given constrained authority to 
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 Although enrolled by Congress in 1969, President Nixon did not sign the bill into law until 1970. 
18
 Specifically, FTC actions related to cigarette advertising regulations could not occur before July 1, 1971.  
After this date, the FTC had to notify Congress that it determined action was necessary with respect to the 
regulation.  This notification had to include the text of the regulation rule and ―a full statement of the basis 
for such determination.  No such trade regulation rule adopted in such proceeding may take effect until six 
months after the Commission has notified the Congress of the text of such rule, in order that the Congress 
may act if it so desires.‖  (Section 7a, PL 91-222, 1970).   
19
 ―Except as otherwise provided in this title, the Secretary shall, for each entitlement period, pay out of the 
Trust Fund to- (1) each State government a total amount equal to the entitlement of such State government 
determined under section 107 for such period, and (2) each unit of local government a total amount equal to 
the entitlement of such unit determined under section 108 for such period. … the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall be the trustee of the Trust Fund and shall report to the Congress…‖ (Section 101-107, PL 92-512, 
1972).   
30 
 
develop regulations within the definitions set by Congress.
20
  In sum, even in cases that 
previous scholars consider non-delegation, Congress does in fact delegate.
21
   
Not only does the legislature delegate authority, but I also assume it has 
alternatives over the recipients of that authority, the states or the national executive 
branch.  Empirical evidence provided by Epstein and O‘Halloran (1999) demonstrate 
Congress delegates to national-level actors (such as the Executive Office of the President 
or cabinet departments) and state and local actors, to name a few.  The focus of this 
project is on that choice to include delegation to the states in national-level laws and how 
much of the authority is delegated to the states.  This delegation choice rests upon the 
assumption that Congress is the principal and the states, the national executive branch, or 
some combination of the two are potential agents.  In other words, Congress can alter the 
amount of authority delegated to the states versus kept at the national level along a 
continuum.  If all responsibility for a policy is delegated to national executive branch 
actors, no authority is delegated to the states (and vice versa).  Additionally, Congress 
can delegate a portion of the authority to the states and the remaining amount to the 
national executive branch.  These design choices result in diverse outcomes since 
different actors are involved to varying extents.       
                                                 
20
―If the Secretary determines that an employer has taken an action in violation of subparagraph (A), the 
Secretary shall issue an order disqualifying such employer from employing any individual at such wage. … 
The Secretary of Labor shall issue regulations defining the requisite proof required of an individual. Such 
regulations shall establish minimal requirements for requisite proof and may prescribe that an accurate list 
of the individual's employers and a statement of the dates and duration of employment with each employer 
constitute requisite proof. ― (Sections 2-6, PL 101-157, 1989). 
21
 Moreover, the data coding process of this project (chapter 3) did not reveal any additional instances 
where delegation did not occur.  The differences between Epstein and O‘Halloran‘s coding of non-
delegation and my reading of the full text of the laws is most likely due to the coding process Epstein and 
O‘Halloran used.  Specifically, they relied on Congressional Quarterly Almanac (CQ) summaries of the 
laws included in their analyses.  In the data chapter, I discuss the problems that arose when I utilized these 
same summaries and the reasons why I chose to use Congressional Research Service (CRS) summaries 
instead.  In brief, I found that CRS summaries consistently provided more specific information about what 
entities were charged with implementation of which provisions than did the CQ summaries.   
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Yet, it is not obvious that Congress is in a position to require the states to 
participate in national policy.  Specifically, Article I, Sections 8 and 9 of the Constitution, 
as well as the10th amendment, circumscribe the limited power of the national 
government and the immeasurable, residual power of the states (and the people).  The 
flexibility of the Constitution, though, with respect to delegation of authority and 
expansive federal judicial decisions have allowed national authority to extend across all 
areas of policy (Posner 1998, Eskridge and Ferejohn 1994, Harvard Law Review 1994). 
Furthermore, from the New Deal forward national dollars have become a crucial part of 
state-level policy activities, giving Congress the power of the purse (Nathan 1983, Chubb 
1985, Rosenthal 1987, Inman 1988 McCoy and Friedman 1988, Harvard Law Review 
1994, Zimmerman 2005).  This sprawl and brawn of the national legislature have offered 
Congress the opportunity to consider itself as the principal—with the states and the 
national executive branch as potential agents—while crafting policy. 
Principal Agent Framework 
Because Congress delegates authority and because the states and the national 
executive branch have the potential to receive that authority, I stylize the relationship 
among Congress, the national bureaucracy, and the states as a simplified principal agent 
model.  In a standard principal agent model, a principal faces a choice about how much 
authority to delegate to an agent (e.g., see McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; 1989; 
Lupia 2001; or Alesina and Tabellini 2005).  Problematic is that an agent may implement 
the policy in a way that is dissimilar from what Congress itself would have done had it 
chosen to retain authority for the policy.  Agency problems occur because the agent (the 
entity given control over the policy) prefers to act on its own behalf instead of for 
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Congress.  This could entail shirking (not doing the work required in the policy) or 
bureaucratic drift (also known as slack or slippage) where the agent implements a policy 
that differs from that enacted (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). 
Principal-agent problems arise when the principal has incomplete information 
about an agent‘s actions and the principal has preferences that diverge from the agent.  
One solution is that the legislature, as the principal, can attempt to structure the policy 
and delegation relationship in such a way as to create incentives for the agent to do 
exactly what Congress would do if they could implement the policy on their own either 
through ex ante or ongoing controls (e.g., see McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 
1989).  A common arrangement is the inclusion of oversight and monitoring 
mechanisms—either directly to Congress, via an advisory committee, or by the inclusion 
of interest groups in agency decisions.  Unfortunately, from Congress‘ perspective, 
monitoring is never perfect and both slippage and shirking remain.   
In my model, I assume complete information to focus specifically on the 
influence of preference divergence across governmental levels.
22
  Congress, as the 
principal, faces a choice between delegating policy authority to a national agent, a state 
agent, or some combination of the two (what I refer to as joint partnership policies). In 
essence, Congress can choose to centralize authority with a national executive branch 
actor (e.g., the Department of Health and Human Services or the Environmental 
Protection Agency) or devolve more authority to the states.   
Although the principal agent model is a dominant choice of Congress-centric 
bureaucratic delegation scholars, my application of it is new because I add the states as 
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 Future work should incorporate incomplete information to assess the extent to which congressional 
uncertainty over policy outcomes, for instance, influences intergovernmental delegation choices. 
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potential agents to specifically consider intergovernmental delegation.  Just as in other 
principal agent models, goal conflict between the principal and agent is an important 
factor (Waterman and Meier 1998, Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001).  With respect 
to goal conflict, Congress, the national executive branch, and the fifty states may all have 
different preferences when it comes to what they consider ideal policy outcomes.  For 
instance, Congress may prefer a liberal policy, the national executive branch may favor a 
conservative approach, and the states may be heterogeneous with some states preferring 
extremes (liberal or conservative) and others wanting more centrist outcomes.  The extent 
to which the goals of these three sets of actors diverge varies over time.   
Legislator Motivations  
In addition to assumptions about delegation and the relationship and potential 
challenges between the states and Congress, I assume individual legislators are motivated 
by policy outcomes and concerns about re-election.
23
  Legislators make choices about 
policies, but have personal preferences over the outcomes produced by these policies.  
Outcomes are the result of the actions of agents (the states and the national executive 
branch) assigned the authority to implement the policy.  When the states are given more 
authority, state-level actions more heavily influence policy outcomes than when the 
national executive branch is given more authority.  When both the states and the national 
executive branch are given approximately the same amount of authority, their actions 
weigh equally on the outcome.  In terms of the outcomes legislators prefer, they may be 
motivated by re-election or even personal policy preferences (Mayhew 1974, Arnold 
                                                 
23
 In addition, in the individual-level model discussed later, legislators receive a utility boost from forming 
a successful coalition with their co-partisans.  Thus, legislators are also motivated by partisan preferences, 





  Because legislators worry more proximally about re-election, though, and are 
re-elected by their congressional district, legislators in the model consider only those 
outcomes in their individual state.
25
  In other words, a legislator in Massachusetts almost 
certainly cares more what happens in his state than what happens in Wyoming or 
Georgia.
26
   
Discretion and Implementation 
In contrast to Huber and Shipan (2002), who rely on a principal agent model to 
examine the factors that influence how legislatures craft the boundaries of agent 
discretion, I assume agents implement their own ideal point.
27
  Huber and Shipan argue 
that legislators deliberately craft the amount of discretion given to agencies conditioned 
on an array of factors, such as policy preferences, technical complexity, legislative 
capacity, and the political environment (2002).  Discretion is how much leeway an actor 
has to make choices, or ―the policy latitude intentionally left to executive agents in the 
implementing legislation‖ (57, Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999).  A consideration of 
discretion presupposes an agent has the authority to make those choices in the first place.  
Epstein and O‘Halloran describe the relationship such that the number and type of 
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 These scholars also suggest legislators may be motivated by career advancement.  In this study, I assume 
re-election is the necessary condition for career advancement, and therefore, do not consider it as an 
explicit motive. 
25
 District is equal to the entire state for senators and at large representatives.  I consider alternatives such as 
concern over all states, which is more similar to personal policy preferences in Chapter 4 and find that this 
motivation is not supported by the data. 
26
 In a later chapter, I describe interviews I conducted with health policy staffers regarding the health 
reform debate during the summer of 2010 in detail.  Statements made by these elites emphasized how 
outcomes in their states were foremost in the minds of legislators as they constructed health reform 
proposals, corroborating this assumption.  Although legislators were interested in national outcomes, they 
focused mainly on the policy outcomes that would occur in their state as they crafted the various provisions 
of the health reform bills.  In addition, getting re-elected (and the fact that outcomes were related to 
elections) was listed as a concern.     
27




constraints on an agent‘s authority are inversely related to the amount of discretion an 
agent has.   
By assuming total discretion, my model fails to capture the effect of discretion on 
implementation.  What it does portray, nevertheless, is that Congress delegates contingent 
on the knowledge the agent will implement its ideal point. This does not mean to say that 
Congress has no disciplinary actions that could be utilized.  With respect to the national 
bureaucracy, for instance, punishment can include forcing oversight hearings, reducing 
budgets, amending legislation, etc. (Aberbach 1990, 2002).  Congress also has fiscal 
power with respect to the states.  National dollars are doled out to states in a variety of 
ways, including grants-in-aid and direct budget allocations for inter-governmental 
programs.  The legislature can add crossover sanctions or crosscutting requirements to 
grants-in-aid or they can eliminate or reduce direct allocations to punish deviators, or 
those who do not implement in the way the legislature wants (Posner 1998, Zimmerman 
2005).
28
  The ability to punish, though, must be backed up with the capacity and 
willingness to monitor missteps and appropriately administer the penalty.   
By assuming full agent discretion, I assume Congress cannot monitor or 
appropriately punish the offender(s).  There are myriad reasons for this inability.  For 
example, although Congress has hearings, crossover sanctions, and so forth, it cannot 
effectively monitor all fifty states. And, oversight of the relationships among these fifty 
states and the national executive branch is also extremely difficult, if not impossible. My 
assumption matches empirical insights that the states are often able to find loopholes or 
just simply do what they want in national programs (Anton 1997).  In addition, Congress 
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 Posner defines crosscutting requirements as conditions that cut across all or most grants (as of Posner‘s 
1998 book, the Office of Management and Budget had categorized 60 different cross-cutting requirements).  
Crossover sanctions are when mandates for states are sanctioned by removal of assistance. 
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may have difficulty determining whether national executive branch actions or state 
behaviors were outside the bounds of discretion.  Moreover, a new policymaking 
coalition with different preferences—unwilling to punish deviators from the previous 
policy—may exist at the national-level.  As a result of this assumption, this model 
focuses on the intergovernmental aspects of delegation, not on the degree of discretion 
the agents have to exercise that authority.
 29
   
Federalism Beliefs 
I also assume legislators are not motivated by beliefs about federalism or 
upholding the appropriate balance of state and national constitutional authority, where the 
central government has limited and defined authority and the states have less restrained 
residual powers.30  This assumption is supported by Nice (1987), who demonstrates that 
policy actors focusing on states‘ rights or decentralized policy at one time in one policy 
area are found to advocate for national policy at another time in the same area.  
Alternatively, he finds those same actors vigorously opposing centralization in one policy 
will demand it in another (Nice 1987).  Nathan (2005) also states ―[w]here one stands [on 
federalism] depends on where one has power.  Although it might be easier and more 
efficient for a political faction to advance its goals centrally, when one‘s faction is out of 
power at the center, it is equally logical to advance them from the periphery‖ (1459).    
Other scholars‘ support for a federalism belief includes an experiment and 
partisan platform statements.  Specifically, Mikos and Kam conduct an experiment that 
Nicolson-Crotty (2008) uses to support preferences over federalism.  Mikos and Kam 
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 Future work should consider the influence of discretion on intergovernmental authority delegation—
including the variation in monitoring difficulty between the national executive branch and the states and the 
difference in the power that the states versus the national executive branch may have to reject the dictates 
of Congress.   
30
 Although I do not include federalism beliefs theoretically, I assess them empirically in Chapter 4. 
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demonstrated that subjects‘ a priori beliefs about federalism were activated when 
exposed to an argument about physician-assisted suicide and state-rights (2007). This 
activation may have been more about morality than federalism.  The federalism treatment 
in the experiment included mention of abortion as well as other medical procedures.  
Furthermore, legislators may have a different perception of federalism than citizens, 
given their occupational exposure to intergovernmental affairs.  In my health policy 
interviews, for example, one respondent said, ―We don‘t talk about whether a policy fits 
with beliefs about federalism‖ and another commented that experts—including the 
parliamentarians and constitutional scholars—helped to refine the language of the law to 
fit within the constraints of the Constitution.     
Finally, a review of party platforms over the last forty years reveals ambiguity in 
how states‘ rights, big government, and even grants-in-aid are discussed from a 
federalism perspective, leaving room and rhetoric upon which a legislator could build an 
argument about why delegation to the national executive branch (centralizing authority) 
is within their own party‘s principles.  For instance, in 1964 the language of the 
Republican party‘s platform read:  ―Within our Republic the Federal Government should 
act only in areas where it has Constitutional authority to act, and then only in respect to 
proven needs where individuals and local or state governments will not or cannot 
adequately perform‖ (Republican Platform 1964). Whereas the Democratic platform of 
the same year uses the following language:  ―The Democratic Party holds to the belief 
that government in the United States—local, state and federal—was created in order to 
serve the people. Each level of government has appropriate powers and each has specific 
responsibilities. The first responsibility of government at every level is to protect the 
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basic freedoms of the people. No government at any level can properly complain of 
violation of its power, if it fails to meet its responsibilities. The federal government exists 
not to grow larger, but to enlarge the individual potential and achievement of the people. 
The federal government exists not to subordinate the states, but to support them‖ 
(Democratic Platform 1964).
31
  No specific beliefs about federalism are clearly stated in 
either platform.  The 1964 Republican platform offers rhetoric both for why Congress 
could centralize authority (inadequate performance) and why Congress could choose to 
decentralize (constitutional constraints on action).  The 1964 Democratic platform 
similarly offers ambiguous support for legislators‘ positions on centralization or 
decentralization—failure to meet responsibilities versus appropriate powers of each level 
of government.      
In sum, party platforms and fundamental beliefs about federalism and the 
horizontal division of authority in the U.S. do not provide a solid foundation for choices 
about whether to delegate authority to the states, to the national executive branch, or to 
both through a joint partnership.  Instead, legislators can use rhetoric to support almost 
any delegation choice.  For these reasons, I stylize the motivation of Congress as that of 
re-election.  In the following sections, I build on these assumptions and consider the 
influence of preferences and, later, electoral uncertainty on intergovernmental delegation 
of authority choices in a formal decision theoretic model and a coalition bargaining 
model. 
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 More recent platforms indicate a continuation of the same rhetoric:  ―Republicans will uphold and defend 
our party's core principles: Constrain the federal government to its legitimate constitutional functions 
―(Republican Platform 2008). ―Given the economic crisis across the country, states, and territories today 
face serious difficulties…states have had to innovate and take matters into their own hands—and they have 
done an extraordinary job. Yet they should not have to do it alone…We will give these governmental 




Aggregate Model of Congress 
In the aggregate model of Congress, the players include a unitary Congress, 
represented by a pivotal legislator, L, the pivotal legislator‘s state, S, and the national 
executive branch, N.  Congress makes decisions about how much authority to delegate to 
the states, or α, versus delegate to the national executive branch, or 1-α.  Although the 
pivotal legislator in Congress makes a choice over α, he has preferences over policy 
outcomes, x.  Policy outcomes are the result of how much authority state and national 
actors have in a policy; specifically, , where S represents the ideal 
point of the pivotal legislator‘s state and N the ideal point of the national executive 
branch.          
I theorize when faced with the federal design dilemma, Congress ponders the 
potential outcomes that would result from delegation directly to the states, delegation 
directly to the national executive branch, and delegation simultaneously to both before 
making a decision about how to structure authority in the policy.  The best possible 
policy outcome for Congress is defined as the delegation choice that yields an outcome as 
close to a pivotal legislator‘s ideal point (or the pivotal legislator‘s most preferred 
outcome) as possible.   
The pivotal legislator‘s utility is a quadratic loss function,  , 
where L is the legislator‘s ideal point.
32
  Thus, a pivotal legislator prefers policy 
outcomes closer to his ideal point to those farther away.  As described above, the policy 
outcome is simply a weighted combination of the pivotal legislator‘s state‘s actions and 
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 In fact, I assume all legislators in Congress have this same utility function.  I consider how utility 
maximizing individual legislators in Congress coalesce in the next model. 
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the national executive branch‘s actions as they implement the policy.  The weight 
assigned to state-level actions, α, is the choice variable for the legislature.  When 
Congress decides to decentralize more authority to the states, α increases and when 
Congress chooses to centralize authority to the national executive branch, α decreases.  
Substituting the weighted combination of state and national executive branch actions for 
the policy outcome yields:   
    (Equation 1). 
This equation represents the utility the pivotal legislator derives from allocating authority 
between state- and national-level institutions.  Authority refers to how much of the policy 
for which the states are responsible as opposed to national-level institutions.  When a 
national law includes no state authority, or total centralization, the national executive 
branch implements the policy and α is zero.  When states have total authority in national 
law, α is one.  Table 2-1 shows the key variables and their descriptions.   
Table 2-1:  Aggregate-level Model Theoretic Variables and Descriptions 
Variable Name Symbol Description 
State-level authority α The amount of responsibility allocated to the 
states in national law 
National executive branch 
authority 
1-α The amount of responsibility allocated to the 
national executive branch in national law. 
Congress L The pivotal legislator, L, represents Congress 
National executive branch N National-level actors chosen to implement law. 
States S State-level actors chosen to implement law.  
Specifically, S refers to the pivotal legislator‘s 
state. 
Policy outcome x The outcome of the policy once it is implemented.  
Specifically, .  
 
Given this stylized set-up with a quadratic utility function, the pivotal legislator‘s 
optimal choice over the weight of state actions, α*, or optimal state authority allocation, 
can be found by taking the derivative of the utility function with respect to α and setting 
41 
 
the resulting equation equal to zero.  The optimal state authority allocation is shown in 
Equation 2: 
     (Equation 2).   
This result shows that the optimal level of state authority allocation depends on the 
combined location of the national executive branch and the legislator‘s state‘s ideal 
points in relation to his or her own ideal point.   
The second order conditions provide information about whether the optimal state 
authority allocation is a maximum or a minimum.  The second order conditions for a 
maximum are fulfilled when: <0 or when N≠S.  When N=S, the pivotal 
legislator would be indifferent over the degree of state authority allocation and the 
aggregate-level model has no unique solution.  The individual-level model returns to this 
indifference issue and finds that the indifferent legislators are not pivotal in a bargaining 
framework.   
Evaluating the legislator‘s utility at the boundaries of the choice variable, α=0 and 
α=1, yields:  and .  
Comparing this utility to that obtained from unsurprisingly reveals that when 
preferences are aligned with the pivotal legislator to the far left or the far right of the 
national executive branch and his state (and N≠S), the legislator‘s utility is highest if he 
delegates solely to the closest of the two agents.  When N=S, the legislator is indifferent 
to delegating to one, the other, or both of the agents.  I return to more specific predictions 
that can be generated from this result, but first highlight the implications of this model.   
Figure 2-1 illustrates the implications of this simple model using party label as a 





  The line represents the continuum of state authority 
allocation with exclusive delegation to the national executive branch shown at the left 
(α=0) and total decentralization to the states (α=1) on the right.  Individual legislators are 
depicted by their party (R or D) and by their state governor‘s party (R or D).
34
  For 
example, legislator RD is a Republican legislator from a state with a Democratic 
governor.  Under a Republican president, these Republican legislators from states with 
Democratic governors prefer complete delegation to the national executive branch.
35
  
Democratic legislators from states with Democratic governors (DD), in contrast, prefer to 
devolve authority to the states.
36
  Republican and Democratic legislators from states with 
Republican governors (RR and DR) are indifferent over state authority allocation because 
the national and state-level executive branches have approximately the same ideal points 
(N=S).  Alternatively, if a Democrat were in the White House, DR prefers centralization, 
RR decentralization, and DD and RD are indifferent.   
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I describe the benefits and limitations of this proxy in detail in Chapter 3. 
34
 I simplify the description by discussing state level leaders as ―governors.‖  It would also be possible to 
consider state level leaders as a combination of the state governor and the legislature, the state governor 
and other elected executive branch leadership, etc.   
35
 More formally if N = +1, L = +1, and S = -1:  .0
)1(1
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President = R 
43 
 
 Table 2.2 provides detail about the frequency with which the partisanship of 
members of Congress does not match that of their governors, or how often we see RD 
and DR legislators.  I obtained the partisanship and state of individual legislators from 
Congress from Voteview.com and matched these to the partisanship of their states‘ 
governors from the National Governors Association website for 1973 through 2010.  On 
average, the mismatch rate is 48% in both the Senate and the House, ranging from a high 
of 57% in the Senate (2003) and 53% in the House (1997-2000 and 2004) to a low of 
39% (2009) and 35% (1977-78) in the Senate and House respectively.   
Table 2-2:  Match Between Party of Legislator and of State 














  Senate House 
1973 53 47 47% 224 210 48% 
1976 50 50 50% 256 178 41% 
1977 56 44 44% 284 150 35% 
1978 56 44 44% 282 152 35% 
1983 54 46 46% 232 202 47% 
1984 57 43 43% 236 198 46% 
1985 53 47 47% 227 207 48% 
1990 57 42 42% 228 205 47% 
1995 54 46 46% 207 227 52% 
1996 50 50 50% 208 226 52% 
1997 47 53 53% 202 232 53% 
1998 47 53 53% 202 232 53% 
1999 48 52 52% 206 228 53% 
2000 46 54 54% 206 228 53% 
2001 52 48 48% 214 220 51% 
2002 52 48 48% 211 223 51% 
2003 43 57 57% 215 219 50% 
2004 47 53 53% 204 230 53% 
2005 49 51 51% 209 225 52% 
2006 49 51 51% 209 225 52% 
2007 57 43 43% 234 201 46% 
2008 54 46 46% 219 215 50% 
2009 61 39 39% 234 200 46% 
2010 57 43 43% 230 203 47% 
Total 1,977 1,821 3,798 8,557 7,934 16,491 
  52.05% 47.95%   51.89% 48.11%   
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What do this highly stylized model and simple diagram reveal about 
intergovernmental delegation of authority?  First, as mentioned in the introductory 
remarks, in contrast to conventional wisdom, Republicans do not always prefer to 
decentralize authority and Democrats do not always want to centralize. Figure 2-1 
illustrates this by showing a condition under which Republican legislators prefer 
centralization (a Republican president with a Democratic state).  Republican legislators 
from states with Democratic governors strictly prefer centralization of authority over 
devolution to the states and if these legislators have enough votes to pass a policy, 
delegation to the national executive branch would result.   
Second, the model shows the optimal level of state authority changes as the 
distance between the legislator and his or her state increases or as the distance between 
the legislator and the national executive branch increases.  In general, as the distance 
between the legislator and his state increases (or as S moves holding N and L constant), 
the expression is decreasing, or state authority allocation is expected to decrease.  As the 
distance between the legislator and the national executive branch increases (or as N 
moves holding N and L constant), the expression is increasing, or state authority 
allocation is expected to increase.
 
 
Formally, I take the derivative of the expression in Equation 2 with respect to the 
state, S, and then with respect to the national executive branch, N, yielding: 
      (Equation 3),   
 




 and       (Equation 5).   
This calculation captures how the optimal level of state authority allocation changes as 
the preferences of the national executive branch, the pivotal legislator, and the pivotal 
legislator‘s state vary.   
Evaluating the expression leads to the following conclusion: when the distance 
between the pivotal legislator and his state is increases by one unit, but is still smaller 
than the distance between the pivotal legislator and the national executive branch, 
regardless of how the ideal points are arrayed, state authority allocation is increasing 
(α*↑), unless the state is located between the legislator and national executive branch, 
where state authority allocation would remain at 1.  If that same distance increases by one 
unit and becomes larger than the distance between the pivotal legislator and the national 
executive branch, state authority allocation is decreasing (α* ).  Intuitively, as long as 
the state stays closer to the pivotal legislator, state authority allocation increases for the 
most part, otherwise it decreases.   
If, however, as the distance between the state and the legislator and the legislator 
and the national executive branch move such that they become equal, the conclusions are 
slightly more complicated.  If the movement is from a closer state (than national 
executive branch) to an equidistant state, state authority allocation decreases (α* ).  On 
the other hand, if the movement is from a farther state to an equidistant state, state 
authority allocation increases (α*↑).  Finally, if the movement is from one configuration 
where they state and national executive branch are equally distant from the pivotal 
legislator to another equidistant configuration (e.g., they switch sides), this model 
provides no solution.   
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      If I assume a pivotal legislator represents the decisions of Congress, these 
comparative statics yield the first two testable hypotheses:   
 Hypothesis 1:  As the distance between the pivotal legislator and his state 
increases, state authority allocation decreases except when the distance 
between that legislator and the national executive branch is greater. 
 
 Hypothesis 2:  As the distance between the pivotal legislator and the 
national executive branch increases, state authority allocation increases 
except when the distance between that legislator and his state is greater.   
 
The aggregate model allows for a focus on intergovernmental delegation by 
incorporating the states into a principal agent decision theoretic model of Congress and 
offers a set of testable hypotheses.  Yet, the question remains, who is pivotal?  The figure 
and the model reveal that there are four types of legislators in Congress with distinct 
preferences over state authority allocation.  I refer to these four categories of legislators 
as intergovernmental teams.  In a legislature in which one of these four 
intergovernmental teams has the majority, the choice over state authority allocation 
would be that team‘s α
*
, as that team is pivotal.  But, in a legislature in which one team 
does not have the majority, what is the choice?  Returning to Figure 2-1, if RD must 
partner with another intergovernmental team to successfully pass a bill (i.e. forms a 
majority coalition), there are three choices:  RR, DR, and DD.  A bargain must be struck 
with at least one, if not more of the other intergovernmental teams to pass a bill.  
Therefore, I rely on a bargaining game with complete information and utility 
maximization as before to structure a consideration of how these four teams would 








In this individual-level model of legislative coalition formation between the four 
intergovernmental teams, I rely on the same variables used in the aggregate model, with a 
few notable additions as listed in Table 2-3.  Specifically, the individual-level model 
includes the previous variables plus a status quo level of state authority allocation, q, a 
partisan benefit term, P, a transaction cost of making proposals, kn, a frequency of each 
intergovernmental team in a chamber, wi, and a majoritarian threshold for a chamber, M, 
or the number of legislators needed to successfully pass a policy.  In addition, I utilize 
party A to represent the majority party and party B for the minority party.       
There are also four additional assumptions needed.  First, given the power and 
committee leadership positions of the majority party, I assume majority teams have 
agenda control and the initial proposal power, but that minority teams are free to reject 
initial offers and respond with an alternative offer.  This is a one-period bargaining game, 
but teams that receive the initial offer have the opportunity to make an alternative offer to 
any of the other teams.  Instead of an ultimatum game, though, this structure represents 
both the agenda power of the majority party and the potential for political maneuvering of 
the other members of Congress.  Second, I assume voting in the House can be stylized as 
a simple majority, but the Senate must be concerned about the ability to invoke cloture 
(reach 60 votes) given the possibility of a filibuster, represented by M, the majority 
threshold, in the game.  This assumption is not to say that filibusters must always occur in 
the Senate, just that the threat of them carries weight in the coalition formation process.  
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 This coalition model is loosely based on Lupia and Strom‘s model of coalition bargaining and 
termination (1995).  The Lupia Strom model begins with an exogenous event and includes complete 
information regarding setting up a coalition government with different partners.  I substitute the quadratic 
utility function typical of U.S. delegation models and include linear transaction costs and partisan benefit.     
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Third, I assume there is a transaction cost to offering a proposal, ki, and that this cost 
increases in the number of groups in the coalition (ki2 < ki3 < ki4 ).  This increasing cost 
assumption is based on the idea that as diverse members are added to a coalition, it is 
more difficult to maintain the coalition as well as to attract the members in the first place. 
Table 2-3:  Individual-level Theoretic Variables and Descriptions 
Variable Name Symbol Description 
National executive branch 
authority 
1-α The amount of responsibility allocated to the national executive 
branch in national law. 
Congress L The pivotal legislator, L, represents Congress 
National executive branch N National-level actors chosen to implement law. 
States S State-level actors chosen to implement law.  Specifically, S refers to 
the pivotal legislator‘s state. 
Policy outcome x The outcome of the policy once it is implemented.  Specifically, 
.  
State authority α The amount of responsibility allocated to the states in 
national law.  Variants include:  α* (optimal authority 
allocation), αproposed (initial proposal in the legislature), 
and α‘ (alternative proposal in the legislature). 
Status quo policy q The status quo policy, or status quo level of state 
authority allocation.  State authority allocation in the 
status quo policy = αq. 
Partisan benefit Pi The benefit, or added utility, to be gained from making a 
new policy with the other intergovernmental team of the 
same party (e.g., DD & DR or RR & RD).  The partisan 
benefit is subscripted by the party (A or B).   
Transaction cost  kn The cost of offering a proposal that includes n total 
teams. 
Frequency of 
intergovernmental team i. 
wi The number of members of intergovernmental team i, 
where i = team AA, AB, BB, or BA. The total weight of a 
policy coalition = ∑wn. 
Intergovernmental teams AA, AB, 
BB, BA. 
Majority party is party A and minority party is party B. 
Majoritarian threshold M The number of legislators needed to successfully pass 
policy, with a simple majority, M >0.5.   
New policy p° The new policy that results from a successful policy 
coalition that includes ° specific teams. 
 
The fourth assumption is that legislators are members of parties and seek to 
improve the fortunes of their own parties.  The motivation behind a partisan bias is that a 
strong party label could aid in re-election and provide direct member benefits while in 
office, among other things.  The implication of this assumption is that if legislators are 
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faced with a choice over partnering with other legislators from their own party versus 
coalescing with another party, they would choose to partner with their own party.  I 
conceptualize this as an added benefit rather than a decision rule in the individual-level 
model to provide an understanding of the importance of balancing a partisan benefit with 
the benefit of reforming existing policies.  Formally, this is captured with a policy benefit 
term (P).  In other words, this assumption does not mean that legislators simply vote with 
their party.  It means that there are potential benefits to be gained from party 
membership, such as leadership roles, committee assignments, ability to influence a 
party‘s agenda, and so forth.            
In the game there are four unitary actors representing each of the four 
intergovernmental teams.  In order to generalize the game, I use A and B to represent the 
majority and minority party, respectively, in the legislature.  Thus, if Democrats have the 
majority in the Senate, a DD senator will be represented as an AA in the model and a DR 
Senator as an AB.  Similarly, if Republicans have a majority in the Senate, an RR senator 
would also be represented as an AA in the model and an RD legislator as an AB.  This 
generalization works because the model is symmetric with respect to Democrats and 
Republicans and I consider the House and the Senate separately.  I transition back to 
Republicans and Democrats when I discuss the implications of this model. 
Figure 2-2 (with insets 2-2a through 2-2c) displays the extensive form of the 
bargaining game in each chamber where the teams are assumed to bargain over the 
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The unitary actors (more specifically, the intergovernmental teams) make an offer 
to one or more of the other actors (where wi + wj + wk +… ≥ M and w is the frequency of 
the intergovernmental team for that time period).  The other team(s) can accept or reject 
the offer. If a team j accepts the offer from team i, and wi + wj  ≥ M, the new policy is 
passed, the new allocation of authority is implemented, outcomes and payoffs are 
realized.  If the team rejects the offer, that team has the option of making an offer to any 
of the other team(s) or making no offer in favor of the status quo.  If more than one team 
receives an offer, the offer is only successful and outcomes and payoffs realized if wi + 
wj + wk + … ≥ M and all of the teams receiving the offer accept.  If any one team rejects 
the multiple-team offer, all of the teams receiving the offer have the option of making 
offers to any one or more of the teams.  If no teams form a policy coalition, the status 
quo, q, prevails.  If any one team forms the majority requirement on their own, they can 
allocate authority according to their preferences, such as in the House in 1977-1978 when 
DD members occupied 230 seats.   
The game begins with some critical event.  Perhaps a new administration takes its 
place in the White House, a federal agency‘s missteps are widely publicized, the states 
find themselves facing economic disaster, or some other exogenous push creates an 
atmosphere of policy possibility in Congress.  The majority party intergovernmental 
teams (AA or AB) consider whether to offer a new division of authority between the 
national executive branch and the states through a change in α from the status quo level.  
Either team AA or team AB makes an offer first.  This first mover team (or team 1 in the 
extensive form) also contemplates to whom it will offer this division:  to team 2 (the 
other majority party intergovernmental team), team BB, team BA, or some combination 
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of the three.  Since this is a complete information game, team 1 knows how each team (or 
set of teams) will react to the proposal and makes a decision based on this knowledge.  
To solve the game I use backward induction beginning at the final nodes and working my 
way up through the game tree.  The mathematical details are provided in the Appendix.   
 The solution to the bargaining game implies that when a chamber‘s majority party 
is the same as the national executive branch and a simple majority is required to 
successfully pass a bill, a policy coalition will include the two majority 
intergovernmental teams.  This result is due to the fact that in the finite model, there is 
complete knowledge and the majority party teams receive a partisan benefit from 
coalescing with each other (see Proposition 4, Appendix).  The majority party 
intergovernmental team will make an offer to the other majority team such that the 
recipient will accept and play ends.  If the first mover did not make an acceptable offer to 
the other majority party team, the transaction costs would make it not in their interest to 
offer anything at all and the status quo would prevail.  Thus, the degree of state authority 
included in the policy will be crafted to satisfy the mismatched majority party 
intergovernmental team (team AB) under an A president and the matched team (team 
AA) under a B president.   
Consider that under an A president, the AA team is indifferent, but must craft a 
proposal to gain AB‘s approval (if AA is the first mover).  If AB is the proposer, though, 
that team knows that AA will accept any offer they make.  Since AB has strict 
preferences over state authority allocation under an A president (α* for team AB is 0, or 
centralization), AB can offer its most preferred allocation of state authority.  Under a B 
president, alternatively, team AB is indifferent and team AA strictly prefers to 
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decentralize authority to the states.  Thus, regardless of which of these majority teams is 
the first mover, a proposal is only made that will satisfy AA‘s preference over state 
delegation, otherwise the proposal is rejected and the first mover is out the costs of 
making a proposal in the first place.  In sum, the policy will centralize authority to a 
greater extent than the current degree of state responsibility in the policy in the first case 
and decentralize it in the second.   
For example, when a Republican is the president and there is a Republican 
majority in the House, a successful House bill would centralize authority with the 
Republican national executive branch.  The same is true when there is a Democrat in the 
White House and a Democratic majority in the House.  Alternatively, if a Democrat were 
president with a Republican House majority, the bill would decentralize authority to the 
states.  If a Republican were president with a Democratic House majority, the bill would 
also decentralize authority.  In these last two cases, the majority party must cater to the 
AA intergovernmental team within the coalition (RR for the Republican House majority 
and DD for the Democratic House majority).  Under the conditions cited, these AA 
legislators strictly prefer to decentralize authority to their states rather than centralize 
authority under the opposing party‘s leadership in the national executive branch.   
 Given the supermajority requirements in the Senate, the solution to this model 
suggests that successful policy coalitions look slightly different than in the House.  
Specifically, when the Senate majority and the president are of the same party, the policy 
coalition will include both majority intergovernmental teams (teams AA and AB in the 
model) as well as the matched minority intergovernmental team (team BB) (see 
Proposition 5 in the Appendix).  When the Senate majority and the President are from 
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opposing parties, the policy coalition will include teams AA, AB and team BA (see 
Proposition 6 in the Appendix).  For instance, under a Republican president and 
Republican majority in the Senate, a successful policy coalition will include Republican 
senators from states with Republican governors (RR), Republican senators from states 
with Democratic governors (RD), and Democratic senators from states with Democratic 
governors (DD).  Under a Republican president and Democratic majority, though, this 
policy coalition will include RR, RD, and DR Senators. 
 These last two results, focusing on the Senate are presented in Table 2-5.  The 
first row shows when the two majority party intergovernmental teams have enough 
legislators to reach the supermajority threshold, the coalitions have the same composition 
as in the House.  Under an A president, the coalition includes both majority party 
intergovernmental teams and the Senate bill centralizes authority (α→0).  Under a B 
president, the coalition includes the same two teams, but the Senate bill decentralizes 
authority (α→0).  If, however, the majority party does not have enough members to 
successfully invoke cloture (i.e. 60 votes), then the coalition under an A president will 
also include the BB minority intergovernmental team and the state authority allocation 
will decentralize authority just enough to entice some BB legislators to vote to invoke 
cloture without losing AB legislators.  Under a B president, the Senate coalition will 
include the BA minority intergovernmental team and authority will be centralized just 






Table 2-4: Individual-level Bargaining Model Senate Coalitions 
Party of President A B 
Senate Majority Party A A 
Coalition when AA+AB≥M AA+AB AA+AB 
Output α→0 α→1 
Coalition when AA+AB<M AB+AA+BB AA+AB+BA 
Output α→1* α→0* 
*Refer to Proposition 5 and 6 in the appendix for the specific threshold conditions for state authority allocation, also 
see ft 24. 
 
 In sum, the pivotal teams in the House and the Senate depend upon what party is 
in the majority, how many members are needed to form a successful policy coalition, and 
the party of the president.  Based on the model, the pivotal team in the House is the 
mismatched majority party team AB under an A president and the matched majority party 
team AA under a B president.  In the Senate, the pivotal team is the matched minority 
party team BB under an A president and the mismatched minority party team BA under a 
B president.  The pivotal teams from the 93
rd
 through the 110
th
 Congresses are listed in 
Table 2-4. 
In addition to providing information about the pivotal teams, this model provides 
insights about the struggles the Senate majority party faces as they consider the need for 
supermajorities to overcome one Senator‘s filibuster.  For example, consider the 
implications of unified government for intergovernmental delegation.  In the House, the 
AA and AB teams prefer to centralize authority with a national executive branch under an 
A president.  Although this centralization may also be the first choice of the majority 
party teams in the Senate, a successful Senate bill must balance the BB team‘s preference 
for decentralization.  In other words, legislators must find the line between the benefits 
gained from successfully making policy with movement in α.
38
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 Formally,  
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Table 2-5:  Pivotal Intergovernmental Teams 
Congress President Senate House 
93 R RD DD 
94 R DD DD 
95 D DR DD 
96 D RR DR 
97 R DD DD 
98 R DD DD 
99 R DD DD 
100 R RD DD 
101 R RD DD 
102 R RD DD 
103 D RR DR 
104 D DR RR 
105 D DR RR 
106 D DR RR 
107 R RD RD 
108 R DD RD 
109 R DD RD 
110 R RR DD 
111 D RR* DR 
*In the 95th Congress, Senate Democrats had > 60 votes.  
**In the 111th Congress Democrats had 60 votes for 3 months, during 
which DR legislators were pivotal. 
  
Another implication of the model includes the conditions under which the Senate 
and the House differ in the degree of authority allocated to the states.  In fact, the model 
predicts that Senate bills and House bills will have a more similar allocation of authority 
under a divided legislature than a unified one. Table 2-5 presents the results for the 
bargaining model of the House and Senate together.  In the top half of the table, with a 
unified legislature and an A president, the Senate bill will decentralize authority and the 
House bill will centralize it and under a B president, the Senate bill will centralize 
authority and the House bill decentralize it.  On the contrary, when there is a divided 
legislature and a president with the same party label as the Senate majority, both 
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chamber‘s bills will decentralize authority versus a president with the same party label as 
the House majority, both chamber‘s bills will centralize authority.   
Table 2-6 Individual-level Bargaining Model House-Senate 
Differences 
Unified Legislature Senate Majority = A House Majority = A 
President = A AA+AB+BB AA+AB 
Output decentralize* centralize 
President = B AA+AB+BA AA+AB 
Output centralize* decentralize 
Divided Legislature Senate Majority = A House Majority = B 
President = A AA+AB+BB BB + BA 
Output decentralize* decentralize 
President = B AA+AB+BA BB + BA 
Output centralize* centralize 
*Refer to Proposition 5 and 6 in the appendix for the specific threshold conditions for state 
authority allocation, also see ft 24. 
 
For instance, under a Republican president, a Democratic Senate, and a 
Republican House, the Senate will choose to centralize authority due to the pivotal RD 
team, the House will also choose to centralize authority due to the simple majority 
requirements.  Alternatively, if the House is Democratic, the House bill would 
decentralize authority to the states.  Since this model does not expressly consider 
bicameralism, though, these findings should be taken as suggestive only.  A model that 
explicitly includes bicameralism will better define the conditions under which the 
chambers may agree or disagree on state authority allocation, as well as how potential 
disagreements are resolved.   
In summary, the aggregate and individual models provide propositions about state 
authority allocation and policy coalitions that would be formed in the House and Senate 
under a variety of conditions.  The next section informally considers one additional 
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attribute of intergovernmental policymaking, uncertainty about the ideal points of future 
implementers of a policy.     
Political Uncertainty 
 The formal models discussed to this point have implicitly assumed that policies 
are implemented under the same political conditions in which they are enacted.  Policy 
implementation, though, may occur years in the future.  As a result, the current 
preferences of the agents may not be the only concern legislators have as they consider 
the downstream outcomes of their upstream policy decisions.  More specifically, there is 
a risk of national- or state-level executive replacement.  This replacement could result in 
a new administration in charge of implementing the policy with different preferences.  
For instance, when legislators pass a law under a Republican president as he is leaving 
office, they know implementation may be different under the incoming Democratic 
president.  The same is true at the state-level; changes in state governors will result in 
changes in implementation.
39
  Uncertainty, then, refers to the chance of executive 
replacement with a different party. 
The influence of this political uncertainty depends on the relationship between the 
legislator‘s partisanship and the party of the executive. If a legislator shares partisanship 
with his state‘s governor, the influence of political uncertainty on state authority 
allocation is negative.  For instance, a Democratic legislator from a state with a 
Democratic governor will choose to delegate less responsibility to the state as uncertainty 
over the next executive‘s partisanship increases.  On the other hand, if a legislator‘s party 
                                                 
39
 I assume for simplicity that governors represent the ideal point of state agencies.  Some governors, of 
course, have more authority than others.  In some states governors have the power to reorganize their 
executive branches, spend federal money without legislative consent, etc. (National Association of Budget 
Officers annual fiscal surveys and the Book of the States).  In future work, scholars should include indices 
of governor versus state legislative power.     
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label does not match that of his state governor‘s party, the influence of political 
uncertainty on state authority allocation is positive.  A Republican legislator from a state 
with a Democratic governor may choose to delegate more responsibility to the states if 
there is a high degree of political uncertainty over whether a Democratic will still be 
governor during implementation.   
The logic is the same for national political uncertainty.  For legislators in the same 
party as the president, as political uncertainty over what party will hold the presidency 
during implementation increases, those legislators will prefer to delegate away from the 
national executive branch (or increase state authority allocation).  For legislators in the 
opposing party, the effect of national political uncertainty is to reduce the state authority 
allocation in favor of national executive branch implementation.  Overall, as a legislator 
becomes less certain that his party will be in power or more certain that the opposing 
party will be in power, he decreases delegation of authority to that particular level.    
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
This discussion over current and future preferences of legislators, the national 
executive branch, and the states yields a set of testable predictions.  In general, the 
distance from the pivotal legislator in Congress to her pivotal state governor, the distance 
between the pivotal legislator and the national executive branch, and state and national 
political uncertainty—influence the level of state authority allocation in national law.  
The specific hypotheses from the aggregate model are: 
 Hypothesis 1:  As the distance between the pivotal legislator and his state 
increases, state authority allocation decreases except when the distance 




 Hypothesis 2:  As the distance between the pivotal legislator and the 
national executive branch increases, state authority allocation increases 
except when the distance between that legislator and his state is greater.   
 
Adding the informal influence of political uncertainty on state delegation choices: 
 Hypothesis 3:  As state political uncertainty increases, state authority 
allocation decreases for legislators that match their governor‘s party and 
increase for legislators that do not match their governor‘s party. 
 
 Hypothesis 4:  As national political uncertainty increases, state authority 
allocation increases for legislators that match the president‘s party and 
decreases for legislators that do not match the president‘s party.   
 
From the bargaining model, a different set of hypotheses are indicated, including: 
 Hypothesis 5: Under a Republican president, Republican legislators from 
states with Democratic governors (RD legislators) prefer to centralize 
authority to a national Republican-led executive branch.   
 
 Hypothesis 6:  Republican legislators from states with Republican 
governors (RR legislators) prefer to decentralize policy under a 
Democratic president.   
 
 Hypothesis 7: Democratic legislators from states with Democratic 
governors (DD legislators) prefer to decentralize authority to the states 
under a Republican president. 
 
 Hypothesis 8:  Democratic legislators from states with Republican 
governors (DR legislators) prefer to centralize authority to the states under 
a Democratic president. 
 
 Hypothesis 9:  When the Senate majority party is of the same party as the 
president, a successful policy coalition will include the two majority party 
intergovernmental teams and the matched minority party 
intergovernmental team (i.e., team BB). 
 
 Hypothesis 10:  When the Senate majority party is different than that of 
the president, a successful policy coalition will include the two majority 
party intergovernmental teams and the mismatched minority party 
intergovernmental team (i.e., team BA).    
 
To conclude, the theory of intergovernmental delegation specifically takes into 
account the role of preferences over policy outcomes and the location of individual 
64 
 
legislators‘ preferences vis a vis the national executive branch and their own specific 
state executive branch, the institutional voting rules of the House and the Senate, and 
uncertainty over the preferences of future implementers of the policy in the determination 
of how much authority is delegated to the states versus kept at the national level.  Two 
simple models, one at the aggregate level and the second at the individual level, 
combined with an informal consideration of political uncertainty structure these 
considerations and result in both intuitive and counter-intuitive predictions about which 
legislative teams coalesce with each other and when Congress centralizes versus 
decentralizes authority under different conditions.   
The findings contrary to accepted wisdom are that Republicans prefer to 
centralize and Democrats prefer to decentralize under a Republican president.  
Additionally, successful policy coalitions in the Senate will include different types of 
minority legislators depending upon the party of the president.  For instance, under a 
Democratic president and Democratic Senate majority, the policy coalition will include 
RR legislators, but under a Republican president the coalition will include RD legislators.  
The next chapter provides a descriptive of the data gathered to assess this theory of 





Aggregate Congress Model 
Actors 
There are three unitary actors:  a pivotal member in Congress (L), that pivotal member‘s 
State (S), and a National Executive Branch (N).  There is common knowledge of the 
game, actor preferences, etc.   
 
Preferences 
Actors are utility maximizers and have single-peaked preferences, each with an ideal 
point in one-dimensional policy space and quadratic preferences over outcomes:  
 where i = L, S, or N for legislator, state, and national executive 
branch, respectively and . 
 
Play 
I assume that Congress delegates to both the states and the national executive branch and 
gives these agents complete discretion, meaning that agents implement their ideal point.  
The total degree of authority in a law is equal to 1, the amount of that authority delegated 
to the states is equal to α, and that to the national executive branch is 1-α.  Congress 
makes choices over policy authority but has preferences over outcomes.  Outcomes are a 
convex combination of state and national executive branch choices such that 
  Substituting this equation into the utility function for the pivotal legislator 
yields Equation 1:  .     
 
Proposition 1: 
Given the quadratic utility function of the pivotal legislator and the fact that α is bounded 
by 0 and 1, the optimal choice of α is found by taking the derivative of Equation 1: 
   and then setting this equation equal to zero.  
Solving for α yields the optimal level of authority for Congress to allocate to the state, or 
 (Equation 2) and , indicating a maximum.   
 
The second order conditions are fulfilled when: <0 or when N≠S. 
Evaluating the legislator‘s utility at α=0 and α=1 yields:  
and .  Comparing this utility to that obtained from   
shows that the best choice of the pivotal legislator is to delegate to the closest agent 
unless he is located between the agents, then the best choice is to delegate to both.  In 
other words,  when |L-N|>|L-S| and  when |L-N|<|L-S| as long as L is 
located outside of the N-S interval.   
 
Proposition 2:  L-S Distance: 
As the distance between the pivotal legislator and his state increases, the optimal level of 
state authority, α* decreases except when the state’s ideal point is internal to the 
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legislator and the national executive branch (L<S<N or N<S<L), as is found by taking 
the derivative of α* with respect to S and to N (Equation 5):   .   
 
Proposition 3:  L-N Distance: 
Also based on Equation 5, as the distance between the pivotal legislator and the national 
executive branch increases, the optimal level of state authority, α* decreases except when 
N is internal to the legislator and his state (L<N<S or S<N<L). 
 
Individual Level Bargaining Game 
Actors 
There are four unitary intergovernmental teams:  AA, AB, BB, and BA, where team A 
represents the majority team in a chamber and B the minority team.  The first letter 
represents the party of the legislator and the second the party of that legislator‘s state 
governor.  In addition, as above in the Congress game, States (Si) and the National 
Executive Branch (N) implement policies.  There is common knowledge of the game, 
actor preferences, etc.   
 
Preferences 
Actors are utility maximizers and have single-peaked preferences, each with an ideal 
point in one-dimensional policy space and quadratic preferences over outcomes:  
 where i = AA, AB, BB, or BA for the legislator and 
.  P represents partisan benefits which are positive if the other partisan 
intergovernmental team (e.g., if both BB and BA are in the coalition) is present in the 
coalition and zero if not.  The transaction costs of formulating policy and making an offer 
to other teams is represented by k, which is subscripted by the particular team making the 
offer and the number of teams in the coalition.  Transaction costs are assumed to be zero 
for the recipients of the offer.  In addition, the costs of crafting policy and maintaining a 
coalition increase as the number of partners increases, such that: .    
 
Play 
An exogenous critical event begins the game and one of the majority party 
intergovernmental teams considers making an offer to team 2 (the other majority 
intergovernmental party team), team BB, team BA, or some combination of the teams.  
The recipients of the initial offer decide whether to accept 1‘s offer or reject it for either 
the status quo or to make an alternative offer to any of the other teams.  An offer, though, 
is only made to a team or combination of teams, where .  The 
recipients of the second offer, or alternative plan, decide whether to accept the alternative 
or reject it for the status quo.       
 
Solution 
The solution to this 4-person bargaining game is found via backwards induction using the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept, beginning with the final nodes in the 
extensive form.  There are four separate conditions to assess:  an A president with team 
AA offering first, an A president  with team AB offering first, a B president with team 
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AA making the first offer, and a B president with team AB as the initiator.  For example, 
under an A president with AA making the first move and at the lowest tier in the game 
tree, team AA considers AB, BB, and BA‘s singleton proposals separately by evaluating 
the value of each offer compared with that of the status quo in the following way: if  
(or the value of the alternative to AA versus the value of the status 
quo, q, to AA), AA accepts the offer, otherwise AA rejects it for the status quo.   
 
The value of each option is:  
.  Since AA is the recipient of the offer, the costs are zero and the policy term 
is only positive for alternatives that also involve the AB team.  In addition, the terms for 
the state, legislator, and national executive branch can be substituted and the value can be 
rewritten as:   .  In other words, for team 
AA, the benefit of making policy under an A president is the benefit gained from making 
policy with other members of the A party.  Under a B president, though, these values 
look considerably different:  .  Rearranging 
yields: .  Under a B president, team AA is 
now concerned not just with the party benefit, but also with the distance between the 
team and the national executive branch and how much authority is given to that level (1-
α).   
    
Proposition 4:  A policy coalition will include only the majority party intergovernmental 
teams (AA and AB) when , such as in the House, and the new α is 
contingent on team AB’s preference for centralization under an A president 
( ) and AA’s preference for decentralization under a B 
president ( .  
 This result is due to the complete knowledge and finite nature of the game, in addition to 
the partisan benefits assumption and that the initial proposer (either AA or AB) will offer 
the other majority party intergovernmental team a change in α such that the recipient 
accepts the offer and play ends at round one.  The result does not depend on which 
majority party intergovernmental team is the first mover.     
 
Proposition 5:  A policy coalition will include the majority party intergovernmental 
teams (AA and AB) and the minority intergovernmental party team BB under an A 
president.   
When , the majority party intergovernmental teams are faced with a 
dilemma:  accept the status quo or include a minority party intergovernmental team in the 
policy coalition in order to overcome the threat of a filibuster by any one legislator.  Yet, 
under an A president, the AB team and the BB team disagree on α*:  team AB prefers to 
centralize ( ) and team BB to decentralize ( ).  To build a successful 
policy coalition, the majority party teams must balance movement in status quo with the 
costs and benefits of making a new policy.  Team AB will only accept (or propose) a 
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change in the degree of state authority if  and team BB will 
only accept a change where  and is either the 
status quo or another offer made by the recipient (either AA, AB, or BB).     
 
Proposition 6:  A policy coalition will include the majority party intergovernmental 
teams (AA and AB) and the minority intergovernmental party team BA when 
 and there is a B president.   
In this case, teams BA and AA have opposing preferences (for centralization and 
decentralization, respectively) and the following condition results:  
. 
 
Propositions 5 and 6 rely on the subgame perfect equilibrium solution concept and the 
assumption that a team rejects an offer for the status quo if it is indifferent.  Specifically, 
at the lowest tier in the game tree, teams 1 (the first mover majority team) and BB both 
accept team 2‘s offer of α under certain circumstances.  For the majority party team AB, 
 and for BB if , BB accepts.  Team BA, though, 
will only accept an offer that includes team BB, since BA is indifferent over α and will 
only accept if the value of a policy change also includes partisan benefits.
40
  Similarly, at 
the other nodes along this lowest tier, team AA accepts any offer of , 
team AB only accepts offers that include team AA, and team BA only accepts offers that 
include team BB.  The choices are made because of the following values (focusing on 
one condition as an example, the other conditions can be found by substituting the new 
values of the legislator, state, and presidential ideal points and using α‘ to generalize the 
various alternative proposed across the extensive form): 
 
Under an A president with team AA as the first mover, for the bottom tier of the 
extensive form: 
 
Team AA:  V(α‘) versus V(q) 
.  The parenthetical indicates that partisan benefits only occur when the policy 
coalition includes team AB as well.  Reducing this equation yields 0>0 when the policy 
coalition does not include team AB and AA or , when it does.  In other words, 
since the partisan benefit term is positive by definition, team AA only accepts an offer 
that also includes team AB. 
 
                                                 
40
 Alternatively, if I assume policy change wins at indifference, two things change:  1) team BA is in the 
final policy coalition under an A president and team B under a B president and the policy change in both 
instances is only constrained by the majority party intergovernmental teams.  This assumption seems less 
realistic than to assume a team rejects at indifference, given both the conventional wisdom regarding the 
stability of the status quo and the influence of the minority party in the Senate.  In the aggregate empirical 
analysis chapter I provide the results relying on this alternative choice for indifference, which do not alter 
the conclusions I draw. 
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Team AB:  V(α‘) versus V(q) = 
.  Rearranging and reducing this equation yields:    , or that 
team AB will accept an alternative proposal iff  if team AA is involved, or 
iff , if not.   
 
Team BA:  V(α‘) versus V(q) = 
.  Reducing this equation yields   1<1 (when team BB is not included in the coalition) 
and  when team BB is included in the policy coalition.  Thus, team BA rejects all 
offers unless team BB is included.  As long as there is a positive partisan benefit, team 
BA accepts all offers that also include team BB.   
    
Team BB:  V(α‘) versus V(q) = 
.  Rearranging and reducing (relying on the fact that ) this equation yields the 
following conclusion:  as long as , BB accepts any offer that does  not include 
team BA, if not, BB rejects in favor of the status quo.  If team BA is also included, BB 
accepts any offer such that   . 
 
In the middle tier of the game tree, recipients of the initial proposal decide whether to 
accept team 1‘s offer, to reject it for the status quo, or to reject 1‘s offer and make an 
alternative offer given the known choices that will be made at the lowest tier.  As an 
example, team 2 must consider whether to accept team 1‘s proposal versus reject it to 
make an alternative offer to any one or more of the teams (including back to team 1), or 
even reject team 1‘s proposal and make no alternative offer in favor of the status quo.  
Continuing the example from above (with an A president and team AA as the first mover, 
which means team AB is team 2), team AB considers  
.   
 
These values can be read in the following manner:  the value to team AB of the proposal 
from AA to AB alone ( , the value to team AB of the proposal from AB to AA 
alone ( , and the value to team AB of the proposal from AB to teams AA, BA, and 
BB ( ).   
The value of each option to AB is: .  In other 
words, the value of the options depends on the state authority allocation offered, the 
potential partisan benefits, and the costs of making an offer.  If team AA‘s offer is  
, AB accepts AA‘s offer.  If not, AB makes an alternative offer 
to team AA as long as < .  If not, AB chooses the status quo.   
 
At the top node of the game tree, team 1 decides whether to make an offer to another 
team or set of teams, and if so, which team(s).  Due to the partisan benefit of offer to 
team 2, the higher costs of maintaining a larger coalition, and team AA‘s indifference 
over the level of state authority (under an A president), if team AA moves first, it offers a 
change in state authority such that team AB accepts.  If AB moves first, it only makes a 
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proposal if it can offer a change in state authority that has value given the costs and 
benefits of policymaking.  The same is the case under a B president, but given AB‘s 
indifference and AA‘s preference over . 
 
In detail, under an A president with team AA as the first mover, AA knows that AB will 
accept a proposal where , that BA will only accept an offer 
that also includes team BB, and that team BB will only accept an offer if 
 if team BA is included).  If , AA will 
offer a proposal to team AB such that AB accepts.  If , AA will offer a 
proposal to teams AB and BB (since k is increasing in the number of teams included and 
team BA rejects offers that do not also include team BB) iff  and both teams 
accept.  In order for both teams to accept, AA  must offer the following proposal: 
. 
 
This result above suggests that the first mover team in the Senate (where 
 is likely) must balance the non-indifferent majority party team‘s preference and the  
non-indifferent minority party team‘s preference over α with the costs and benefits of 
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Measuring the Federal Allocation of Authority 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The first two chapters presented an empirical and theoretical puzzle:  national 
policy varies in the amount of responsibility given to the states both over time and across 
laws. State involvement in policy can result in different policy outcomes than when the 
states are not involved.  Thus, what are the conditions under which Congress opts to 
delegate more or less authority to the states?  Using formal models of Congress 
delegating authority to the national executive branch and the states, I derived a number of 
hypotheses with respect to the effect of policy preferences of the states, Congress, and the 
national executive branch.  This theory of intergovernmental delegation must be tested 
against current arguments related to the decentralization of authority.  Conventional 
wisdom, for instance, is that Republicans prefer to devolve authority while Democrats opt 
to centralize.  Scholars also posit the following three arguments:  1) when the party of the 
national government is more similar to that of all state governments, decentralization is 
more likely (partisan congruence) (Krause and Bowman 2005), 2) policy type determines 
decentralization choices, where redistributional policies are more efficiently implemented 
by a central government and developmental policies by subunit governments (Peterson 




  In order to test the theory of intergovernmental delegation against these 
alternative explanations, the concepts of federal delegation of authority, policy actor 
preferences, political uncertainty, partisanship, partisan congruence, policy type, and 
election timing must be operationalized.  
DATA 
Dependent Variable 
Unit of Analysis and Selection of Data 
 To evaluate the conditions under which national legislators delegate authority to 
federal actors, this study utilizes the law as the unit of analysis.  The dataset includes 





 Congresses (2005).  The list of important laws was downloaded and 
crosschecked with Mayhew‘s Table 4.1 for the years 1973-2002 (2005).
42
  This list 
contains a total of 208 separate listings (from 1973-2008).  Non-domestic legislation was 
excluded from this list including 22 of Mayhew‘s entries.
43
  I also excluded D.C. Home 
Rule and the declaration of Martin Luther King Jr. Birthday as a national holiday since 
the first is specifically related only to the governance of the District of Columbia and the 
second is a formal statement of a holiday.  I counted each law as one unit, which means 
each omnibus piece of legislation is counted as one enactment.  This, for example, 
combines Mayhew‘s listings of Omnibus Deficit Reduction Act of 1993 with a separate 
                                                 
41
 Peterson defines developmental policies as those that ―provide the physical and social infrastructure 
necessary to facilitate a country‘s economic growth‖ and redistributive policies as those that ―reallocate 
societal resources from the haves to the have-nots‖ (17, 1995). 
42
 Downloaded from http://pantheon.yale.edu/~dmayhew/datasets.html on September 2008 and again 
March 2010. 
43
 These included, for example, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 2002 Authorization for Use of 
Force against those Responsible for Recent Terrorist Attacks, 2002 Authorization for Use of Force against 
Iraq, HIV/AIDS funding for Africa and the Caribbean, 2008 Nuclear Trade Agreement with India, 1997 
Chemical Weapons Convention ratification, and the 1978 Panama Canal treaties ratification. 
75 
entry of Reform for College Student Loan Financing (PL 103-066) and the Deficit 
Reduction Package of 1990 with the Child Care Package (PL 101-508).  After these 
exclusions and mergers, there were a total of 179 significant laws enacted from 1973-
2008. 
 The years of this study provide variation in partisan majorities across branches of 
the national government, as shown in Table 3-1, allowing me to consider how 
preferences affect intergovernmental policy design.  For instance, Republicans controlled 









 Congresses, the presidency and House in the 107
th
 Congresses, and both 




 Congresses.  Democrats, alternatively, controlled 








, and the 110
th
 Congresses and all three 






 Congresses.  
Table 3-1:  Partisan Makeup of National Institutions 
Year Congress President Senate Majority House Majority Overall  
73-75 93 Ford, R Democrat (56 seats, R 42) Democrat (242 seats, R 192) RDD 
75-77 94 Ford, R Democrat (61 seats, R 37) Democrat (291 seats, R 144) RDD 
77-79 95 Carter, D Democrat (61 seats, R 38) Democrat (292 seats, R 143) DDD 
79-81 96 Carter, D Democrat (58 seats, R 41) Democrat (277 seats, R 158) DDD 
81-83 97 Reagan, R Republican (53 seats, D 46) Democrat (242 seats, R 192) RRD 
83-85 98 Reagan, R Republican (54 seats, D 46) Democrat (269 seats, R 166) RRD 
85-87 99 Reagan, R Republican (53 seats, D 47) Democrat (253 seats, R 182) RRD 
87-89 100 Reagan, R Democrat (55 seats, R 45) Democrat (258 seats, R 177) RDD 
89-91 101 Bush, R Democrat (55 seats, R 45) Democrat (260 seats, R 175) RDD 
91-93 102 Bush, R Democrat (56 seats, R 44) Democrat (267 seats, R 167) RDD 
93-95 103 Clinton, D Democrat (57 seats, R 43) Democrat (258 seats, R 176) DDD 
95-97 104 Clinton, D Republican (52 seats, D 48) Republican (230 seats, D 204) DRR 
97-99 105 Clinton, D Republican (55 seats, D 45) Republican (228 seats, D 206) DRR 
99-01 106 Clinton, D Republican (55 seats, D 45) Republican (223 seats, D 211) DRR 
01-03 10744 Bush, R Democrat (50 seats, R 50) Republican (221 seats, D 212) RDR 
03-05 108 Bush, R Republican (51 seats, D 48) Republican (232 seats, D 202) RRR 
05-07 109 Bush, R Republican (55 seats, D 44) Republican (232 seats, D 202) RRR 
07-09 110 Bush, R Democrat (49 seats, R 49) Democrat (257 seats, R 178) RDD 
Shaded lines indicate Republican presidency. 
                                                 
44 In the 107th Congress the partisan majority in the Senate was as follows: 1/3/01-1/20/01 Democrat (D) 50 seats, 
Republican (R) an 50 seats (D majority due to outgoing Vice President Al Gore), 1/20/01-6/6/01 R 50 seats, D 50 (R 
majority due to incoming Vice President Richard Cheney), 6/1/01-11/12/02 D 50 seats, R 49 (D majority due to James 
Jeffords, Vermont, switch to Independent and caucus with D), and 11/12/02-1/3/03 R 50 seats, D 48 (R majority due to 
a death and replacement but no reorganization was completed).  Information on majorities was abstracted in December, 




To measure the dependent variable of intergovernmental delegation, I created a 
new dataset of policy authority delegation across federal actors.  I obtained a summary of 
each law‘s major provisions from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) through the 
Library of Congress THOMAS on-line service.
45
 CRS provides a summary of each 
introduced bill and each enactment into law.  Previous studies often utilize Congressional 
Quarterly (CQ) Almanac summaries of laws (e.g., Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999, 
Maltzman and Shipan 2008).  A comparison coding of CQ summaries and CRS 
summaries revealed that CQ summaries often provided ambiguous information on the 
specific federal entity that received authority in each provision.  CRS summaries, 
alternatively, provided more details about which entities were responsible for each 
provision included in the summary.   
As a result, for this project, I used the CRS summary for the final enrolled 
enactment for each major law.
46
  Given the structure of the summaries, each provision of 
every law in the dataset was coded for delegation of responsibility.  In each summary, the 
provisions are demarcated by CRS as a new bullet in the text and each provision 
separated by a blank line.  The average number of provisions in a CRS summary is 134.  
The summaries of significant legislation range from 1 to 1066 provisions—where the 
large summaries included omnibus and budget reconciliation legislation (see Table 3-2).   
 
                                                 
45
 Accessed November 2008-June, 2010 from http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html.  Please refer to 
THOMAS ―About Summaries‖ website at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/abt_dgst.html for more information. 
46
 Wawro (2001) also uses CRS summaries.  In 1970 the Congressional Research Service (then named the 
Legislative Reference Service) received additional resources through the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1970.  Prior to this time, CRS summaries are extremely brief and often only provide a 2-3-sentence 
summary of an entire bill.    
77 
Table 3-2:  Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables (unit of analysis = law) 
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Proportion of National Provisions 179 0.751 0.274 0 1 
Proportion of Joint Provisions 179 0.22 0.257 0 1 
Proportion of State Provisions 179 0.029 0.119 0 1 
Degree of Decentralization 179 0.249 0.274 0 1 
Total Number of Provisions  24,012 134.067 168.382 1 1066 
 
In 1973, for example, Congress amended the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 
(PL 93-028).  The CRS summary of this law included four provisions giving the 
President authority (after public hearings) to set priorities and usage of petroleum 
products, changing the definition of ―working poor,‖ delineating that the President‘s 
authority does not include the ability to withhold or reserve obligated authority or funds, 
and requiring industry to make their price reports public.  At the other end of the 
spectrum is the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1998 (1066 provisions), 
which includes provisions related to agriculture, Medicare, foreign aid, the Food and 
Drug Administration, the Post Office, the Child Online Privacy Act, and others.  In total, 
24,012 provisions were coded. 
Coding Choices 
 To be able to later examine congressional delegation choices, the laws must be 
coded as to which entity receives authority in a policy.  A minimum of two coders relied 
on specific definitions of authority and delegation to guide their coding processes.  
Authority was defined as the power to determine, judge, enforce, and conduct the 
activities laid out in a policy—or when Congress empowers another actor/group to make 
choices and complete the tasks necessary to result in an outcome from the delegated 
work. Congress relies upon this other entity (its agent, in a broad sense) to provide a set 
of functions or to implement the policy.  The conduct of activities included in this 
78 
definition included technical assistance, training, filling out paperwork, research, and the 
provision of care or services as detailed in the policy, among others.   
The coding procedures included assigning a provision as ―national‖ when a new 
national agency was created, when an existing national agency or group was required to 
perform a duty or implement the provision, or when the president was made responsible 
for specific actions.
47
  ―State‖ provisions were those that required state or local-level 
action with no national involvement.
48
  ―Joint‖ provisions included those where both 
state- and national-level entities were assigned responsibility or required to establish or 
maintain a state-national partnership.
49
   
There were a number of ―other‖ categories that were also coded including public-
private partnerships, delegation to private contractors, delegation to the judiciary, and 
delegation to international agents.  When delegation categories were not obvious based 
on the CRS summary, coders referred to the full text of the law and the appropriate year‘s 
United States Code to assign delegation.     
After two coders completed a law, a separate third coder reviewed the two 
previous decisions and in cases where there were discrepancies, the differences were 
aired at a conference where all coders discussed how the decision rules applied in that 
situation, reviewed the full text of the law (for that provision), the text of the correct 
United States Code, and any additional background material (such as agency websites).  
                                                 
47
 When Congress retained authority, the provision was coded as ―no authority delegated.‖  If Congress 
assigned an independent commission‘s membership, the commission was coded as ―other‖, if the 
membership was assigned by the President (or national executive branch agency) they were categorized as 
national and if by a combination of the state governors (or other state-level actors) and national actors, it 
was categorized as joint.    
48
 I assume that local policies are subsumed into state policies. Local governments also likely play an 
important role in intergovernmental relations and the decisions of policymakers.  Narrowing the scope of 
the study in this way will miss some of the nuances of intergovernmental relations that require further study 
in future projects. 
49
 Please refer to the appendix for a detailed description of the coding rules. 
79 
After each law was coded, summary measures for that law were calculated including:  the 
total number of provisions in the law, the total number of national provisions, the total 
number of joint provisions, the total number of state provisions and the total number of 
other provisions. The percent agreement on the coding of national, state, and joint 
authority between the initial two coders averaged 78.35%.  Any law with less than 70% 
agreement between those two coders was re-coded by the author.   
 We confined our determination of whom or what was given authority to each 
individual provision unless it was apparent that a series of provisions were linked.  In the 
Education Flexibility Partnership Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-025), for instance, the first 
summarized provision authorizes the Secretary of Education to allow states to participate 
in the Education Flexibility Partnership program (Ed-Flex).  The next seven provisions 
set forth requirements, authorizations, and prohibitions for states that participate in the 
program; therefore, even though these provisions circumscribe the authority of states, 
they are not direct mandates for the states.  Instead, these provisions refer to the authority 
of the Secretary of Education in overseeing the entire program and are coded as joint 
delegations of authority.    
This coding provides a dramatic departure from previous empirical tests of 
centralization and decentralization.  Previous studies have either used preemption data 
compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures (mostly based on 
Congressional Budget Office data) (Nicholson-Crotty 2008), data on grants-in-aid 
(Peterson 1995), or have limited their coding to laws that specifically deal with states 
(Krause and Bowman 2005).
50
  These datasets cover limited time periods (e.g. CBO only 
                                                 
50
 CBO data is compiled as a result of the 1995 Unfunded Mandate Reform Act and is available from 1997 
onward.  Their data includes mandates on states, localities, tribes, and private entities.  Mandates are 
80 
covers 1997 onward) and do not consider legislation that does not delegate authority to 
the states—in other words, for my project they select on the dependent variable.  For 
instance, Krause and Bowman (2005) examined all public laws passed between 1947-
1998 (excluding appropriations bills, omnibus bills, and land transactions).  Laws were 
excluded if there was no intergovernmental content.  This project, with its broader 
perspective regarding the uses of federal delegation options for Congress, must consider 
all designations of authority within legislation, whether they be grants-in-aid, mandates, 
direct orders to states, traditional delegation to the national executive branch, or 
otherwise.     
Next, I create an overall federal delegation measure that takes into account both 
joint and state delegation choices.  For this variable, I create a blunt measure of overall 
state policy delegation, or decentralization, by collapsing the categories of delegation into 
a continuous measure within the bounds zero to one.  This measure captures the degree of 
authority delegated to the states in a law (the degree of decentralization) and is calculated 
by adding the proportion of state provisions in a law (provisions that delegate entirely to 
the states) to one-half the proportion of joint provisions (provisions that delegate partially 
to the states and partially to the national executive branch).
51
  For example, a law with 
100 provisions:  50 national, 40 joint, and 10 state would receive a decentralization score 
of .30 (which is equal to (50*0 + 40*0.5 + 10*1)/100).  Table 3-2 lists the descriptive 
statistics for all four measures for the dependent variable.    
                                                                                                                                                 
defined as any duty imposed on these units.  Excluded from this definition are voluntary grants-in-aid.  See 
CBO website for more details at http://www.cbo.gov/. 
51
 By using a measure that considers ½ of joint provisions, I implicitly assume that joint partnerships 
allocate approximately half of the authority to the states and half to the national agents.  Although this is 
not necessarily true for each individual case, as an overall average it is a rough approximation.  In the 
empirical analyses, I consider a variety of other specifications and find my results are robust to changes in 
this measure, including counting joint provisions as equal to state provisions, dichotomizing the delegation 
into ―mostly state‖ versus not (and utilizing various thresholds of ―mostly state‖). 
81 
This choice implicitly treats all provisions summarized by the CRS as equally 
important.  While ideally I would weight by the importance of the provision, this choice 
would be impractical given the scope of the study.  This equality of provisions 
summarized, though, is not a big problem because CRS is comprised of policy experts 
who ―describ[e] the measure‘s most significant provisions.‖
52  
In other words, CRS has 
already chosen the significant provisions.  The coding team then codes those provisions 
and I treat each of them equally.      
Descriptive Statistics  
 As Table 3-2 indicates, the most common type of delegation in the dataset is 
national with on average 75% of provisions (excluding ―other‖) delegated to national 
entities, fitting the traditional perspective of bureaucratic delegation.  The mean 
proportion of provisions delegated to the states, in combination with national actors and 
alone, is 0.22 and 0.03 respectively. Furthermore, the mean degree of decentralization in 
a law is 0.249, which demonstrates that on average a quarter of the implementation 
responsibility in significant national laws is delegated in some way to the states.  In other 
words, delegation of authority occurs not just to national actors, such as national-level 
agencies, but also to the states. 
 Overall, I show federal delegation choices in Figure 3-1 (across all provisions and 
including the ―other‖ category) and federal delegation choices for each year in the dataset 
                                                 
52
 The quote is from the THOMAS website listed below.  The Congressional Research Service has existed 
since its statutory establishment in 1914 (then called the Legislative Reference Service).  A major 
reorganization occurred in 1970 with the Legislative Reorganization Act expanding the duties of the 
department and changing the name.
 
A consideration of CRS summaries prior to 1970 reveals substantial 
differences in the amount of information provided in those summaries from those post-1970.  The span of 
this study is 1973-2008 due to these variations and the ability to access them electronically through 
THOMAS.  Some changes over subsequent years have likely occurred in CRS as well and will result in 
measurement/coding errors.  No changes have been publicized such that scholars can review the potential 
impact of any changes.  Information about CRS can be found at http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/whatscrs.html 
and information about the summaries at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/abt_dgst.html. 
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in Figure 3-2 (across all laws).  In Figure 3-1, which summarizes delegation choices 
overall, national delegation is the most common federal design choice, accounting for 
65% of all provisions in the dataset.
53
  Direct mandates for the states comprise 1% and 
joint partnerships 20% of authority design.  In the remaining 14% of provisions, 
delegation occurred to other entities (e.g., the judiciary, non-profit groups, industry, etc.).  
Thus, although Congress delegates implementation responsibility to the states, it rarely 
does so by crafting a law where the states act alone.   
Figure 3-1:  Overall Delegation Choices 1973-2008 
 
In Figure 3-2, variation across the years in these design choices is evident.  For 
instance, 1996 is the year with the largest total number of summarized provisions in 
significant legislation with 1,489 national, state, or joint summarized provisions in that 
year (1,845 provisions including ―other‖).  Of these provisions 1,159 were delegated to 
national-level actors, 305 to joint partnerships, and 25 directly to the states for 
implementation.  That year also has the greatest number of national delegation provisions 
and the greatest number of state delegation.  The maximum number of joint delegations, 
though, occurred in 1998, when 436 provisions out of 1,678 total (including ―other‖) 
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provisions were delegation to joint partnerships.  The fewest number of total provisions 
in significant legislation occurred in 1995 where of 98 provisions, 10 were national 
delegation, 2 joint partnerships, and zero direct state delegation (the remainder of the 
provisions were delegated to other actors).   
Figure 3-2:  Variation in Federal Delegation Choices 
 
A consideration of year-to-year variation in Figure 3-2 reveals that from 1976-
1977, from 1991-1992, and from 2002-2003 the total number of provisions changed only 
slightly from 464 to 349, 400 to 496, and 895 to 859 respectively.  The division of 
delegation choices, though, varies tremendously.  In 1976 the delegation design included 
401 provisions to national actors, 39 to joint partnerships, and two directly to the states.  
In contrast to 1977 where the breakdown is 214 national, 108 joint, and six state 
delegation.  Similarly from 1991 to 1992 and from 2002 to 2003, the design choices 
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differ.  Specifically, 141 of the provisions were delegated to national actors and 213 to 
joint partnerships (zero to the states alone) in 1991, but in 1992 national, joint, and state 
delegation occurred in 275, 169, and 11 provisions.  And, from 2002 to 2003 the 
delegation choices changed from 676 national, 126 joint, and 11 state to 777 national, 36 
joint, and one state.      
Another way to look at the data is that a law can be characterized by all three 
values:  proportion national delegation, proportion joint partnership delegation, and 
proportion state delegation.  These three proportions are the federal authority composition 
of each law in the dataset and are more easily visualized in a ternary diagram as shown in 
Figure 3-3.  Each of the 179 laws is represented by one dot in the diagram (dots are 
colored by the 4-year time period in which the law was made), where the left lower 
corner represents laws mainly delegated to national executive branch agents, the right 
lower corner delegation directly to the states, and the apex represents delegation via joint 
partnerships.  A law that delegates equally to the states, national agents, and joint 
partnerships (33.3% state, 33.3% national, and 33.3% joint) would be represented by a 
dot in the exact center of the triangle.  
 There are three petals defined by the dotted lines meeting in the center and the 
three outside edges.  Laws that fall within the left petal represent those laws where the 
delegation of the provisions is mostly to national level agents.  The farther a law is 
located from the lower left corner within this petal, the more the delegation design 
includes state delegation, either through joint partnerships (as the dots drift upward) or 
direct state delegation (as the dots fall to the right).  The right-most petal includes laws 
where direct delegation to the states is the most common choice, which are only five laws 
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in the dataset.  These laws include the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (turquoise 
dot at the lower right vertex), the Freedom of Access to Reproductive Health Services 
Clinics Act of 1994 (orange dot on the bottom axis on the dotted line), the Y2K Act (blue 
dot), the Voting Rights Amendments of 1975 (open circle orange dot), and the National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993 (orange dot on the right axis).  Abortion laws and voting 
laws populate this rare choice of delegation directly to the states with no national 
involvement as well as one law devoted to delineating legal responsibility (and state 
versus national jurisdiction) in the event that massive failures resulted in 2000.   
Figure 3-3:  Federal Authority Composition 
 
The final upper central petal includes laws delegated mostly through joint 
partnerships between the states and national-level actors and includes laws from each 














four-year increment.  The variation in all petals in Figure 3-3 demonstrates that scholars 
who ignore the states as a delegation choice neglect aspects of the laws that do not fall 
exactly on the lower left hand point of the triangle.  Furthermore, by looking at the 
delegation of authority in individual laws, across all laws, and over time, it is apparent 
that not only do existing bureaucratic delegation arguments overlook an important 
delegation choice in the states; but also this choice exhibits variation in need of an 
explanation. 
 Focusing on specific examples of delegation choices and the degree of 
decentralization provides evidence of the variation of federal design choices and what 
these aggregate numbers look like from a different angle.  In an act that amends the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (PL 102-166), Congress gave the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) the authority to establish the Technical Assistance Training 
Institute, which provides technical assistance and training for the laws that the EEOC 
enforces.  It also requires the EEOC to carry out these activities and target specific groups 
of individuals (e.g., those who have not been ―equitably served by the EEOC‖).  The 
states are only mentioned once in this law—in title I:  ―Amends Federal law to declare 
that: (1) for purposes of provisions relating to equal rights under the law, the right to 
make and enforce contracts includes…; and (2) the rights protected by the amended 
provisions are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and 
impairment under color of State law.‖  This law is 100% national and has a 
decentralization score of zero.  Similarly, the Family and Temporary Medical Leave Act 
(PL 103-003) is also 100% national, with a decentralization of zero.  In this law, 
Congress delegated authority to the Secretary of Labor to prescribe regulations, 
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investigate, and enforce the provisions of the Act, but gave no authority to the states.  
Interestingly, the Act also established a Commission on Leave to research (among other 
things) alternative and equivalent state enforcement of the Act.  
 Other laws give the states either partial or complete responsibility.  For example, 
in contrast to the Civil Rights Act amendment and the Medical Leave Act, joint 
partnership policies are dominant choices in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 
(PL 103-159) and in the No Child Left Behind Act (PL 107-110).  In the Brady Handgun 
Act, the Attorney General is directed to determine deadlines by which states should 
provide an on-line system for documents and permits grants to states for such record 
systems.  This law codes at 8% national, 91% joint, and 1% state yielding a 
decentralization score of 0.465 (0.8*0 +0.91*0.5 + 0.01*1).  In No Child Left Behind, the 
majority of the provisions establishes procedures, planning, and reporting and provides 
allocation requirements for the states and the Secretary of Education (10.6% national, 
87.1% joint, and 2.3% state with a decentralization score of 0.459).   
 Direct delegation to the states is the most prevalent choice in the Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban (PL 108-105), as well as the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (PL 
103-031).  In the Partial Birth Abortion Ban a defendant accused under the Act could 
seek a hearing before the State Medical Board on the physician‘s conduct (not a national 
or joint body).  This law has a decentralization score of 1 and is 100% state delegation.  
The National Voter Registration Act set forth a variety of requirements and permissions 
for the states but provided little national involvement in the implementation of the Act 




 While this method provides an excellent measure of decentralization of authority, 
one that compares with general views of these laws, it does have flaws.  The 
decentralization score is a blunt measure of responsibility for implementation, not a 
measure of true authority over the policy.  I do not measure the amount of discretion each 
actor has over the provisions for which it is responsible, nor do I attempt to measure the 
amount of national control versus state control in each of the joint provisions.  In effect, 
then, this measurement strategy provides a view of implementation responsibility—not 
specific determinations of actor authority and discretion. From a theoretical perspective, I 
do not consider discretion.
54
  Empirically I consider different versions of the measure, 
including assigning joint provisions the same value as state provisions and dichotomizing 
the delegation into mostly state versus mostly national laws.  The results reported in 
Chapter 4 are robust to these changes. 
Joint Policies 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to consider and separately analyze joint 
partnership policies.  Scholars in federalism and bureaucratic delegation hint at two 
potential relationships that may be at the heart of the delegation of a federal combination 
of policy authority. First, along the lines of Chubb‘s double pyramid of federal actors, 
national legislators may delegate first to a national agency that is then authorized to sub-
delegate authority to state-level agencies (1985).  Alternatively, national legislators may 
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 With respect to discretion, it is as if I have held discretion constant across laws.  In the aggregate 
empirical analyses, I conducted one simple test of the effects of variation in discretion, by incorporating a 
variable in the empirical analyses measuring the number of words per law as a rough proxy for discretion 
(Huber and Shipan 2002, Randazzo et al., 2006).  This variable was not statistically significant, did not 
improve the fit of the models, and did not change the substantive findings reported.   
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delegate authority to state-level agencies, but ―hire‖ national agencies as their 3
rd
 party 
monitor of the states‘ outputs (based on Tirole 1986).   
Both of these scenarios are distinctly different from delegation directly to the 
states with little or no national involvement (a direct mandate for the states).  In the first 
instance, the national executive branch (most often through national-level agencies) sub-
contracts implementation to the states and, then, is responsible for the details of ―hiring‖ 
the states to do the policy work (an internal supervisory role).  In the second case, the 
national executive branch plays more of an external supervisory role with respect to the 
states. 
In the coding process we attempted to pay particular attention to the structure of 
the joint partnership policies to consider whether sub-contracting versus supervising was 
the more common role of the national executive branch in joint partnership policies.  It 
was immediately evident that there were many more than two relationship structures in 
joint partnership policies.  What the coding process uncovered, is that some policies 
delegated authority for implementation to the states with a national-level agency acting as 
the overall administrator (such as serving as the repository of reports, disseminator of 
information and grants-in-aid, as well as training and technical assistance) as evidenced 
in Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003‘s 
(PL 108-173) rural hospital flexibility program.  The MMA established this grant-in-aid 
program with specific requirements states must fulfill, plus consultation with the state 
hospital association and rural hospitals on the best way to use the funds.  The Health 
Resources and Services Administration (within the Department of Health and Human 
Services) was authorized as the administrator of this grant program with responsibility for 
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ascertaining the states met the requirements set forth in the law, disseminating the funds, 
and reporting back to Congress.   
A different authority relationship (but still a grant program) was described in the 
National Inter-modal Surface Transportation System Act (PL 102-240).  The Secretary of 
Transportation was directed to establish the grant program and apportion money for all 
states, as opposed to running a program that was already established, as in the MMA.  
Alternatively, other provisions required a national executive branch actor to establish a 
competitive grant program or pilot projects among a few states, as in the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 
The structure of joint-partnership policies varies across regulatory programs as 
well.  In the Safe Drinking Water Act, the states were granted primary enforcement 
responsibility as long as a state had adopted more stringent standards than the national 
standards as determined by the Environmental Protection Agency.  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, though, required the Federal Communications 
Commission to create a Federal-State Joint Board to perform oversight.  In the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Secretary of Health was required 
coordinate federal, state, and local programs to control health care fraud.  
Furthermore, in other types of policies, such as the Healthy Forests Restoration 
Act, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization, or the Water Resources 
Development Act, there are still other types of joint-partnership policies.  In the Healthy 
Forests Restoration Act of 2003, the Secretary was required to facilitate collaboration 
among the states in preparing for fuel projects that would be planned and conducted by 
the Secretary.  Alternatively, in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
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1986 the President was permitted to enter into cooperative agreements with states for 
hazardous waste cleanups.  The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 directed the 
Secretary to survey rehabilitation methods for former industrial sites only upon the 
request of local officials and to provide technical assistance, only upon request of the 
states. 
 In Table 3-3, I provide a summary of these types of joint partnership policies 
identified and their examples.  Although for this study we coded all joint partnership 
policies as one category, due to the number and variety of relationships identified in the 
joint partnership policies, this is an avenue for further research.   
Table 3-3:  Categories of Joint Delegation 
National Role vis-à-vis the States Example 
Subcontract National Inter-modal Surface Transportation System 
Act 
Supervise/Administrate Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and 
Modernization Act 
Substitute/Contingency Safe Drinking Water Act 
Cooperate Telecommunications Act of 1996 
Facilitate Health Forests Restoration Act of 2003 
Assist/Support Water Resources Development Act of 1986 
 
 In all, I have created measures of national allocation of authority to the states, or 
intergovernmental delegation.  This intergovernmental delegation of authority exhibits 
variation in the degree of state authority over time and across laws. What explains this 
variation in federal delegation?  In the next section, I discuss the measurement of three 
categories of independent variables.  First, as outlined earlier, my primary theoretical 
variables require measures of legislative, national executive branch, and state preferences 
along with political uncertainty.  Second, I elaborate the control variables included in the 
analysis. Third, alternative arguments require measures of policy type, Republican 
92 
national government, partisan congruence, and election year. I now discuss the 
measurement and operationalization of these variables.       
 
Intergovernmental Delegation Theoretical Explanators 
Preferences 
 The preferences of Congress, the national executive branch, and the states play a 
crucial role in the theoretical model.  Unfortunately, one problem I face is the need to use 
the same metric for the preferences of Congress, the national executive branch, and the 
states—particularly because I need to calculate distances between these entities to test the 
implications of the theory.  No such measure exists across my entire sample.  Although at 
the national level I could use DW-NOMINATE scores, averaged across both chambers 
and for the president, the same measure does not exist across time for the states.
55
  
One possible operationalization of preferences is to use a blunt measure of 
partisanship for the legislature, party of the president for the executive branch, and the 
parties of the governors for the states.  Other scholars have used partisanship as a proxy 
for preferences, such as Berry et al. (2007) and Lupia et al. (2009) as well as all studies 
that use divided government as a variable (e.g., Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999, Huber and 
Shipan 2002, etc.).  The benefit of using party is that the measure exists for all actors in 
my model.  The weaknesses of this approach include the following:  (1) party may not 
mean the same thing cross-sectionally and inter-temporally—a Democrat in Mississippi 
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 Clinton and Lewis characterized national agency preferences using expert opinions and agency attributes 
but the measures are not comparable to NOMINATE scores (2008).  Nixon (2004) provides estimates of 
the ideal points of the national legislature, agency commissioners (using service in both as the bridge) as do 
Bailey and Chang (2001) but neither provides state-level ideal point estimates.  Wright and Osborn (2002) 
provide roll call data for state legislatures for 1999-2000 only.  Shor et al. (2011) have spent many years 
delineating a common space measure for presidents, Congress, and state legislatures, but this data was not 
available for use at the time this study was completed. 
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may not mean the same thing as a Democrat in Massachusetts and a Republican in 1973 
may not be the same as a Republican in 2003, (2) I will need to assume a dichotomous 
measure of party can be meaningfully aggregated for the states, and (3) to assume this 
measure can provide information about distances between actors.  Each of these issues is 
discussed below. 
The Concept of Party 
 Does party actually measure the same phenomenon across the units (e.g., states, 
executive branch, and Congress) and over the time period of my study?  The answer is 
that it does not—the Democratic and Republican parties have changed over time and 
never truly represent the same thing from state to state.  Does this issue create a major 
problem for the empirical analysis of a formal model based on distances between the 
preferences of the actors involved?  My model does not include temporal considerations 
of preferences—so movement of the parties across time does not impede my cross-
sectional empirical analysis.  Also, due to the theoretical framework I compare distances 
between actors in the same state, not Democrats in Massachusetts to Democrats (or 
Republicans) in Mississippi.  In short, no it does not create a major problem for the 
empirical analyses.     
Thus, the party of the current president is used as a proxy for national executive 
branch preferences.  Although this measure misses nuances of agency preferences (that 
can vary across agencies), it incorporates presidential power over agency leadership and 
agency outputs (via review of rules and regulations, for instance).  In addition, the 
national executive branch includes not just delegation of authority to national agencies 




  Additionally, I use the party of the governor of the pivotal 
legislator‘s state to measure the partisanship of the state.  The pivotal legislator is derived 
from the model described in the preceding chapter and is matched to the empirical data 
across the years of the study.  Party is coded as a -1 for Democrats, 0 for Independents, 
and +1 for Republicans. 
Measuring Distance 
 Using these three proxies for the preferences of Congress, the national executive 
branch, and the states, I approximate the distance between them as the absolute value of 
the difference between the pivotal House and Senate member and his or her state, as well 
as that between House and Senate member and the president.  These values are the same 
for all members of the pivotal intergovernmental team.
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  I take the mean of these 
distances across the House and Senate to derive the congressional distances.  For 
example, when the pivotal intergovernmental team in the House is DR legislators and the 
pivotal team is RR legislators in the Senate under a Democratic president, the distance 
measures would be calculated as follows (with examples outlined in Table 3-4):
58
 
 Distance between House (HR) and State|-1-1 | = 2  
 Distance between HR and National Executive Branch (NEB)|-1-(-1)| = 0 
 Distance between Senate and State = |1 – 1| = 0 
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 Although one option would be to consider a measure that incorporates both governors and state 
legislative majorities, interviews conducted during the summer of 2010 with legislative staffers revealed 
that congresspersons mainly considered their governors when thinking about state implementation of law.  
These interviews are detailed in Chapter 5.    
57
  Recall in Chapter 2, I described the pivotal ―legislator‖ as a pivotal legislative team.  Each member of 
that team is a specific type of legislator, which includes the party of that legislator and the party of his 
governor.  I use the pivotal legislative team to provide the identity of the party of the ―pivotal legislator‖ 
and the party of his governor.  
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 Recall from Chapter 2, DR legislators are Democratic legislators from states with Republican governors, 
DD legislators are Democratic legislators from states with Democratic governors, RD legislators are 
Republican legislators from states with Democratic governors, and RR legislators are Republican 
legislators from states with Republican governors. 
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 Distance between Senate and NEB = | 1 – (-1)| = 2 
 Distance between Congress and State = (2+0)/2 = 1 
 Distance between Congress and NEB = (0+2)/2 = 1 
Table 3-4:  Example Distance Calculations 
Party of Median 
Member in 
Congress 
Party of Governor of 
State of Median 











D D D |-1- -1| = 0 |-1- -1| = 0 
D D R |-1 - -1| = 0 |-1 - +1| = 2 
R R R |+1-+1| = 0 |+1-+1| = 0 
R D D |+1- -1| = 2 |+1- -1| = 2 
 
 The implication of this operationalization is that I use blunt measures of 
preferences (i.e., partisanship) to create a measure of distance.  A problem with this 
approach, of course, is that it can provide only a general approximation for the actual 
distance between the preferences of the actors involved, which translates into a difference 
of how coefficients on such measures can be interpreted.  More specifically, I cannot 
interpret a one-unit change in the distance as a one-unit change between the preferences 
of Congress and the other actors.  Instead, this change must be interpreted as a change 
from closer to farther or vice versa.     
Political Uncertainty 
 In my theoretical model, political uncertainty is the likelihood that the party of the 
president or governor at time t+1 will be different than the current leader‘s party in the 
context of a legislator‘s partisanship.  A typical measure of a related concept, state 
political competition, is the folded Ranney index.  I do not utilize this measure because it 
is based on the proportion of seats in the upper and lower chambers of a state‘s legislature 
held by the Democratic party, the Democratic proportion of the gubernatorial vote, and 
the proportion of terms of office for the three institutions during which the Democratic 
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party was in control.  Instead, I need a measure of uncertainty over the partisanship of the 
governor and the president.   
 To operationalize political uncertainty at the national and state level, therefore, I 
begin by collecting the margin of electoral victory for each governor‘s race and each 
presidential race from 1968 through 2008.
59
  The margin of victory is measured as the 
absolute difference between the votes obtained by the top two opposing party candidates 
for the governor.  Specifically, I take the number of votes for the winning candidate, 
subtract those for the second place candidate (as long as that candidate is from a different 
party) and then divide by the total number of votes placed in that race to yield an 
electoral margin score. Next, I create a rolling average of the past three elections‘ 
electoral margin for each year in the dataset.   
 Finally, I produce a separate column that includes the electoral margin in 
executive election years and a 1 in the off election years (a dummy variable).  To 
measure state political uncertainty, I take the average of the rolling average column and 
the electoral margin with dummy variables for the off election years‘ column.  Recall, 
though, that the theoretical model is based on a pivotal intergovernmental team of 
legislators.  Thus, I take the mean of the individual legislators‘ governors‘ political 
uncertainty for each pivotal intergovernmental team of legislators across the years in the 
dataset.  As an example, if there are three legislators in the pivotal intergovernmental 
team, I take the average of the political uncertainty of all three states during those years.  
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 As an alternative, I measure the duration of a governor/President‘s political party in the executive branch.  
For each year in the dataset, this measure is calculated as the pivotal legislator‘s governor‘s party duration 
in years (the same is done for the president‘s party).  
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For national political uncertainty, the same process is used with one exception; I use the 
margin of electoral college votes instead of the popular vote.       
 In addition, the context of political uncertainty is crucial.  If a Democratic 
legislator considers his Republican governor‘s seat unsafe, political uncertainty is a 
positive factor.  On the other hand, if a Republican may soon replace a Democratic 
legislator‘s Democratic governor, political uncertainty is a negative factor.  To address 
this issue, I normalize political uncertainty.  To do so, I multiply each executive‘s 
political uncertainty by an indicator that is equal to -1 if the legislator and the state 
governor are of different parties and a +1 if they share partisanship.  This simple 
transformation of the measure of political uncertainty does two related things:  1) it 
incorporates the context of the legislator‘s party with that of the executive‘s party and 2) 
it simplifies the hypotheses to be tested.
 
 
Focusing on the state, because I have already accounted for the similarity or 
difference of the legislator‘s party with that of the governor, the direction of the influence 
of state political uncertainty is now negative.  Figure 3-4 shows that by multiplying state 
political uncertainty by -1 for those legislators from a different party, the influence of 
political uncertainty runs in the same direction.  Now, the effect of increasing 











Alternative Arguments’ Variables 
To consider alternative arguments, I include measures for partisan congruence, 
Republican control of national institutions, election year, and policy type.  I use Krause 
and Bowman‘s (2005) vertical partisan congruence variable to consider their adverse 
selection hypothesis (where Congress decentralizes authority when the states share 
similar partisanship to the Congress and the president and centralizes otherwise).  To 
measure the congruence between the partisan makeup of the national and state 
governments, Krause and Bowman interact two categorical variables measuring partisan 
balance at each level.  At the national level, a -1 captures when all three institutions 
(executive, and both legislative chambers) are majority Democratic, +1 when all three are 
Republican, and 0 in cases of divided government.
61
  At the state-level a similar process 
ensues:  the states are weighted by their electoral college votes and aggregated to create a 
single state partisan balance variable.  As these partisan control variables increase, 
Republican control increases.   
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 The gap between same and different party in the right-hand graph is for illustration only.  In truth, the 
expectation is that these lines lie on top of each other. 
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 Additionally, divided-divided government is measured as a -0.5 when Democrats control two of the three 
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In addition, I interact these national and state partisan balance variables following 
Krause and Bowman to ―create a comprehensive national-state partisan interaction term 
[that] taps into the degree of vertical partisan congruence between national and state level 
political institutions‖ (372, Krause and Bowman 2005).  Conventional wisdom suggests 
that as Republican control increases (or as the national partisan balance measure 
increases), state authority delegation will also increase.
62
  The interactive argument 
forwarded by Krause and Bowman conjectures that as partisan congruence increases, 
decentralization of authority to the states also increases.     
To consider Nicholson-Crotty‘s (2008) contention that Congress refrains from 
state mandates during election years, I create a variable coded as one during election 
years (every two years) and zero otherwise.  Finally, for Peterson‘s (1995) argument that 
federal delegation is based on the type of policy considered, I create a variable using the 
Policy Agenda‘s project topic and subtopic codes and Peterson‘s policy coding scheme 
(198-201, 1995).
63
  Redistributive policies, according to Peterson, are those that 
―reallocate societal resources from the haves to the have-nots,‖ in comparison to 
developmental policies that ―provide the physical and social infrastructure necessary to 
facilitate a country‘s economic growth‖ (17, 1995).
64
  He argues that redistributive 
policies are more efficient if centralized and developmental policies are more efficient if 
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 I also utilize simple dummy variables of party for the majority in the House, majority in the Senate, and 
party of the president as well as categorical measures for when Republicans control these three institutions 
at the national level.  The results do not differ dramatically from using national partisan balance.   
63
 The Policy Agenda‘s Project Topic Codebook was accessed from the Fall, 2008 through the Fall, 2009 at 
http://www.policyagendas.org/codebooks/topicindex.html.   
64
 Peterson includes transportation, natural resources, safety, education, and utilities as developmental 
policies and redistributive policies as pensions/medical insurance, welfare, health and hospitals and 
housing.  I checked the robustness of the findings with respect to including education as a developmental 
policy and then as a redistributive policy and found no significant difference in the results.  I include 
education as a redistributive policy in the reported analysis. Policy areas are obtained from the Policy 
Agendas Project (Jones, Wilkerson, and Baumgartner 2008).     
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decentralized.  For efficiency reasons, then, legislators will opt to centralize redistributive 
policies and decentralize developmental policies (Peterson 1995).  For this variable, 
developmental policy is coded as 0 and a redistributive policy as 1.  The descriptive 
statistics for each of these variables are summarized in the appendix. 
Control Variables 
There are a variety of other variables that are expected to influence the delegation 
of authority to the states.  Scholars commonly control for the federal deficit, state fiscal 
health, traditional state policies, an activist national government, and unified government
 
 
(Krause and Bowman 2005, Nicholson-Crotty 2008).
65
  The federal deficit or surplus 
measure was obtained from the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
2008 Historical Tables.  I utilize the previous year‘s surplus or deficit as a percentage of 
the gross domestic product measured in constant fiscal year 2000 dollars. As the federal 
deficit increases, if national legislators are off-loading some costs to the states, state 
responsibility will increase.  State fiscal status is measured as the previous year‘s percent 
change in revenues as obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau State Government Finances 
website (in addition to archived historical data provided via email from the Census 
Bureau).  I use state own-source revenues at time t and derive the percent change in these 
revenues (100*[revenue at time t – revenue at time t-1]/revenue at t-1).  As state revenues 
increase, state responsibility is expected to increase. 
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 Although not commonly included in studies of decentralization, I also incorporated controls for 
heterogeneity of state governors, heterogeneity of the majority party in each chamber, percent majority in 
each chamber, a blunt dichotomous measure of the technical uncertainty of the policy, and various time 
trends as these factors could potentially account for differences in delegation strategies.  These variables 
were statistically insignificant (with the exception of percent majority in the Senate) and did not alter the 
empirical results reported in Chapter 4. Moreover, I included a temporal variable that measures years from 
1973 that ranges from zero (at 1973) to 34 (at 2007) (as well as nonlinear versions of a time trend) but 
dropped this variable from the analysis due to lack of improvement in the models and high correlation with 
many of the other variables such as federal deficit.    
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As for traditional state policies, an activist public, and unified government, I 
include a rough proxy for the status quo level of state authority by including a dummy for 
policies that are considered to be traditional state policies (Gostin, 2002).  These policies 
include education, health, and social welfare, which are coded as 1, while other policy 
areas are coded as 0.  During the time span of my study, the federal government had 
already entered these traditional realms of state policy.  I expect, though, that state 
authority delegation will be positively associated with traditional state policy areas in 
comparison to other types of policies.   
I use Krehbiel‘s (1998) version of a public mood variable to control for more 
activist years in the study.  This variable is coded as a 4 in 1973 and decrements one step 
each year until reaching a 1 in 1976 and a 0 for each year thereafter. I expect these years 
to be associated with centralization of authority at the national level (due to an activist 
public), thus the direction of the effect of this variable on state authority allocation will be 
negative.  Finally, I incorporate unified government by coding a dummy variable that is 
one during times of unified government (when the House, Senate, and president are of the 
same political party) and zero otherwise.  Based on speculations that legislators may use 
delegation to the states in order to move policy forward during politically contentious 
times, I expect movement from a unified government to a divided government to be 
associated with an increase in delegation to the states.  The descriptive statistics for all 





Table 3-5:  Descriptive Statistics for Dichotomous Variables 
Variable # of 0's # of 1's 
Unified 138 41 
Technical Uncertainty 148 31 
Election Year 73 106 
Redistributive Policies 157 21 
Traditional State Policies 136 43 
 
Table 3-6:  Descriptive Statistics for Other Categorical Variables 
  Frequency 
Variable -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 
National Partisan Balance 29 9 86 34 21 
 
  
House to President Distance 
  
63 
   
116 
House to State Distance 
  
162 
   
17 







Senate to President Distance 
  
94 
   
85 
House to Senate Distance 
  
59 
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Congress to State Distance       11 100 14 54 
        Table 3-7:  Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Political Uncertainty of State 
Executives (Congress) 179 -0.040 0.075 -0.164 0.063 
Political Uncertainty of State 
Executives (House) 179 -0.111 0.072 -0.170 0.166 
Political Uncertainty of State 
Executives (Senate) 179 0.031 0.145 -0.167 0.228 
Political Uncertainty of National 
Executive (Congress) 179 -0.062 0.410 -0.600 0.543 
Political Uncertainty of National 
Executive (Senate) 179 0.094 0.511 -0.638 0.785 
Political Uncertainty of National 
Executive (House) 179 -0.227 0.467 -0785 0.638 
State Revenue as a % of GDP 179 0.007 0.067 -0.187 0.165 
Deficit as a % of GDP 179 -2.331 1.876 -6 2.4 
Years Since 1945 179 44.793 11.123 28 63 
Total # of Provisions in Law 179 134.067 168.382 1 1066 
State Partisan Balance 179 -0.434 0.209 -0.772 -0.148 
Partisan Congruence 179 0.039 0.295 -0.321 0.772 
Congress to State Distance 179 1.310 0.492 0.5 2 
Congress to President Distance 179 1.123 0.504 0 2 
House to Senate Distance 179 1.341 0.943 0 2 
Senate to State Distance 179 0.810 0.910 0 2 
Senate to President Distance 179 0.950 1.002 0 2 
House to State Distance 179 0.190 0.588 0 2 
House to President Distance 179 1.296 0.958 0 2 
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CONCLUSION 
 In summary, I have created an innovative approach to studying federal delegation 
of authority or centralization and decentralization decisions empirically by coding 
significant legislation from 1973 through 2009.  I have utilized publicly available data to 
collect the remaining parameters of interest to evaluate the factors I argue are related to 
Congress‘ decision about when the states are given more or less authority in national law.  
These parameters include the distance between the preferences of Congress and the 
states, Congress and the national executive branch, and state and national political 
uncertainty.  I have also collected the variables necessary to test existing theories of 
centralization as competing hypotheses.  Later chapters provide large-N and small-N 





Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria additional information: Non-domestic legislation was 
excluded from this list including: Public Law Numbers: 99-440, 107-040, 107-243, and 
108-025 (The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Authorization for Use of Force 
against those Responsible for Recent Terrorist Attacks, Authorization for Use of Force 
against Iraq, and HIV/AIDS funding for Africa and the Caribbean). 
 
Other Categories of Delegation: There were a number of ―other‖ categories that were also 
coded including public-private partnerships, delegation to private contractors, delegation 
to the judiciary, and delegation to international agents. This other category was not 




Policy authority is given to any national entity (e.g., president, independent commission, agency), including 
when a new national program/agency is created & when a program is transferred between agencies. 
State 
Policy authority is given to state entities (state entities are defined to include: state legislature, state 
agencies, local government, school boards, township actors, metropolitan planning organizations, tribal 
actors, rural areas, urban centers, etc.). No national authority or funds are mentioned in that provision. 
Joint 
If policy authority is given to both national and state actors (e.g., grants- in-aid to states, state-national 
programs, national-tribal partnerships), including when states have authority for a program but national 
money is authorized. This code also includes when national money is withheld from states that don‘t meet 
certain standards, when state actors can offer alternatives that national agencies must accept, and when a 
national entity provides training or technical assistance to the states or vice versa. 
Other 
If authority is delegated to the judiciary, to private actors, to a public- private partnership, or to actors 
external to the U.S. (national-foreign partnerships) the provision is coded as ―other.‖ Party committees are 
defined as private actors. In addition, if the provision (1) doesn't give authority to any actor (e.g. definitions 
of terms in the policy), (2) mentions a project or program but no specific responsible entity is described, (3) 
appropriates (or earmarks) money but not for a specific entity/program, or (4) when "the sense of 









Coding Protocol for Federal Policy Delegation 
Pam Clouser McCann 
January 4, 2010 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
 
This protocol introduces:  (a) the criteria for classifying key concepts related to 
delegation of authority to entities in a federation; and (b) the coding procedures that will 
allow us to generate variables that operationalize these concepts.   
 
1. Concept of Delegation 
Delegation of Authority is the assignment of authority and responsibility to another 
entity.  This is when Congress empowers another actor/group to make choices and 
complete the tasks necessary to result in an outcome from the delegated work.  
Delegation is the shift of decision-making authority from Congress to some other 
person/group—the assignment of power to another.  Congress relies upon this other 
entity (its agent, in a broad sense) to provide a set of functions or to implement the 
policy.  Congress can delegate to a wide variety of people, groups, and organizations in 
the United States including:  the national executive branch (this includes the president 
and federal agencies), the states, joint partnerships between the states and the national 
agents, the judiciary, private corporations or non-profit groups, to partnerships between 
national agents and private/non-profit entities, or even to foreign countries or 
international organizations.   
 
Possible Agents of Congress Examples 
National A national agency, the president, a 
national commission 
State Governors, one or more states, states in 
general 
Joint States and a national agency, governors 
and the president 
Judiciary Courts or law enforcement in general 
Private/Non-Profit Industry, non-profit foundations 
Private-National Partnership National agency and a non-profit 
foundation 
Foreign/International/-National Partnership World Health Organization, NATO, etc. 
 
2. Concept of Authority 
Authority (as defined by West‘s Encyclopedia of American Law): is the (right of) power 
to enforce laws, exact obedience, command, determine, or judge.   This can also be 
referred to as the power or right to give orders or make decisions or the responsibility of 
administrative control over others.  Along with authority is accountability—those entities 
that receive a delegation of authority are ultimately accountable for their actions and the 
outcomes that may result.  The extents to which oversight is conducted and clear 
demarcations of accountability are available differ widely across policies and over time.     
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2.  Concept of Policy Area 
Policy Area is the categorization of policy types according to the Policy Agenda Project‘s 
(PAP) definitions.  These include economic, health, environment, among others.  Please 
refer to the PAP website for the full listing of policy areas, subtypes and definitions at:  
http://www.policyagendas.org/codebooks/topicindex.html 
 
3. Coding Delegation and Policy Area 
Coders obtain evidence of delegation of authority and the policy types by reviewing 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) summaries of public laws from 1973 through 
2010.  The laws coded include significant legislation and a random sample of non-
significant legislation over this time period.   
  
Unit of Data Collection: The unit of observation is each provision summarized by 
CRS.  Consequently, each law coded will have multiple 
provisions that are coded. 
 
Date:   Fill in the date you coded the law & your initials in the top  
left-most cell in the Excel spreadsheet. 
 
Authority: Designate whether no, national, state, joint, or other entity 
is delegated responsibility (see details below). 
 
Policy Type:   Use Policy Agenda‘s Project‘s Master Topics Codebook to 
assign policy area coding.  The codebook is found at 
http://www.policyagendas.org/page/topic-codebook.  
 
Authority:   
0. No Authority:  Mark the provision as a 0 or ―no authority‖ if no agent/entity 
received a delegation of power in that provision‘s summary. 
 
1. National: Designate a 1 if Congress delegates authority to a national agent (the 
President, national agency, commission, etc.) 
includes when a national actor is responsible for listing state agencies 
(but the states are not responsible for anything specific in that 
provision) 
includes when a new program is authorized and created but no 
mention of where it is located (assume it means a national agency) 
includes when agencies are transferred to a national agency 
includes when national actor's authority is limited (but no other entity 
is mentioned as taking more responsibility) 
includes when a national actor is jointly responsible with a private 
entity 
 
2. State: If Congress delegates authority to the states (or agents of the states), mark 
that provision with a 2.   
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state entities are defined to include:  governors, state legislatures, 
state agencies, local government, school boards, township actors, 
metropolitan planning organizations, tribal actors, rural areas, urban 
centers. 
Includes explicit mention that states assume federal duties (as long as 
no national agencies are involved in that provision and no money 
from national entities) 
Does not include mentions of states within joint partnership policies 
(see #3) 
 
3. Joint: When Congress creates (or continues) a partnership between national and 
state-level agents, indicate that this is a ―joint‖ provision or a 3.  A partnership 
includes cases when both sets of entities are each given authority but no 
relationship between the two is described.   
includes national-tribal partnerships 
includes when national actors withhold money from states that don't 
do X or provisions that provide states with money that do Y. 
includes when state actors can offer alternatives to those mentioned 
in the provisions, but that the national agency must accept the 
alternative if it determines that it would provide certain things 
Includes when state actors and private actors are responsible or 
eligible for grants/demo projects from national entities 
 
4. Other:  When a provision delegates authority to any other entity (law 
enforcement, courts, private, non-profit corporations, groups, industry). 
 
99. Unknown:  When a provision appears to imply that an entity is responsible but a 
reading of the full text of the legislation and/or the relevant year‘s U.S.C. (United 
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Congressional Intergovernmental Delegation of Authority from 1973-2008: 




In the first three chapters I introduced the federal policy design dilemma and 
provided a framework for considering intergovernmental delegation. The theoretical 
argument examines how policymaker preferences and political uncertainty with respect to 
implementation influence congressional intergovernmental delegation choices. In this 
chapter, I analyze the main arguments of this theory at the aggregate level of Congress 
using the novel dataset developed in the previous chapter. Specifically, I study how the 
distance between the ideal points of a pivotal legislator in Congress and his state and that 
pivotal legislator and the national executive branch, along with state and national 
executive branch political uncertainty, influence the degree of decentralization in 
significant national laws from 1973-2008.  In addition to conducting systematic empirical 
tests of my theory, I test alternative hypotheses by incorporating factors including policy 
type, partisan ideology, federalism-related electoral concerns, and average partisan 
congruence of the national political institutions with the state-level political institutions.  
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I begin by specifying the hypotheses to be tested in this chapter, then describe the 
research design and variables used in this study. After setting up the research design, I 
present the results of the analyses and conclude by discussing the implications of the 
empirical results in light of my theory, rival arguments, and the limitations of the data.  
TESTING THE THEORY 
In Chapter 2, I begin with an aggregate model of how Congress decides the 
degree of authority to allocate to the states versus the national executive branch in policy. 
Congress perceives of itself as the principal and optimizes the eventual policy outcome 
by choosing the degree of authority to delegate to the states and the national executive 
branch. The authority ranges from zero (complete centralization with the national 
executive branch) to one (complete decentralization to the states). This initial model 
provides a framework for understanding the intergovernmental delegation choices made 
in national laws. Specifically, I propose four inter-related hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1:  As the distance between the pivotal legislator and his state 
increases, state authority allocation decreases except when the distance 
between that legislator and the national executive branch is greater. 
 
 Hypothesis 2:  As the distance between the pivotal legislator and the 
national executive branch increases, state authority allocation increases 
except when the distance between that legislator and his state is greater.   
 
 Hypothesis 3:  As transformed state political uncertainty increases, state 
authority allocation decreases. 
 
 Hypothesis 4:  As transformed national political uncertainty increases, 
state authority allocation increases.   
   
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
            As described in detail in Chapter 3, to evaluate the conditions under which 
national legislators delegate authority to intergovernmental actors, this study utilizes the 
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law as the unit of analysis and includes 179 significant pieces of legislation from 
Mayhew‘s list of major laws from the 93
rd
 through the 110
th
 Congresses.  
Dependent Variable 
To measure the dependent variable of intergovernmental delegation, I utilized the 
new dataset of policy authority delegation in laws delegated to national, state, and joint 
actors to create a decentralization proportion that collapses these three categories, where 
decentralization is the combination of the proportion of provisions delegated directly to 
the states plus one-half of the proportion of provisions delegated to both the national 
executive branch and the states. The degree of decentralization ranges from zero to one, 
with a mean of 0.249 and a standard deviation of 0.274. Thus, on average, national laws 
delegate about a quarter of their provisions to the states.  Stated another way, 25 of the 
179 laws delegated solely to the national executive branch and 102 delegated at least 
some portion of the provisions to the states, either alone or in combination with national 
executive branch actors.    
Independent Variables 
            What explains variation in intergovernmental delegation over time? In this 
section, I review the measurement of the independent variables. First as outlined earlier, 
my primary theoretical variables require measures of legislative, national executive 
branch and state preferences along with political uncertainty. Second, I elaborate the 
control variables included in the analysis. Third, alternative arguments require measures 
of policy type, Republican national government, partisan congruence, and election year. I 




            The preference distance of legislators from their states and the national executive 
branch are fundamental in the theoretical model.  Recall from Chapter 3, however, that 
no accurate measure of these ideal points on the same scale currently exists.  Shor, Berry 
and McCarty (forthcoming) have been developing this measure for many years, but it is 
not available at the time of this study.  Instead, I use party labels as a proxy for the 
approximate location of the actors‘ ideal points.  As discussed in previous chapters, this 
introduces concerns about how to interpret the coefficients of any estimation.   
Specifically, I cannot assume an increase in distance is truly a one unit increase; 
rather it is a move from closer to farther.  Additionally, it is important to note the first two 
hypotheses from the theoretical chapter are generated only when the state and national 
executive branch are not equally distant from the pivotal legislator.  Using party as the 
blunt measure of ideal points yields the possibility that, indeed, they are.  Since I assume 
theoretically Independents align with one of the parties, there are four possible 
configurations of party labels as is shown in Table 4-1, where L is the pivotal legislator, S 
is the pivotal legislator‘s state, and N is the national executive branch.   






 First, the pivotal legislator may have the same party label as both his state and the 
national executive branch.  Second, he may have the same party label as his state, but 
differ from that of the national executive branch.  Third, the legislator may differ in 
partisanship from his state, but have the same party label as the national executive 
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branch.  And, fourth, the legislator may have a different party label as both the national 
executive branch and his state.  Fortunately, the individual bargaining model provides 
information about the identity of the pivotal intergovernmental team, or the party labels 
of the actors (L,N,S) while using party label as a proxy for ideal points.   
According to the results of the bargaining model, under no condition (e.g., any 
configuration of party of the president, the Senate majority, and House majority) will the 
party label of the national executive branch match that of the pivotal legislator‘s state.  
This result is due to the fact that when N=S, legislators are indifferent over authority 
allocation and are not pivotal in the House (only the majority party team with strict 
preferences is pivotal) nor in the Senate (the non-indifferent minority party 
intergovernmental team is pivotal, unless the majority party has enough votes to meet the 
super-majoritarian threshold).  Thus, in the House and in the Senate, the hypotheses are 
expected to hold.
66
   
As discussed in Chapter 3, though, I average the distance between the House and 
Senate to yield an average congressional distance to the state and congressional distance 
to the national executive branch.  This process implicitly assumes the enacted degree of 
state authority allocation is located about halfway between what the House and Senate 
choose in their own separate bills, as is shown in Table 4-2.
67
  In the table, I present the 
distance between the House pivotal legislator and his state and the House pivotal 
legislator and the national executive branch on vertical axis and the same Senate distance 
measures on the horizontal axis.   
                                                 
66
 In the analyses, I conduct separate analyses considering the indifferent team as pivotal.  These results are 
reported in the appendix. 
67
 Although scholars have typically assumed conferences between the House and Senate result in a 
compromise between the two chambers (e.g., Lupia and Sin (2010)), see Magelby (2011) for a 
consideration of why this may not be the case.   
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Table 4-2 Effect of Averaging House & Senate 
    Senate   
  Distance L=S L=N   
House L=S H:α→1 H:α→1   
 
  S:α→1 S:α→0   
L=N H:α→0 H:α→0   






C-N: 2 C-N: 1 
C-S: 1 
α→0.5 
C-S:  2  
α→0 
C-N: 1 C-N: 0 
 
When the House pivotal member is aligned with his state, the House bill will 
decentralize authority (top shaded gray row); since, by assumption, the preferences of the 
national executive branch and the state are not equal, making the state the closer agent.  
Similarly, when the House pivotal member is aligned with the national executive branch, 
the House bill will centralize authority (bottom shaded gray row).  For the Senate, the 
same outcomes are expected (non-shaded rows).  When arrayed with the possible House 
outcomes, as in Table 4-2, the House and Senate bills may agree or disagree on state 
authority allocation.  For instance, when the bills agree (the left to right diagonal 
demarcated by the bold dotted border), the enacted legislation is expected to carry forth 
that choice (e.g., the left to right diagonal below the double line).  When they disagree, by 
averaging the distance measures, I also average the expectation with respect to the 
authority allocation (to a mostly joint partnership, or α→0.5).   
 After this process, the prediction with respect to how state authority allocation is 
expected to change as the distance between Congress and the state and Congress and the 
national executive branch changes must be altered as well.  As the Congress to state 
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distance increases in Table 4-2, state authority allocation decreases, regardless of 
movement in the legislator to national executive branch distance.  This conjecture can be 
seen by moving from C-S:0 (where α→1) to any other C-S distance (at 1, α→0.5 and at 
2, α→0).  As the Congress to national executive branch distance increases, given the 
Congress to state distance, state authority allocation increases.  This increase is shown by 
moving from C-N: 0 to C-N:1 or 2, where α→0 becomes α→0.5 and α→1 respectively.  
These expectations are in line with the previous hypotheses 1 and 2.  Thus, Hypotheses 1 
and 2 can be restated for Congress in the following manner: 
 Hypothesis 4-1:  As the Congress to state distance increases, given changes in 
the Congress to national executive branch distance, decentralization decreases. 
 
 Hypothesis 4-2:  As the Congress to national executive branch distance 
increases, given changes in the Congress to state distance, decentralization 
increases. 
 
As a reminder, the distance measures have the following properties in the dataset: 
            Distance between Democratic (D) House and Republican (R) State|-1-1 | = 2  
            Distance between R Senate and R State = |1 – 1| = 0 
Distance between R Senate and D National Executive Branch = | 1 – (-1)| = 2 
            Distance between Congress and State = (2+0)/2 = 1 
            Distance between Congress and NEB = (0+2)/2 = 1 
            In the House, the distance measures reveal that the legislator-to-state distance is 
perfectly negatively correlated with the legislator-to-national executive branch distance. 
Of the 179 laws examined in this study, 63 are cases where the legislator-to-state distance 
measures two and the legislator-to-national executive branch measures zero. The 
remaining 116 laws are cases where the legislator-to-state distance measures zero and the 
legislator-to-national executive branch measures two. In the average congressional 
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distance models reported below, the Senate variation allows both distances to be included 
in the analysis. For the models including Senate and House measures, I create a dummy 
variable that codes a zero for when the states are closer to the pivotal House member and 
a one when the national executive branch is closer (and the states are more distant).  
Political Uncertainty 
            Political uncertainty refers to the likelihood that the party of the president or 
governor will be different during implementation than at enactment.  As discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3, I measure political uncertainty as the rolling average of the past three 
elections‘ electoral margin for the top two opposing candidates for the governor for 
election years.  I use the average of the past three elections in order approximate 
legislators‘ perceptions about how uncertain the party of the executive branch at the 
national and state levels may be.
68
  For off-election years, I use the mean of this rolling 
average and one (representing perfect certainty). In order to normalize the hypotheses 
(e.g., the direction of the effect of the political uncertainty is the same for all legislators), 
this measure is then transformed by multiplying by 1 if the pivotal legislator and his state 
have the same party label and -1 if they do not.  
To measure national political uncertainty, I create a variable in the exact same 
manner (using electoral college vote margins) and an alternative dummy variable for 
presidential election years, where election years are coded as a zero and off-election years 
as a one.
69
 This second measure approximates the situation when national political 
uncertainty is zero during off election years (or that the party of the president is known 
                                                 
68
 The results are robust to changing this timeframe to 4, 5, and 6 years. 
69
 Since this measure is a proxy for legislators‘ perceptions of uncertainty over the preferences of the 
implementing executive, the electoral vote margin provides a closer approximation of this concept.  I also 
utilize the population vote margin in the analyses and find the coefficient on the variable is near zero, 
insignificant, and does not improve model fit in any of the specifications. 
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with certainty) and one during election years (or that the party of the incoming president 
is completely uncertain).  The national political uncertainty measures are transformed in 
the same manner as the state political uncertainty measures.  
Alternative Arguments’ Variables 
To consider alternative arguments, I include measures for partisan congruence, 
Republican control of national institutions, election year, and policy type. I use Krause 
and Bowman‘s (2005) vertical partisan congruence variable to consider their adverse 
selection hypothesis (where Congress decentralizes authority when the states share 
similar partisanship to the Congress and the President and centralizes otherwise). To 
measure the congruence between the partisan makeup of the national and state 
governments, Krause and Bowman interact two categorical variables measuring partisan 
balance at each level. At the national level, -1 captures when all three institutions 
(executive, and both legislative chambers) are majority Democratic, +1 when all three are 
Republican, and 0 for cases of divided government.
70
  At the state-level a similar process 
ensues: the states are weighted by their electoral college votes and aggregated to create a 
single state partisan balance variable. As these partisan control variables increase, 
Republican control increases.  
In addition, I interact these national and state partisan balance variables, following 
Krause and Bowman, to ―create a comprehensive national-state partisan interaction term 
[that] taps into the degree of vertical partisan congruence between national and state level 
political institutions‖ (Krause and Bowman 2005, 372). Conventional wisdom suggests 
that as Republican control increases (or as the national partisan balance measure 
                                                 
70
 Additionally, divided-divided government is measured as a -0.5 when Democrats control two of the three 
institutions and +0.5 when Republicans do.  
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increases), state authority delegation will also increase.
71
  The interactive argument 
forwarded by Krause and Bowman conjectures that as partisan congruence increases, 
decentralization of authority to the states also increases.  
To consider Nicholson-Crotty‘s (2008) contention that Congress refrains from 
state mandates during election years, I create a variable that is coded as one during 
election years (every two years) and zero otherwise. Finally, for Peterson‘s (1995) 
argument that federal delegation is based on the type of policy considered, I create a 
variable using the Policy Agenda‘s project topic and subtopic codes and Peterson‘s policy 
coding scheme (198-201, 1995).
72
  Redistributive policies, according to Peterson, are 
those that ―reallocate societal resources from the haves to the have-nots‖ in comparison 
to developmental policies that ―provide the physical and social infrastructure necessary to 
facilitate a country‘s economic growth‖ (17, 1995).
73 
 For this variable, developmental 
policy is coded as 0 and a redistributive policy as 1.  
Control Variables 
There are a variety of other variables expected to influence the delegation of 
authority to the states. Scholars commonly control for the federal deficit, state fiscal 
health, traditional state policies, an activist national government, and unified government
 
                                                 
71
 I also utilize simple dummy variables of party for the majority in the House, majority in the Senate, and 
party of the President as well as categorical measures for when Republicans control these three institutions 
at the national level. The results do not differ dramatically from using national partisan balance, therefore, I 
include that measure here.  
72
 The Policy Agenda‘s Project Topic Codebook was accessed from the Fall, 2008 through the Fall, 2009 at 
http://www.policyagendas.org/codebooks/topicindex.html.  
73
 Peterson includes transportation, natural resources, safety, education, and utilities as developmental 
policies and redistributive policies as pensions/medical insurance, welfare, health and hospitals and 
housing. I checked the robustness of the findings with respect to including education as a developmental 
policy and then as a redistributive policy and found no significant difference in the results. I include 
education as a redistributive policy in the reported analysis. Policy areas are obtained from the Policy 
Agendas Project (Jones, Wilkerson, and Baumgartner 2008). 
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(Krause and Bowman 2005, Nicholson-Crotty 2008).
74
 The federal deficit or surplus 
measure was obtained from the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
2008 Historical Tables. I utilize the previous year‘s surplus or deficit as a percentage of 
the gross domestic product measured in constant fiscal year 2000 dollars. As the federal 
deficit increases, previous scholars argue that state responsibility will increase. State 
fiscal status is measured as the previous year‘s percent change in revenues as obtained 
from the U.S. Census Bureau State Government Finances website (in addition to archived 
historical data provided via email from the Census Bureau). I use state own-source 
revenues at time t and derive the percent change in these revenues (100*[revenue at time 
t – revenue at time t-1]/revenue at t-1). As state revenues increase, state responsibility is 
expected to increase. 
As for traditional state policies, an activist public, and unified government, I 
include a rough proxy for the status quo level of state authority by including a dummy for 
policies that are considered to be traditional state policies (Gostin, 2002). These policies 
include education, health, and social welfare (and are coded as a 1) and other policy areas 
as a 0. During the time span of my study, the federal government had already entered 
these traditional realms of state policy. I expect, though, that state authority delegation 
will be positively associated with traditional state policy areas in comparison to other 
types of policies.  
                                                 
74
 Although not commonly included in studies of decentralization, I also incorporated controls for 
heterogeneity of state governors, heterogeneity of the majority party in each chamber, percent majority in 
each chamber, a blunt dichotomous measure of the technical uncertainty of the policy, and various time 
trends as these factors could potentially account for differences in delegation strategies. These variables 
were statistically insignificant (with the exception of percent majority in the Senate) and did not alter the 
empirical results. Moreover, I included a temporal variable that measures years from 1973 that ranges from 
zero (at 1973) to 34 (at 2007) (as well as nonlinear versions of a time trend) but dropped this variable from 
the analysis due to lack of improvement in the models and high correlation with many of the other variables 
such as federal deficit.  
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I use Mayhew‘s (1992) activist public mood variable to control for more activist 
years in the study. This variable is coded as 1 in 1973-1976, and 0 thereafter.
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  I expect 
these years to be associated with centralization of authority at the national level (due to 
an activist public), thus the direction of the effect of this variable on state authority 
allocation will be negative. Finally, I incorporate unified government by coding a dummy 
variable that is one during times of unified government (when the House, Senate, and 
president are of the same political party) and zero otherwise. It is possible that legislators 
may use delegation to the states in order to move policy forward during politically 
contentious times.  I expect movement from a unified government to a divided 
government to be associated with an increase in delegation to the states.  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Given the structure of the dependent variable as a proportion that ranges from 
zero to one, estimation can be challenging, particularly since my variable includes values 
that are zero or one. I approach this problem from two different angles. First, I proceed 
with OLS using the continuous variable (proportion of delegation to the states) as the 
dependent variable and cluster by year, to address the potential that errors may be 
correlated within years. Second, I estimate the model using a fractional logit (Papke and 
Woolridge 1996, Ye and Pendyala 2004). By using a fractional logit, the predictions lie 
in the range of the dependent variable and the model specification takes into account the 
heteroskedastic errors. The statistical and substantive conclusions are consistent across 
both estimation strategies. I report OLS results in the next section, followed by the 
fractional logit results.  
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 Krehbiel (1998) also uses a version of a public mood variable that is coded as a 4 in 1973 and decrements 
one step each year until reaching a 1 in 1976 and a 0 for each year thereafter. I examine the models using 
this alternative measure and find no substantive or statistically significant difference in the results.  
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RESULTS 
In Table 4-3, I present three models using the average distance between the House 
and Senate (i.e., Congress) and their intergovernmental agents. The first model includes 
only the key variables from the theoretical argument, the second adds controls, and in the 
third model, I assess alternative arguments. In Model 1, as the theory predicts, I find as 
the distance between the pivotal members in Congress and their states increases, 
delegation to the states decreases. Additionally, as state political uncertainty increases, 
delegation to the states also decreases, all else constant. The addition of the control 
variables in Model 2 does not alter the direction of the effect of these theoretical 
variables, although they both increase in magnitude.  
In Model 1, the magnitude of the coefficient on the distance between Congress 
and the states is such that given a bill with 100 provisions, a regime with similar 
Congress and state partisanship would centralize authority with the national executive 
branch for more than 16.4 of those provisions (as opposed to delegate them to the states), 
when the distance between the national executive branch and the pivotal legislator is 
zero, but would centralize authority in  12.5 provisions when the national executive 
branch to Congress move farther apart (-16.4+3.9).  This result is statistically significant 
at the p<0.001 level.  Also in line with expectations, as state political uncertainty 
increases, delegation to the states decreases in a statistically significant manner (by about 
13.4 provisions in a 100 provision bill).  What this means is that for a Democratic 
legislator with a Democratic state governor, as state political uncertainty increases by one 
unit, authority will be delegated to the national executive branch alone (instead of to the 
states or via joint partnership policies) for more than 13 provisions in a 100 provision 
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law.  As national political uncertainty increases, delegation to the states increases by 
about 3.1 provisions, but this finding is not statistically significant. 
Table 4-3 Congressional Distance & Degree of Decentralization using OLS 
d.v. = decentralization proportion (0 is total 
centralization and 1 is total 
decentralization) 








Congress to State Distance - -0.164*** -0.232* -0.358**  
    (0.043) (0.090) (0.116) 
Congress to President Distance + -0.089* -0.132* -0.200*  
    (0.035) (0.057) (0.093) 
Interaction of State & National 
Distance   0.039 0.046^ 0.091*  
    (0.024) (0.028) (0.040) 
State Political Uncertainty - -0.134* -0.174* -0.121 
    (0.050) (0.078) (0.084) 
National Political Uncertainty + 0.031 0.026 0.004 






Traditional State Policies (0,1) +   0.124*** 0.109*  
      (0.031) (0.046) 
Unified Government (0,1) +   -0.048 -0.211*  
      (0.030) (0.078) 
Activist Public Mood -   -0.055* -0.072**  
      (0.021) (0.025) 
Federal Deficit as a % of GDP 
(lagged) +   0.006 0.011 
      (0.008) (0.010) 
State Revenue Growth as % of GDP 
(lagged) +   -0.002 -0.131 






Election Year (0,1) -     -0.011 
        (0.027) 
Redistributive Policies (0,1) -     0.03 
        (0.063) 
National Partisan Balance +     0.342*  
        (0.144) 
State Partisan Balance +     -0.031 
        (0.121) 
Partisan Congruence (NPB x SPB) +     0.730*  
        (0.353) 
  Constant   0.336*** 0.449** 0.634**  
      (0.082) (0.153) (0.201) 
  N   177 177 177 
  Adjusted R2   0.02 0.141 0.128 
  Model standard errors are clustered by year. p values: ^ 0.10, * 0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001. 
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In contrast to expectations, when the distance between the state and the pivotal 
legislator is zero, as the distance between the national executive branch and the pivotal 
legislator increases, decentralization also decreases (by about 8.9 provisions for a 100 
provision bill).  And when the distance between the state and pivotal legislator is moves 
farther apart, as the distance between the national executive branch and Congress 
increases, decentralization decreases (by about  3.9 provisions).   
With the addition of control variables in Model 2, the size of the coefficients on 
the distance variables increases (from 16.4 to 23.2 provisions for the Congress-to-State 
distance, 8.9 to 13.2 provisions for the Congress-to-National distance, and 3.9 to 4.6 
provisions for the coefficient on the interaction between the two distance measures), as it 
does for the state political uncertainty variable (from 13.4 to 17.4 provisions).  The 
precision of these estimates decreases, although the results still reach traditional levels of 
significance.  
Of the control variables, traditional state policies are more likely to be delegated 
to the states.  Moving from policy areas that are not traditionally delegated to the states to 
those that are (e.g., education, health) is associated with an increase of about 12.4 
provisions in a 100 provision bill that would be decentralized to the states.  In addition, 
less authority was delegated to the states during more activist years (1973-1976) than 
post-1976 years (approximately 5.5 provisions).  The coefficients on movement from 
unified to divided government at the national level, the federal deficit, and states‘ fiscal 
health are not statistically different from zero, indicating, at least in these specifications, 
the possibility they are unrelated to federal delegation design cannot be rejected.   
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What Model 3 reveals is slightly different. First, the theoretic variables still 
perform as they did in Models 1 and 2, with the exception of an increase in the standard 
error of state political uncertainty. Second, the rival arguments‘ variables perform as 
expected by their authors‘ and are statistically significant with the exception of election 
year and policy type, which are both not statistically different from zero in the model. As 
the national political institutions become more Republican, more provisions are delegated 
to the states (34 more provisions in a 100 provision law when State Partisan Balance is 0) 
and when the national and state political institutions are more similar in average 
partisanship, more provisions are delegated to the states.  
Due to the high degree of multicollinearity, however, there is a problem with 
estimating Model 3 and including my theoretical variables and the alternative arguments. 
The variance inflation factor after the analysis reveals that the Congress to state and 
Congress to national distance measures along with the partisan congruence and state and 
national partisan balance measures have a VIF greater than 100, indicating a high degree 
of multicollinearity. A model including only the rival arguments and controls find that the 
coefficients for the alternative arguments have the same sign, but the magnitude is 
reduced and they are no longer statistically significant. Furthermore, the adjusted R
2
 
indicates that Model 2 (my theory with controls) accounts for more of the variation in the 
dependent variable than this larger model (alternatives with controls)—14.1% versus 
12.8%.  Thus, the more parsimonious and theoretically driven model provides a better fit 
with the data. 
In summary, the aggregate analysis of the determinants of congressional 
intergovernmental authority provides a degree of support for the theory of federal policy 
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design.  In particular, as the distance between Congress and the state increases, state 
delegation of authority decreases and as state political uncertainty increases, state 
delegation of authority also decreases.  Not as consistent with the theoretical expectations 
is the finding that as the Congress to national executive branch distance increases, 
delegation to the states decreases.  One potential reason for this finding may be 
measurement error in the preference distance.   
Another potential issue is the need to account for the proportional nature of the 
dependent variable in the estimation.  The results reported above are based on OLS 
estimation. Yet, with a dependent variable that is a proportion that ranges from zero to 
one, there are flaws in using OLS, such as heteroskedastic errors and results that lie 
outside of the range of the dependent variable.
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 Fractional logit modeling techniques 
provide a framework for considering the unique issues of an outcome variable that 
represents fractions of a quantity of interest (Papke and Wooldridge 1996, Ye and 
Pendyala 2004). In my model, the dependent variable represents the fraction of the 
proportions in a law delegated to the states (either directly or via joint partnerships). I 
provide the results from using fractional logit estimation in Table 4-4. Overall, the 
fractional logit reveals the same findings with respect to my theory of intergovernmental 
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 Tobit analyses of the same model as OLS with 0 and 1 boundaries have results consistent with those 
reported for OLS. 
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Table 4-4 Congressional Distance & Degree of Decentralization with Fractional Logit 
d.v. = total joint & state provisions/total 
provisions 













Congress to State Distance - -1.495* -1.091  
    (0.732) (1.185)  
Congress to President Distance + -1.296* -1.044  
    (0.517) (0.896)  
Interaction of State & National 
Distance   0.284 0.239  
    (0.163) (0.333)  
State Political Uncertainty - -0.967 -1.26  
    (0.743) (0.820)  
National Political Uncertainty + -0.206 0.269  






Traditional State Policies (0,1) + 0.835*** 0.607* 0.618*  
    (0.217) (0.270) (0.271) 
Unified Government (0,1) + -0.822*** -0.370 -0.850 
    (0.241) (0.587) (0.460) 
Activist Public Mood - -0.378 -0.56 -0.689*  
    (0.226) (0.311) (0.304) 
Federal Deficit as % of GDP (lagged) + 0.006 0.041 0.064 
    (0.063) (0.081) (0.072) 
State Revenue Growth as % of GDP 
(lagged) + 3.758** 4.876** 4.892*** 






Election Year (0,1) -   0.061 -0.086 
      (0.220) (0.214) 
Redistributive Policies (0,1) -   0.581 0.608 
      (0.426) (0.334) 
National Partisan Balance +   -1.039 0.24 
      (1.074) (0.774) 
State Partisan Balance +   -0.596 -0.265 
      (0.860) (0.660) 
Partisan Congruence (NPB x SPB) +   -2.400 0.951 
      (2.362) (1.750) 
  Constant   1.094 0.238 -1.263*** 
      (1.247) (1.925) (0.232) 
  N   179 179 179 
  Wald Chi   152.275 229.265 130.389 
 Model standard errors are clustered by year. p values: ^ 0.10, * 0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001. 
 
            Specifically, the state distance and national distance measures are negatively 
related to state authority allocation and are statistically significant in Model 5 (although 
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not in Model 6, again likely due to the severe multicollinearity). Unexpectedly and in 
view of the coefficients on the national-to-Congress distance and the interaction between 
national and state distance, as the distance between the pivotal legislator and the national 
executive branch increases, delegation to the states decreases in a statistically significant 
manner and regardless of the value of the distance between the states and the pivotal 
legislator.  
            In other words, across all specifications, even when the distance between 
Congress and the states is zero, as the distance between Congress and the national 
executive branch increases, delegation to the states decreases. This finding holds across 
specifications and indicates that contrary to my positive prediction for this coefficient, 
Congress delegates fewer provisions to the states as the distance between Congress and 
the National Executive Branch increases. This finding may point to the limitations in 
using a blunt joint partnership measure in the data coding process for the dependent 
variable (see Chapter 3) or it may indicate the complexity of the relationships between 
Congress, the national executive branch and the states inherent in these joint partnerships. 
Specifically, perhaps it is more difficult for Congress to monitor and control national 
executive branch agencies if the states are also included as an agent. This result indicates 
that further research in this area is needed. 
            A closer look at the interactive effects of these distance measures through a graph 
reiterates the finding that as the distance measures between the pivotal legislator in 
Congress and his state increases that the predicted proportion of decentralization 
decreases. This decrease is evident across all levels of distance between that pivotal 
legislator and the national executive branch (see Figure 4-1). At each national distance 
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level, the slope of the line is negative. Furthermore, as this national distance increases, 
the predicted proportion also decreases as can be seen with the step down pattern of the 
three lines. The coefficient on the interaction, though, is not statistically significant.  
            The results of fractional logit models also indicate that the alternative arguments 
do not explain state authority allocation in a statistically significant manner. The signs on 
the coefficients for election year, national partisan balance, state partisan balance, and 
partisan congruence flip from Model 6 to Model 7 in Table 4-4. Model 6 includes both 
my theoretical variables and the variables for the rival arguments as well as controls. 
Model 7 excludes my argument‘s variables to assess the effect of the rival arguments on 
decentralization in the data. The flip in signs is most likely due to inflated standard errors 
in the presence of severe multicollinearity between my argument‘s variables and those of 
the alternatives. When I exclude my theoretical variables, though, the rival arguments do 
not reach statistical significance. Election year, policy type, Republican national political 
institutions, and average partisan congruence between the states and national institutions 
fail to significantly explain how Congress delegates across this broader dataset.  

















































            The model in Table 4-5 considers the possibility that averaging the distance 
between pivotal House members and their states with the distance between pivotal 
Senators and their states to create congressional distances may hide crucial chamber 
differences.
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  The results in Model 8 (using OLS) show that as the Senate becomes more 
distant from the states, they decentralize fewer provisions to them and as state political 
uncertainty increases, decentralization decreases, although the sign on both of these 
coefficients are positive in Model 9 (the fractional logit model).  
Table 4-5 Senate & House Distance Measures 
  OLS Fractional Logit 
  
Model 8 d.v. 
proportion 
Model 9 d.v. #state&joint 
provisions/total 
provisions 
Senate More Distant (0,1) -0.140* 1.37 
  (0.062) (0.711) 
Senate State Political Uncertainty -0.43 2.717 
  (0.249) (2.557) 
House More Distant (0,1) 0.188 0.89 
  (0.189) (1.524) 
House State Political Uncertainty 0.583 2.835 
  (0.622) (4.994) 
National Political Uncertainty 0.035 0.246^ 
  (0.020) (0.186) 
Constant 0.075 -2.887*** 
  (0.098) (0.742) 
N 177 179 
Adjusted R2 0.134  
Wald Chi2   108.885 
Model standard errors are clustered by year. p values: ^ 0.10, * 0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001 
 
The coefficient on the difference between the pivotal House member and his state 
governor‘s partisanship is not statistically different from zero according to the results 
across model specifications. Model 9 is also the only model that finds a statistically 
significant and positive effect of national political uncertainty on delegation choices. The 
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 Although, as discussed earlier, there is no theoretical basis in this project to understand how the House 
and Senate bills ultimately combine into an enactment.  This consideration deserves further attention and I 
refer back to it in the concluding chapter. 
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concern in Models 7 and 8 is multicollinearity between the Senate and House distance 
measures, to which the fractional logit is more sensitive. Therefore, I rely on the average 
distance measures for Congress. 
 Additionally, I model the House and Senate separately in Table 4-6.  The findings 
for the Senate and House independently are consistent with those reported in the previous 
tables.  In the OLS model of the Senate, as the distance between the pivotal senator and 
his state increases, delegation to the states decreases and as state political uncertainty 
increases, state delegation also decreases.  The coefficients in the House are not 
statistically different from zero.  Whether these findings can lead to the conclusion that 
the Senate holds more sway over federal policy design, though, remains to be seen.  A 
better measurement of ideal points will offer more variety in the House distance 
measures, thereby providing more leverage for the analyses.  In addition, there may be 
certain circumstances when one or the other chamber is more crucial, such as whether the 
policy area is more local than state-based (e.g., education), where the House may be more 
important.  Furthermore, models utilizing an alternative indifference assumption as 
discussed in Chapter 2 (i.e., the indifferent majority party team in the House and the 
indifferent minority party team in the Senate are the pivotal teams) reveal that House-to-
State and –National distances perform as expected in those models (see Appendix).  
There are two possible reasons for this result:  1) the additional variation gained by using 
the indifferent pivot aids in the estimation or 2) the House forms coalitions differently 
than the Senate.  Either way, House and Senate interactions deserve additional attention 
in the future and the conclusions of this study still stand.       
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 In summary, although the findings are not consistent with expectations about 
national executive branch distances and national political uncertainty, across models and 
estimation strategies, the hypotheses with respect to state distance and state political 
uncertainty receive strong support.  Taking these findings together, the theory of federal 
policy design provides insight into how Congress delegates authority 
intergovernmentally. 
Table 4-6:  House and Senate Individual Models 
  OLS OLS 
  Senate House 
Senate-to-State Distance -0.152***   
  (0.036)   
Senate-to-National Distance -0.052   
  (0.026)   
Senate State Political Uncertainty -0.542*     
  (0.200)   
House-State (0,1) Distance 0.188 0.178 
  -0.189 (0.191) 
House State Political Uncertainty 0.583 0.517 
  -0.622 (0.607) 
National Political Uncertainty 0.02 0.024 
  (0.021) (0.017) 
Other Chamber's Majority Party 0.008 0.007 
  (0.013) (0.012) 
Constant 0.332*** 0.018 
  (0.076) (0.103) 
N 177 177 
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.127 
Wald Chi2     
Model standard errors are clustered by year. p values: ^£0.10, *£005, **<0.01, 
***<0.001.  Control variables included traditional state policies, unified 
government, activist mood, federal deficit, and state fiscal health. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
            The results of this chapter reveal that previous ideas about federal delegation to 
state-level actors are, at best, incomplete and, at worst, misleading. Instead, hypotheses 
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based on the logic of federal delegation with intergovernmental teams find support across 
a variety of models, specifications, and estimation techniques. The laws included in the 
current analysis span three decades and indicate that a consideration of individual 
legislators in Congress and their relationships with their individual states and that of the 
national executive branch is informative for how Congress delegates authority. This 
novel dataset reveals that although delegation from Congress to national entities is the 
most frequent strategy, delegation to state-level agents occurs commonly and in concert 
with national delegation. A focus on horizontal delegation misses these frequent state-
level agents and the importance of intergovernmental delegation options.  
            What the empirical results in this chapter indicate is the importance of a 
consideration of both the national and state political context of national policy. More 
specifically, a consideration of national legislators‘ choices over intergovernmental 
delegation of authority must consider 1) the relationship between individual legislators 
and their individual states, 2) the relationship between legislators and the national 
executive branch, and 3) political uncertainty at both levels.  
When the proportional nature of the dependent variable is taken into account, in 
contrast to commonly held beliefs, Republican administrations don‘t devolve authority 
more than Democrats. Moreover, partisan congruence between the states and the national 
institutions is not found to be a statistically significant factor. In addition, the size of the 
federal deficit and timing of elections do not explain the choice of Congress to create 
provisions that delegate power away from Washington. As expected, as the states do 
better financially, the national government relies more on them to implement national 
laws.  
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            There are some limitations to the state authority allocation with intergovernmental 
teams model and the empirical analyses. First, the intergovernmental delegation argument 
and preference distance empirics rely on the assumption that partisanship provides cues 
as to the preferences of the actors in the model. As more refined measures of preferences 
at the different levels (national and state) become available later this year, this stylization 
can be relaxed. Second, I collapse measures of federal delegation into a proportion that 
varies from 0 to 1. Altering the degree of state authority captured in joint delegations 
does not change the findings reported here. Future work should take a closer look at how 
joint partnerships are structured and how Congress may use these joint structures under 
different conditions. Third, I have not included interactions with the judiciary, an 
important agent in concerns over federalism. Future work should consider the influence 
of court preferences and/or decisions on state authority allocation as well.  
            Overall, this chapter tests a theory of intergovernmental delegation against rival 
arguments using a novel dataset of delegation of authority across 35 years. I show that 
many of the components in the theory of intergovernmental delegation are supported in 
the analyses whereas other arguments fail to explain the variation in authority 
centralization in this broader dataset. The theory of intergovernmental delegation with 
state authority allocation incorporates state implementers and explicitly considers 
legislators‘ incentives given they are elected from state-level constituencies and better 
explains delegation choices than previous arguments.  
            A fascinating divergence from my hypotheses about intergovernmental delegation 
is that as the distance between Congress and the national executive branch increases, 
even contingent on the state distance, Congress delegates fewer provisions to the states. 
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This finding indicates the need to consider more specifically the structure of joint 
partnership policies and how these structures may be used differently when the 







Table 4A-1:  Multivariate Analysis of State Allocation of Authority in National 
Legislation **using alternative assumption regarding indifference** 
d.v. =decentralization proportion (0 total centralization and 1 total 
decentralization, thus + coefficient = increasing state allocation of authority). 
Robust s.e. in () with clustering by  
year. 
 
Model 2A Theory 






Congress to State Distance - -0.221*** -0.209** 
  
-0.061 -0.065 
Congress to President Distance + 0.029 0.053 
  
-0.042 -0.053 
State Political Uncertainty - -0.025** -0.024** 
  
-0.009 -0.008 
National Political Uncertainty + 0.006 0.007 






Unified Government (0, 1) + -0.051* -0.1 
  
-0.025 -0.058 
Federal Deficit as a % of GDP (lagged) + 0.009 0.007 
  
-0.01 -0.01 
State Revenue Growth as a % of GDP (lagged) + 0.495* 0.405 
  
-0.218 -0.22 
Traditional State Policies (0,1) + 0.119*** 0.083*  
  
-0.032 -0.04 
Activist Public Mood - -0.013* -0.013 





Redistributive Policies (0,1) - 
 
0.06 
   
-0.045 
State Partisan Balance + 
 
0.035 
   
-0.087 
National Partisan Balance + 
 
0.076 
   
-0.099 
Partisan Congruence + 
 
0.213 
   
-0.241 
Election Year - 
 
-0.007 
      -0.022 






  N 
 
177 176 
  Adjusted R
2







Table 4A-2: House and Senate in State Allocation of Authority in 
National Legislation using Alternate Indifference Assumption 
d.v. =decentralization proportion (0 total centralization and 1 total decentralization, thus, + 




House to State Distance 
-
0.098*** 
  -0.025 
House to President Distance 0.017 
  -0.019 
House State Political Uncertainty -0.027**  
  -0.008 
House National Political Uncertainty 0.012 
  -0.007 
Senate Senate to State Distance -0.434**  
  -0.158 
Senate to President Distance 0.372**  
  -0.135 
Senate State Political Uncertainty -0.019**  
  -0.006 
Senate National Political Uncertainty 0.029**  
  -0.01 
Controls Unified Government (0, 1)  
   
Federal Deficit as a % of GDP (lagged) 0.008 
  -0.008 
State Revenue Growth as a % of GDP (lagged) 0.436*  
  -0.183 
Traditional State Policies (0,1) 0.120*** 
  -0.031 
Activist Public Mood -0.003 
    -0.008 
  Constant 0.12 
    -0.111 
  N 177 
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Health Insurance Reform and Intergovernmental Delegation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Most national laws include delegation of authority to the states, either alone or in 
partnership with national-level actors.  The amount of state-level responsibility in 
national laws varies over time and in ways that current arguments about Republican 
devolution, aggregate partisanship, the timing of elections, and the type of policies fail to 
explain.  I contend that previous arguments miss a crucial feature of American politics, 
namely the intergovernmental context of national legislators, and that intergovernmental 
policy design is based upon this context, in combination with the rules governing each 
legislative chamber.  By intergovernmental context I mean that state-level constituents 
elect legislators and the partisanship of a state‘s leadership is paramount to how the 
policy will be implemented when the states receive authority in national law.  Thus, 
individual legislators are concerned about what their state will do with the policy when 
considering various national proposals with intergovernmental delegation.   
After developing a theory of intergovernmental delegation based on this 
intergovernmental context and creating a database of intergovernmental delegation, I 
conducted a large-N aggregate analysis, which reveals support for my argument.  
Specifically, I find that as a pivotal intergovernmental group of legislators becomes more 
distant from their states, delegation to the states decreases and that as uncertainty over 
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the partisanship of the next term‘s state leadership increases, state delegation decreases.  
In this chapter, I use a case study to extend this analysis by providing an in-depth 
consideration of the national politics of the 2009-2010 health insurance reform, which 
eventually yielded the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).  The 
intergovernmental delegation within the ACA and the voting rules and processes of the 
House and Senate ultimately resulted in health insurance reform that involves both 
national and state policy implementers on a massive scale and in uncharted territory.  
By focusing on the nuances of the politics surrounding one policy, I gain a closer 
look of how and why Congress created the intergovernmental structural choices it did.   
Underlying the wheeling, dealing, and partisan bickering was the strategic and careful use 
of state and national delegations of authority in House and Senate proposals.  
Policymakers mindfully created the architecture of responsibility within the myriad 
policies debated where states or national-level bureaucrats had authority within the 
policy.  A close consideration of these bills reveals that they differed significantly in the 
degree of authority delegated to the states.  The central question of this chapter is a 
consideration of why policymakers crafted proposals with such variation in the extent to 
which authority was delegated to the states.  Specifically, I consider three crucial 
components of the theory of intergovernmental design from Chapter 2, the states as a 
viable agent for Congress, legislators‘ intergovernmental context, and the importance of 
the institutional rules of each chamber in determining the bills each produced.         
The case study method allows me to consider if real-world legislators behave in 
the way I hypothesize they do and if the posited mechanism is at work in national 
policymaking.  The benefits of focusing on health insurance reform are twofold:  the 
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recent process was fresh in the minds of staffers and numerous different reform proposals 
were voted on, each varying in the extent of intergovernmental delegation.  The 
limitations, of course, include the focus on one policy area and one time period, limiting 
my ability to consider whether policy type or the passage of time influence 
intergovernmental delegation.  Further, there is the problem of the relative constant 
partisanship of the national and state-level executive branches (only two states changed 
governors during the voting on health insurance reform measures), a key element in my 
argument.  Thus, the counterfactuals of how legislators would behave if a Republican 
was in the White House and/or their state governor was of a different party are 
unavailable.  Due to the lack of counterfactuals, this case study does not fully test my 
theory.   
In sum, this case study of health insurance reform allows me to examine three 
aspects of my theory: intergovernmental delegation strategies used by legislators, how 
legislators‘ intergovernmental context contributes to state authority allocation, and the 
effect of institutional differences between the House and Senate on proposals and 
legislative behavior (e.g., statements or voting).  I am unable, however, to check whether 
legislators would have chosen different delegation options under a Republican president 
or alternative governor.  I can, though, examine the machinations of policy actors with 
respect to the mechanisms underlying my theory and compare the theoretical 
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 One of the rival explanations is that policy type determines delegation choices, since I only consider one 
policy type in this chapter, I cannot examine this particular argument. 
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I analyze, using the coding processes elaborated in Chapter 3, the structure of 
delegation in the bills voted on in the House and the Senate including the Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions (or HELP) and Finance committee bills from the Senate, 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (or ACA), the Tri-Committee House bill, 
and the Health Education and Reconciliation Act (or HERCA), as well as the patterns of 
voting and signs of support on measures by legislators in both chambers.  I utilize 
archival resources including votes cast, transcripts of committee hearings and floor 
debates, news media, memos, blogs, and reports issued by key players such as 
congressional elite, the Congressional Budget Office, the Governmental Accountability 
Office, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and the Office of Management and Budget.  In 
addition, I code the results of anonymous interviews conducted from July through 
September 2010 with current and former Democratic and Republican congressional 
staffers.   
This chapter proceeds first by briefly setting the context for health insurance 
reform in the United States.  Second, I consider my theory of federal policy design in the 
context of health insurance reform.  Third, I elaborate the methods and analyses 
employed in this case study.  Fourth, I analyze crucial aspects of my theory regarding 
how legislators delegate authority across federal levels.  Finally, I consider alternative 
arguments about centralization and decentralization of policy authority in comparison to 
intergovernmental delegation hypotheses.       
CONTEXT OF HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM 
 Reforming the health care system played a large role during the 2008 presidential 
campaigns and particularly in the Democratic primaries (Reichard 2008, Cooley 2008).  
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Data on the vast amounts of money sunk into health care in the United States compared 
to other developed nations, yielding shockingly poorer health outcomes, the lack of any 
or adequate insurance for millions of Americans, and the rapid increase in health care 
costs were emphasized repeatedly (see Murray and Frenk 2010 for an overview of the 
data and trends from the World Health Organization data).  A Commonwealth Fund 
(2010) report on the congressional bills as of December 2009 summarizes the prevailing 
conditions on the minds of policymakers:   
In September, the Census Bureau reported that 46.3 million 
people lacked health insurance in 2008, up from 45.7 million in 
2007. The Commonwealth Fund estimates that in 2007 an 
additional 25 million insured adults under age 65 had such high 
out-of pocket costs relative to their income that they were 
effectively underinsured, an increase from 16 million people in 
2003… An estimated 79 million adults, both with and without 
health insurance, reported problems paying their medical bills in 
2007 and 80 million reported a time that they did not get needed 
health care because of cost… At current cost trends, average 
family premiums in employer plans are expected to nearly 
double by 2020. 
 
Coupled with the ever-increasing out-of-pocket expenses insured workers were being 
asked to pay, increasing 8.5% between 2004-2006, the Democratic base (and the majority 
of all Americans) expressed dissatisfaction with the current system and the need to 
change the status quo (Fuchs and Emanuel 2005, Farley 2009, Cunningham 2010).   
With big wins at the polls in November 2008, it was possible that Democrats 
would take on the challenge of reforming the ―broken‖ health care system.  Yet, the cry 
for change had been present for decades, and policymakers had repeatedly failed to 
deliver (Gray et al. 2009, Light 2011, Skocpol and Williamson 2010).  The collapse of 
the Clinton administration‘s massive effort and eventual health proposal in 1993-1994 
and the difficulties encountered in passing and sustaining other health-related legislation 
146 
(for instance the Medicare Catastrophic Care Act in 1988 and subsequent repeal) led 
many in the health policy community to take the ―believe it when I see it‖ perspective.
79
   
In addition, those knowledgeable about the system of health care and public 
health in this country expressed the dire need to overhaul the organization, financing and 
delivery of health and public health services (Chassin et al 1998), including the 
employer-based health insurance system, the fractured public and private health care 
funding, and the organization of local health departments, to name a few (Jacobson and 
Gostin 2010, Fuchs and Emanuel 2005).  Such a large upheaval seemed politically 
impossible in a society with strong, organized, and vested interests in the current system 
and with the enormous price tag and uncertainty accompanying such an effort.       
Jacobs and Skocpol (2010) discuss the expert advice given to Obama that he 
should only work for incremental changes in health care and health insurance, if any at 
all.  Yet, Ted Kennedy‘s plea that Obama make health reform an agenda priority, along 
with the Democratic majorities in the House and Senate seemed to work together to make 
the initial presidential push for health insurance reform along with the extended sideline 
cheering from the White House to Congress (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010).
80
  Instead of 
pursuing the Clinton strategy of assembling experts knowledgeable about the nuances of 
the public health and health care system, writing a detailed bill, and then giving it to 
Congress for debate and hopeful passage, Obama outlined broad principles of reform and 
left Congress with the work of crafting and deliberating the specific contours of health 
insurance reform (Oberlander 2009).  Jacobs and Skocpol (2010) add that ―it was not that 
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 See Light(2011) for a brief review of the organization and financing of health care along with reform 
efforts over the decades and Gray et al. (2009) regarding state policy advances and failures.      
80
 The authors, based on interviews with staffers, cite Kennedy‘s losing battle with brain cancer as a key 
motivating factor. 
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different from what always happens when [fashioning] major legislation… [following] 
the paths and practices used for years [by Republicans and Democrats alike]…building 
the necessary coalitions to enact it through five committees and the entire House and 
Senate in less than a year.‖    
The ACA, as modified by HERCA, is a law with hundreds of provisions touching 
on various aspects of health care, health insurance, and public health in the United States 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2010).
81
  The law requires U.S. citizens and legal residents to 
have health insurance (the individual mandate) or pay a monetary penalty, and requires 
employers to offer their employees coverage, both with certain exceptions and 
specifications.  ACA also creates state-based health insurance exchanges (or organized 
marketplaces for private insurance) and small business health options program (SHOP) 
exchanges with specifications regarding benefits, options, and rating rules and increases 
the rules and regulations over the health insurance industry with greater national-level 
involvement.   
The law expands Medicaid to all under the age of 65 with incomes up to 133% of 
the federal poverty level with additional funds to aid states in the expansion.  The ACA 
supports comparative effectiveness research, provides demonstration grants to states 
regarding medical malpractice alternatives to current tort litigations, and improves 
preventative services and long-term care coverage.  Additionally, it provides limitations 
to ensure that federal funds are not used for abortions.  The ACA is expected to cost 
approximately one trillion dollars and is projected to reduce the federal deficit by $143 
billion over the next ten years‖ (Hacker 2010, Cutler, Davis, and Stremikis 2010).        
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 The Kaiser Family Foundation provides a summary of the ACA as modified by HERCA (as well as the 
Senate and House bills and ACA alone) at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf.   
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During the debate and since the passage of the health insurance reform law, policy 
elites and public health scholars have remarked on the potential and magnitude of the 
reform calling it ―the most important piece of health care legislation since the creation of 
Medicare and Medicaid‖ (Cutler 2010), ―the most sweeping reform in health insurance 
since the creation of Medicare…and Medicaid‖ (Light 2011), ―a remarkable policy 
breakthrough‖ (Hacker 2010), and  ―a historic health care reform law that will help 
ensure that all families are able to get the care they need, as well as financial security and 
relief from rising premiums…the first step toward bending the health care cost curve for 
the federal government and families‖ (Cutler, Davis and Stremikis 2010).   
The recent health insurance reform legislation does not lack for its critics, though.  
Jacobson and Lawrence (2011), for instance, say that ―[d]espite its innovation in health 
care access, prevention and wellness, the [the health insurance reform law] takes the 
existing system as a given and does little to change the fundamental dynamic on how 
public health is organized, financed, and delivered‖ and Ruger (2010) states that ―the Act 
is primarily about health insurance, not health care delivery.‖
82
  Light (2011) also 
discusses the failure of policymakers to deal with ―the increasingly unreliable foundation 
of employer-based health insurance.‖  In the end, the success of health insurance reform 
depends upon three things:  the ability of Congress to fund the existing pieces of the 
legislation, the capability of current and future politicians to fine-tune the policy, and the 
commitment of implementers, including the Department of Health and Human Services, 
the America‘s Health Insurance Plans, health care practitioners, and state policymakers 
and bureaucrats, to name a few.      
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 See also Jacobson and Lauer (2010) for an interesting assessment of Skocpol and Williamson (2010) and 
potential pitfalls related to whether ACA ―will be a transformational event.‖   
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 What is interesting, from the perspective of this chapter, about the context of 
health insurance reform legislation in 2009 and 2010, is the fact that although federalism 
and intergovernmental issues were foundational in how the various pieces of legislation 
were crafted, few scholars and pundits have remarked on their significance during the 
debates and passage.  In fact, federalism has only taken on importance as states have filed 
suit against the federal government for encroaching on state sovereignty with respect to 
Medicaid expansion and as states began working with the Department of Health and 
Human Services (or HHS) to implement various provisions (Chollet 2010, Nichols 2010, 
Jennings and Hayes 2010, Iglehart 2011, Hodge et al. 2010, yet see Jost 2010 or 
Rosenbaum 2010 for an earlier consideration).  And yet, this study‘s closer look reveals 
that crafting the intergovernmental nature of health insurance reform played a key role in 
this policymaking venture.   
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Intergovernmental Policy Design 
 Recall the answer as to why Congress varies the intergovernmental structure of 
policies, according to my theory, is that legislators prefer to delegate to the closest agent, 
either the states or the national executive branch.  This consideration of the leadership in 
the states from which legislators hail creates four types of legislators in Congress:  
Democratic legislators from states with Democratic governors (DD legislators), 
Democratic legislators from states with Republican governors (DR legislators), 
Republican legislators from states with Democratic governors (RD legislators), and 
Republican legislators from states with Republican governors (RR legislators).  The 
majoritarian rules of each chamber, the frequency of the intergovernmental teams, and 
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the party of the president determine which of these teams is pivotal to policy success in a 
chamber, or around which team‘s preferences voting for a policy depends.   
The predictions that surface from the theory of intergovernmental delegation 
under a Democratic president, as in the 111
th
 Congress, are equivalent to the conventional 
wisdom that Republicans prefer to devolve authority to the states (unlike those under a 
Republican president).  The mechanisms at work, though, are different.  With respect to 
intergovernmental delegation, the intergovernmental context of legislators is crucial.  
Namely, DR legislators want to centralize authority, RR legislators push for 
decentralization, and DD and RD legislators are indifferent between the two choices, but 
align with their co-partisans.  The pivotal team in the House was the DR legislators‘ team 
and in the Senate, for the majority of the 111
th
 Congress, was the RR legislators‘ team.   
Given the array of institutional actors, this theory predicts that a Democratic 
House under a Democratic president will centralize authority in House bills.  In contrast, 
the Democratic Senate, constrained by super-majoritarian requirements to overcome real 
or potential filibusters will decentralize authority just enough to get 60 votes by attracting 
some RR legislators, but not enough to lose DR Senators.  This theory also provides 
predictions about how individual legislators will behave, on average: 
 DR legislators in the House and Senate will voice a preference to 
centralize and vote accordingly. 
 DD legislators in the House and Senate will be indifferent regarding 
centralization, but will likely vote with DR legislators. 
 RR legislators in the House and Senate will state and vote for a preference 
for decentralization. 
 RD legislators in the House and Senate will be indifferent regarding 
centralization, but will likely vote with RR legislators. 
 
The following section describes the data collected in order to examine the mechanisms 
and predictions of the theory and rival arguments.   
151 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 For this in-depth qualitative project, I utilize an explanatory case study design and 
consider the mechanisms underlying the theory of federal policy design versus rival 
explanations of policy decentralization for explaining the state allocation of authority in 
the various health insurance reform policy proposals.  Within the single case of the 2009-
2010 health insurance reform policy, there are multiple subunits for analysis.  
Specifically, I define my case to be the congressional health insurance reform process 
from November, 2008 through March, 2010 and a subunit to be a national legislative 
package debated and voted on in at least one venue.  This definition yields five separate 
subunits within the health insurance reform case:  the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act (HERCA), the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), the 
House Tri-Committee bill, the Senate HELP Committee bill, and the initial Senate 
Finance bill.   
 I utilize multiple sources of evidence including documents, archival records, and 
semi-structured interviews with policy elites.  By triangulating these data sources, I 
attempt to uncover the preferences of legislators with respect to intergovernmental 
delegation of authority.  Legislators may use rhetoric (to the media, during committee 
hearings, or on the floor) to discuss how they feel about a measure, they may use actions 
(committee or floor voting, in addition to the rhetoric), and they may privately discuss 
strategies with their policy staffers.  Triangulation of the data over time is crucial, since 
members of Congress may also use rhetoric to hide their preferences or their voting 
behavior from their constituents (or others) or they may feel forced to vote in particular 
ways due to partisan pressures.   
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I analyze the resulting data for overarching themes, the calculus of individual 
legislators, and important features of the negotiation and crafting of the legislative 
packages in the House, in the Senate, and between national-level institutions.  Next, I 
delineate the process used to access archives, obtain documents, and conduct the 
interviews.    
Archival records include votes cast, party identification, dates of election, and 
data on state governors and elections (see appendix for details on collection).
83
  For each 
national legislator the following archival data was utilized:  name, chamber, district, state, 
election year, party, governor‘s name, governor‘s election date, governor‘s party, votes 
cast on the floor, and votes cast in committee.  Committee votes were captured from the 
transcripts of committee markups and voting sessions.  The documents examined for this 
project included media outlets such as blogs, newsprint (online and hard copy sources), 
television and radio transcripts, as well as transcripts of committee meetings, roundtables, 
hearings, and floor debates.  These data sources were searched for the terms ―congress,‖ 
―legislat,‖ ―house,‖ ―senat,‖ ―member,‖ and ―rep‖ and reviewed for content related to 
legislative decision-making.  In addition, I searched for ―state,‖ ―federal,‖ ―intergov,‖ 
―preempt,‖ and ―mandate‖ in order to examine intergovernmental and federalism 
considerations.  Please refer to Appendix A-1 for additional details on the collection 
process.   
In June of 2010, three months following the passage of the ACA and HERCA, I 
emailed key committee staff in the House and Senate with a one page description of my 
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 The United States Senate and House of Representatives online current legislator listings were used to 
capture each legislator‘s date of election.  The National Conference of State Legislators election data 
(gubernatorial results and election dates) were collected from their website and matched to each national 
legislator using Excel. 
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research and a request for an interview (see Appendix A-2).  In addition, due to concerns 
about a possible lack of response and the likely research and health policy fatigue of 
staffers, I individually emailed identifiable staff of all 535 members of Congress (using 
members‘ website information) instead of a sampling.  In all, over 650 emails were sent 
in the final two weeks of the month.
84
  Once in Washington, I used a snowball sampling 
technique whereby I asked each participant to provide a list of names of additional 
staffers I should contact.  I chose to interview staff and not legislators for two reasons:  I 
assumed that staffers would have more available time in Washington during the summer 
months than would legislators and, more importantly, I thought I would be able to get to 
the heart of the mechanisms of why legislators made the decisions they did about what to 
support, not what rhetoric they used, by speaking with key members of their staff.  In the 
end, I was able to interview via phone, email or in-person, twelve policy staffers.      
     In order to gauge the way in which members of Congress thought about 
intergovernmental delegation, I created a list of open-ended questions and prompts to use 
in conversational interviews with the participants.  This list was short (see Table 5-1) and, 
due to the massive nature of the policy, focused on two aspects of health insurance 
reform:  health insurance exchanges and Medicaid.  The degree of state authority in both 
policy instruments was contentious and the narrowing of the interview allowed us to 
delve into specifics of delegation to the states, ideology, and federalism concerns.   
The conversational nature of the interviews allowed staffers to tell the story 
behind the scenes.  Interviews lasted between 45-90 minutes and every staffer had 
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 The overwhelming response from emails was ―no response,‖ an out of the office reply, or an error 
message (those staffers no longer worked for those offices).  Approximately 50 staffers emailed back that 
they had nothing to do with the process and I should contact the relevant committee staff instead.  Four 
replies from these emails were affirmative and I began the interviews in early July with the hope that I 
could increase the number of participants while on site.   
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engaging and interesting stories and anecdotes about the process to relay.  At the end of 
each interview I asked for the names of key individuals with whom I should speak while 
in Washington and assured them their name would not be identified as the referral.  
Although this strategy meant I spent many hours sitting on couches and waiting in 
hallways for staff members to find a few minutes to spare of their time (perhaps to get me 
out of the office), it meant that I ended with a consensus list of key players from both 
parties and chambers.  
Table 5-1:  Staff Interview Prompts 
To what do you attribute the ultimate passage of health reform? 
What were particularly difficult parts of (1) and how were they 
overcome? 
Where intergovernmental issues identified (especially exchanges & 
Medicaid)? 
If yes, how did these issues surface? 
     How were they dealt with? 
     If participant mentions governors/state leaders, the states, elections, 
     ideology/partisanship, or policy type, prompt for more information.  
How about federalism? 
What benefits were there to the way the Senate Finance bill state 
exchanges? 
What detriments? 
What about the House national exchange? 
What key points were there in the Medicaid expansion? 
What are your future concerns for health reform? 
How do expect these will be dealt with? 
Are there other issues with health reform you would like to discuss? 
 
Immediately following each interview, an individual interview report was 
generated, making certain to use unabbreviated language and to highlight any questions I 
had about any particular comments in my notes.  I emailed these questions to the 
interviewees and filled in their responses on the report.  I would then contact or re-contact 
(if I had already sent them an email) individuals who had been listed as key to the 
process.  Once in Washington, I found a positive response to my invitations for an 
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interview from all but one member‘s office.  The staffer from that office responded that 
he or she ―was not comfortable talking about [health insurance reform] and federalism.‖  
Another key office was positive in their response but could not find time in their calendar 
to meet with me during my time in town.  
Staffers who opted to participate in the study were highly involved in the process 
of health insurance reform either in one of the relevant House or Senate committees or in 
their individual member‘s offices.  Only one staffer had not been either at the table while 
the bills were crafted in the committees or in numerous meetings with their boss 
discussing plans of action.
85
  At the time of the interviews (July and September 2010), 
these staffers were carefully watching implementation and some were in the midst of re-
election campaigns.  Participants included Republicans and Democrats from both the 
House and the Senate.     
Following my week of interviews, I assessed the interview documents for 
overarching themes derived from the theoretical argument, rival explanations, as well as 
any additional crucial issues that had emerged in conversations with the staffers. The 
results of these interviews, the coding of the bills and laws, and archival review are 
described in detail in the Data Analysis section.  In particular, the critical aspects of the 
theory of intergovernmental delegation I examine include: 
 Legislators‘ perceptions regarding delegation of authority to the states 
 The influence of chamber rules for who is pivotal in voting, and 
 The nature and influence of legislators‘ intergovernmental context on state 
authority allocation. 
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 That staffer had recently joined the member‘s office, but had discussions with the previous occupant of 
that position and felt comfortable answering the questions provided.  The responses of that staffer align 
with those of the other participants and remain in the results reported here. 
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The intergovernmental context of legislators refers to the fact that when national policy is 
delegated to state implementers, individual legislators in Congress must consider how the 
leadership in their own state will implement the policy.  This implementation is vital 
because the way the language of statutes maps into policy actions determines the ultimate 
policy outcomes.  Prior to analyzing the data from the various sources, I discuss the 
operationalization and measurement techniques used for state authority allocation and 
intergovernmental delegation.   
Federal Authority Allocation 
To measure intergovernmental delegation I followed the procedures outlined in 
Chapter 3 and obtained a summary of the major provisions of each law and bill from the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) through the Library of Congress THOMAS on-
line service.
86
 I used the CRS summary for the enacted legislation and for each bill that 
received action and coded each summarized provision for delegation of responsibility 
according to the set procedures of Chapter 3.  These procedures included assigning a 
provision as ―national‖ when a new national agency was created or an existing national 
agency or group was required to perform a duty or implement the provision, ―state‖ when 
provisions required state or local-level action with no national involvement, and ―joint‖ 
when both state- and national-level entities were assigned responsibility or required to 
establish or maintain a state-national partnership.  After each law or bill was coded, 
summary measures for that law were calculated including:  the total number of 
                                                 
86 Accessed July 2010-February 2011 from http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html.  Previous studies 
often utilize Congressional Quarterly (CQ) Almanac summaries of laws (e.g. Epstein and O‘Halloran 1999 
and Maltzman and Shipan 2008).  A comparison coding of CQ summaries and CRS summaries revealed 
that CQ summaries often provided ambiguous information on the specific federal entity that received 
authority in each provision.  CRS summaries, alternatively, provided details about which entities were 
responsible for each provision included in the summary. 
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summarized provisions in the law or bill, the number of national provisions, the number 
of joint provisions, the number of state provisions and the number of other provisions.  
 To operationalize federal delegation, I first created three continuous measures of 
the proportion of federal delegation in the provisions within each law or bill.
 
The 
proportion of national provisions is the number of national provisions within a law or bill 
divided by the total number of provisions (excluding those that do not delegate authority 
and that delegate to the ―other‖ category) within the measure.  Similarly, the proportion 
of joint-partnership provisions and proportion of state provisions are the number of joint 
(or state) provisions divided by the total number of provisions (excluding as above) in a 
law or bill.  For instance, a law that has a total of 100 provisions with 50 that delegate 
authority to national-level actors, 40 provisions that utilize joint partnerships, and 10 that 
are coded as direct state delegation would be 0.5 national, 0.4 joint-partnership, and 0.1 
state delegation.  
 The overall federal delegation measure, or degree of decentralization, takes into 
account both joint and state delegation choices by collapsing the categories of delegation 
into a continuous measure within the bounds zero to one.  The degree of decentralization 
is calculated by adding the proportion of state provisions in a law (provisions that 
delegate entirely to the states) to one-half the proportion of joint provisions (provisions 
that delegate partially to the states and partially to the national executive branch).  For 
example, a law with 100 provisions:  50 national, 40 joint, and 10 state would receive a 
decentralization score of .30 (50 * 0 + 40 * ½ + 10 *1).   
Table 5-2 lists the descriptive statistics for all four measures for federal authority 
allocation for each health insurance reform bill and law.  Two prominent features of this 
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table include the extensive variation in the degree of authority delegated to the states 
across the proposals and the differences in the House versus Senate choices with respect 
to intergovernmental delegation.  The degree of state authority in the national health 
insurance reform packages ranges from 8.3-42.2%, compared to the average 
decentralization across all laws from 1973-2008 of 24.9%.
87
   
Table 5-2:  Intergovernmental Delegation of Provisions in Health Insurance Reform 
  Provisions Proportion Degree of 
  total none national state joint other National State Joint 
Decentrali-
zation 
HELP Bill 146 8 92 0 41 5 0.69173 0 0.308 30.80% 
TriCommittee  13 0 11 0 1 1 0.91667 0 0.083 8.30% 
Finance bill 66 2 37 6 21 0 0.57813 0.09 0.328 42.20% 
ACA 558 31 349 0 168 10 0.67505 0 0.325 32.50% 
HERCA 77 0 63 0 14 0 0.81818 0 0.182 18.20% 
Provisions refer to the number of provisions, total, no authority delegation, national authority delegation, etc.  
Proportion is the number of national (or state or joint) provisions divided by the total number of national, state, and 
joint provisions. 
 
The House‘s Tri-Committee bill, as predicted by the theory of intergovernmental 
delegation, exhibits the least degree of decentralization of authority to the states or, 
alternatively, the highest degree of centralization with only one of eleven summarized 
provisions including state-level implementation (decentralization score of 8.3%).  The 
next most centralized measure is the Reconciliation package (HERCA), which many 
pundits and policymakers define as the House fix for the Senate-written ACA, scoring a 
decentralization degree of 18.2%.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Senate 
Finance bill is the most decentralized of the policy packages, with a decentralization 
score of 42.2%, followed by the Senate HELP committee package with a decentralization 
score of 30.8%.  In other words, the House proposal and fixer bill were more centralized 
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 The standard deviation for this cross-year average is 27.4 and the range is from 0-100% (see Chapter 3 
for additional details). 
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than the Senate options, which fits with the expectations of the theory of 
intergovernmental policy design.   
This coding provides a skeleton or a summary measure for bills and laws that took 
thousands of hours of work to pass (just including the time during the 111
th
 Congress).  
The remaining sections consider this effort and how these measures and their diverse 
delegation choices came into being. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 In this section I describe the findings from the various data sources described 
above with respect to three components of the theory including, state delegation, 
intergovernmental context, and chamber rules.  Prior to discussing these concepts, I 




Institutions and Actors in the 111
th
 Congress 
In the first session of the 111
th
 Congress, DD legislators were in the majority.  
Specifically, 157 House members and 38 Senators hailed from states with Democratic 
governors and were also themselves Democrats.  The remainder of the Democratic party 
caucus in Congress included twenty Senators (including Lieberman, D-CT) and 93 House 
members who were DR legislators, ten Representatives from states with Independent 
governors, and one Independent Senator from a state with a Republican governor 
(Sanders, I-VT).
88
  These numbers indicate that in the House there were 250 members of 
the Democratic caucus, a comfortable majority given the rules of that institution.  What 
they also reveal is that DD legislators could not pass a bill alone; they needed to gain the 
support of at least one other intergovernmental team in each chamber.  In the House, the 
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 Lieberman can also be coded as an Independent legislator.   
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157 DD legislators needed 61 additional DR legislators (or DI or IR legislators) in order 
to pass a bill on the floor.
89
      
The Senate, given its rules and the potential need for 60 votes to invoke cloture 
and overcome a filibuster by any one senator, faced more of a challenge, in that at least 
three intergovernmental teams were often needed to successfully pass a Senate bill on the 
floor.  From January through April, 28 2009, Senate Democrats comprised only 58 of the 
100 legislators (including Sanders, who caucused with the Democrats).  There were 38 
DD Senators and 20 DR or DI Senators.  With Arlen Specter‘s switch to the Democratic 
party on that date, the Senate reached 59 votes and with the seating of Al Franken of 
Minnesota in July the threshold of 60 votes (Specter became a DD Senator, with the 
Pennsylvania Democratic governor, Ed Rendell and Franken was a DR Senator, with a 
Republican governor, Tim Pawlenty).  Edward Kennedy‘s death in August of that year, 
followed by the election of Scott Brown on January 19, 2010 lowered the Democratic 
majority to 59 votes once again.
90
  In terms of my theory of intergovernmental design, the 
pivotal federal team in the Senate was the team of DR legislators for a scant few months 
in 2009.
91
  For the rest of the 111
th
 Congress, the pivotal team in the Senate was the team 
comprised of RR legislators.     
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 In the 111
th
 Congress, there are two (if Lieberman is counted) Independent legislators.  The theory of 
intergovernmental delegation assumes these legislators fit with one of the majority or minority 
intergovernmental teams and does not provide specific predictions for them.  In this chapter, I consider 
Independents separately to assess whether these legislators act differently than my model suggests. 
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 Paul Kirk was appointed to fill Senator Kennedy‘s position and was in office from Sept 24, 2009 through 
Senator Brown‘s seating on February 4, 2010.  After the special election, though, Senate leaders agreed to 
delay a vote on health care reform until after Brown was seated. 
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 The time specifically included:  July 7 2009 – August 25, 2009, which I do not count since Kennedy‘s 
last floor vote was on April 27, 2009 (60 votes were needed), and September 24, 2009-February 4, 2010 
(when Paul Kirk filled Kennedy‘s seat).  I only count the time period up through the Massachusetts election 
on January 19, 2010, since Senators expressed the commitment (in the Congressional Record) to not pass 
significant legislation until Brown could be seated in February.  Thus, only for the months of October, 
November, and December did the Senate truly have 60 Democratic Senators, and that was only if the ailing 




In the House, the changes between the first and second session of the 111
th
 
Congress included 24 members with new governors in 2010.  New Jersey and Virginia 
elected Republican governors in 2009 where Democrats had previously been in power.  
These changes yielded no differences in the pivotal federal team in the House, though 
there were slight changes in the sizes of the teams.  For both sessions, the pivotal team 
was made of Democratic members from states with Republican governors.  According to 
the theory, these differences in the pivotal teams in the Senate and the House resulted in 
different preferences over whether the states would be given more authority in policy or 
not.  The House‘s pivotal team of Democrats from states with Republican governors 
preferred to centralize power with the national bureaucracy under a Democratic president.  
The Senate, on the other hand, preferred to decentralize authority to the states due to the 
pivotal team of Republicans from states with Republican governors.   
Just prior to the first meeting of the 111
th
 Congress and immediately following the 
2008 elections, media sources began to discuss the potential difficulties Obama would 
have negotiating differences between two powerful committee chairmen in the Senate, 
Baucus (D-MT) and Kennedy (D-MA), and how these same challenges were a problem 
for Clinton‘s health plan (Frates 2008a, 2008b).  These concerns were soon put aside for 
more interesting stories as Obama provided the major principles to be addressed in health 
insurance reform, but left the details up to Congress.  These scintillating issues included 
closed-door health insurance reform proposal negotiations in the Senate with Senator 
Baucus and his ―Gang of Six,‖ Blue Dog Democrats concerns with liberal Democrats in 
the House, and the role of abortion policy in health insurance reform.  The next section 
provides an analysis of the data from archives, documents, and interviews with respect to 
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state delegation, intergovernmental context, and chamber rules as the national health 
insurance reform political process unfolded.   
In the House, three committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, 
and Ways and Means—worked together to craft a single proposal that would eventually 
reach the House floor for a vote.  Other committees and subcommittees also held 
hearings and roundtables on various aspects of health insurance reform during the 111
th
 
Congress, including the Committee on Small Business, the Committee on the Judiciary, 
the Committee on the Budget, and the Committee on Financial Services, to name a few.  
The House debated and passed their version of health insurance reform (Tri-Committee 
bill, HR 3962) on November 7, 2009.    
Although similar to the House, in that a number of committees held roundtables 
and hearings on health care reform topics including the Committees on the Judiciary, 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, and a Special Committee on Aging, the process 
in the Senate was quite different.  Specifically, in the Senate, two committees marked up 
two different bills—the HELP and Finance committees—instead of the three House 
committees working together on one proposal.  The Senate debated the revised version of 
the Finance committee bill (what would eventually become ACA, HR 3590) for 21 days 
in November and December, 2009.  The successful final passage vote took place late on 
December 24, 2009. 
On March 21, 2010, after the special election of Scott Brown (R-MA) to fill the 
vacancy left by the death of Senator Kennedy, the House considered and approved the 
Senate passed ACA bill, immediately followed by a reconciliation package (HERCA, HR 
4872).  President Obama signed the ACA (HR 3590; PL 111-148) on March 23, 2010.  
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The Senate raised procedural concerns with HERCA and sent it back to the House with 
amendments on March 25, 2010, where it passed and was sent to the President to be 
signed (on March 30, 2010), thus ending this episode in modern health insurance reform.  
Although the saga of health insurance reform continues as political actors mount 
challenges to the ACA as modified by HERCA and the states and national executive 
branch are fully engaged in implementation of many of its provisions, this chapter only 
considers the strategic crafting of the health insurance reform proposals in order to 
successfully enact a national law.        
In all, in the House, given the closed rule consideration of health insurance 
reform, thirteen votes in 2009-2010 were on health insurance reform specifically (or less 
than 0.8% of all votes).  Of those votes, Republicans maintained a united front, voting 
together against the House bill, the ACA, and HERCA, with one exception.  Louisiana‘s 
Joseph Cao voted in favor of the House bill on the final passage of the Affordable Health 
Choices Act.  Cao told a Louisiana paper that "[m]y commitment is to support the 
President in his reform bill" (Tidmore 2009).  The Representative, though, voted against 
the health insurance reform measures throughout the rest of the 111
th
 Congress.  In 
comparison, there was variety in the voting behavior of House Democrats.  Forty-six 
House members voted against one or more of the health insurance reform proposals.
92
    
On the Senate floor, there were thirty-four votes cast with respect to the ACA 
during the debate that lasted from November 21 through December 24, 2009 and forty-
four votes on HERCA from March 23-25, 2010.  These votes included motions to invoke 
                                                 
92
 For instance, Mitchell of Arizona‘s 5
th
 district voted against the reconciliation measure that returned 
amended from the Senate, but voted in favor of all other measures and Teague of New Mexico‘s 2
nd
 district 
is one of four members who voted for the Senate amended HERCA, but against all other health care reform 
measures.  Kucinich of Ohio is one of eight Representatives who voted against the House bill, but in 
support of the ACA and HERCA. 
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cloture (except on HERCA, since it was time-limited to begin with) and various 
amendments.  This number means that out of the entire 696 votes cast on the floor during 
the 111
th
 Senate, 11.2% were on the ACA or HERCA.  All Democrats and Independents 
voted in favor of ACA on final passage.  For HERCA, since it was a reconciliation 
measure, which sidestepped the filibuster, a simple majority was all that was needed for 
passage.  Even so, only three Democratic Senators changed their votes from aye to nay:  
Lincoln and Pryor of Arkansas and Nelson of Nebraska (who no longer received the 
Cornhusker kickback in HERCA).   
The preceding committee votes had also been straight party-line votes with 
Democrats voting to report the bill and Republicans voting against doing so, with the 
exception of Olympia Snowe (RD, Maine) on the Finance committee.  Snowe voted in 
favor of reporting the bill, though she voted against the technical corrections and 
modifications the chair had made and stated that her vote in committee was only that and 
her vote on the floor would not necessarily be the same. 
 These votes provide a glimpse at the behavior of legislators during the process of 
crafting health insurance reform.  In the following sections, I rely on the actions of 
legislators, their statements, and the strategies discussed by their staffers and examine the 
extent to which I find support for assumptions underlying and hypotheses derived from 
the theory of intergovernmental delegation.  In particular, I assess whether delegation to 
the states is used as a strategy to craft successful policies, whether legislators 
intergovernmental context, or more specifically their partisan relationship with their 
governors, influences the optimality of delegation to the states, and whether the 
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institutional rules of each chamber influenced which legislators were pivotal during 
proposal passage.      
State Delegation 
One staffer remarked that a crucial question was, ―are we going to let the states 
have any power‖ as various proposals were vetted among committee leadership and staff.  
According to the theory, under a Democratic president, Republican legislators prefer 
delegation to the states and Democratic legislators prefer centralization to a national 
executive branch.  One Republican staffer went on to say that legislators ―gave up long 
ago respecting the whole concept of the states.‖  Delegation to the states, according to 
staffers, was more of a political strategy than based on any specific beliefs about 
federalism and the appropriate division of authority.  ―The Gang of Six crafted the role of 
the states‖ commented one staffer, a second participant added that ―to get Snowe‘s vote, 
[the Finance Committee] made [health insurance exchanges] state based,‖ and ―Nelson 
gave states more control to soften bill and make it more conservative,‖ said another.  On 
the House side, staffers commented that the centralization of authority to the national 
executive branch was because legislators were concerned about what the states would do 
with the policy.  Thus, delegation to the states versus to the national executive branch 
was a strategic feature of both House and Senate proposals.  The next question, is why 
legislators used intergovernmental delegation as a strategy.   
Although staffers remarked that legislators crafted the House and Senate 
proposals based on ―a function of what you can do politically,‖ legislators‘ rhetoric on 
the floor and in committees suggest a variety of possible reasons why the House bill was 
centralized and the Senate bill decentralized. An examination of the transcripts from 
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House hearings reveals that Democratic House members were dubious of the capability, 
potential for success, and usefulness of delegating authority to the states for health 
insurance exchanges.  ―Given that consolidation [of insurance companies] threatens to 
eliminate competition in the State insurance markets, why would the State-based 
connector be better?‖  (Velazquez, D-NY).
93
  Concerns about state-based exchanges 
included that some states weren‘t performing well currently, that disparities in health and 
services would continue to exist, and that continuing the patchwork health policies in 
existence would lead to worsening health outcomes.  
Moreover, House Democrats extolled the virtues of one national exchange, 
including the benefit of transparency and the ability for genuine reform.  A handful of 
Democrats also discussed the importance of allowing states the flexibility of further 
reform and innovation above the floor set by the national policy:  ―… I do celebrate the 
fact that our colleague from Ohio, Dennis Kucinich, was able to get through an 
amendment that allows states to use single-payer, to experiment with it, which they 
cannot do now without this amendment.  And I am fighting to keep that in the bill‖ 
(Conyers, D-MI).  Conyers and Kucininch were both DD legislators and, according to my 
theory, would be indifferent between centralization and decentralization. 
Health policy staffers provided additional details into what was progressing 
behind the scenes of House deliberations.  One participant stated that Democrats did not 
want to decentralize authority to the states because the states had ―not done well‖ with 
other health policies in the past.  Specifically, the concern was that some states 
implement national laws poorly, such as ―by not drawing down all their Medicaid funds‖ 
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 Health insurance exchanges were also called connectors and organized insurance markets, among other 
things. 
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(meaning that a state did not invest enough state resources to be able to receive all of the 
federal money available to that state for the Medicaid program).  House Democrats, 
according to all Democratic House staffers, were worried about inequities across the 
states and exacerbating health disparities if the states were given authority over the health 
insurance reform implementation.  Republican House staffers, during the interviews, 
decried the lack of ability of the states in the Tri-Committee bill to tailor the health 
insurance reform to their population.       
Republicans in the House also revealed frustration and a powerlessness against 
the Democratic majority.  Representative Kline (R-MN), for instance, stated, ―What we 
do know about the Democrats‘ plan, [is] it is the Democrats‘ plan.  We haven‘t seen it 
until we got a glimpse of the 852-page monster on Friday.  The Democrats‘ plan is it 
increases the role of the Federal Government through a new government-run plan and an 
expansion of Medicaid.‖  Republicans overwhelmingly agreed that health reform was 
needed, but voiced concern about the choices of House Democrats.  Specifically, their 
comments repeatedly denounced the centralization of the House plan and the failure of 
House Democrats to include their perspective in the proposal.  According to my theory, 
though, due to the simple majority needed to pass a House bill, there was no need for 
House Democrats to engage with Republicans in order to pass their health insurance 
reform bill.   
  The Senate bill, on the other hand, did include a degree of Republican input 
through the select group of legislators in the ―gang of six‖ on the Finance committee and 
a number of Republican amendments.  The specific reason for the difference between the 
House and Senate perspectives regarding including Republican preferences in their 
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proposals is discussed in a later section. One reason for Senate decentralization, though, 
provided by staffers, and backed by the language used by legislators in debates was a 
―benefits of federalism‖ argument where the ―states are better informed about their own 
particular population and needs,‖ ―more in tune and locally accountable,‖ said another, 
and ―technically better‖ said a third.  These three respondents were all Republican 
staffers.  Orrin Hatch (R-UT) backs up these staffers‘ statements as he describes his 
version of a better health reform proposal in a 12/2/2009 floor speech: 
We could give States flexibility to design their own unique 
approaches to health care reform. Utah is not New York, 
Colorado is not New Jersey, New York is not Utah, and 
New Jersey is not Colorado. Each State has its own 
demographics and its own needs and its own problems. 
Why don't we get the people who know those States best to 
make health care work? I know the legislators closer to the 
people are going to be very responsive to the people in their 
respective States. I admit some States might not do very 
well, but most of them would do much better than what we 
will do here with some big albatross of a bill that really 
does not have bipartisan support. There is an enormous 
reservoir of expertise, experience, and field-tested reform.  
We should take advantage of that by placing States at the 
center of health care reform efforts so they can use 
approaches that best reflect their needs and their 
challenges. 
 
 Democratic staffers, though, point to either a ―blame avoidance‖ reasoning or, 
alternatively, a ―build on the status quo‖ argument instead.  In particular, legislators 
―wanted states to have skin in the game.  [Democrats] don‘t want the government to be 
held responsible for everything,‖ said one staffer and legislators ―don‘t want all their eggs 
in one basket,‖ remarked another.  In other words, Democratic legislators hoped that by 
incorporating delegation to the states in the Senate plan, they would be able to deflect 
blame for any problems down the road and possibly be able to avoid the ―too big 
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government‖ claims of Republicans.  In hindsight, Democratic staffers found it notable 
that decentralization was under the radar of the public and that the common perception of 
the law was of a national government in charge of everything.   
 One committee staffer remarked that ―building on state-based policies and 
regulations in existence made more sense.‖  This participant illuminates yet another 
reason for decentralization, using the status quo policies to craft reform proposals.  
Specifically, health care and health insurance policies have traditionally been in the 
purview of the states.  For instance, since the time Congress delegated regulation of the 
insurance industry to the states in the McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945, states have been 
in charge of overseeing the health insurance industry.
94
  To keep such regulation at the 
state-level in national reform made sense to legislators according to this staffer. 
 Although staffers offered many different reasons for delegation to the states, using 
federalism as a guiding principle was not one of them.  Senator Snowe (R-ME) remarks 
in a transcript of a Finance hearing on October 13, 2009, ―We have heard legitimate 
proposals from both sides about the proper role of Government in providing the answers.  
I think it is clear we all struggle with the appropriate equilibrium.‖  Snowe appears to be 
referring to legislators‘ struggles over when to centralize versus decentralize authority.  
One Senate staffer said once legislators chose the delegation strategies to be used, they 
―worked with constitutional scholars and the parliamentarian such that the language [of 
the policies and delegation options chosen by legislators] did not overstep the federal 
government‘s role.‖  In other words, that legislators first chose the decentralization 
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 In brief, following a Supreme Court ruling (United States versus South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association) that Congress (based on the Commerce clause) could regulate insurance, Congress passed the 
McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945, which gives states authority to do so.  This law does not mandate the 
states regulate insurance, instead, it expressly does not preempt relevant states laws that do such regulation.  
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strategy and then made sure it was worded appropriately. Thus, it was not a question of 
what is the appropriate balance of state versus federal control or what are national versus 
state boundaries of action, it was about political strategy.
95
  
―At the end of the day a lot of [who gets authority] depends on how you get votes 
[in Congress],‖ remarked one staffer.  In other words, although there were many reasons 
for and against the different delegation options proposed in the health insurance reform 
bills, the underlying motivation for the delegation choices was how to form successful 
policy coalitions, or coalitions of legislators that could move a policy through a chamber 
to the end result of enacted legislation.  The theory of intergovernmental delegation offers 
a perspective on how this coalition formation occurs.  In particular, legislators‘ 
preferences in favor of centralization versus decentralization in national law depend on 
their intergovernmental context.   
A legislator‘s intergovernmental context refers to the fact that when considering 
the outcomes that will result from delegation to national actors versus state actors, a 
legislator must consider the distance between his own ideal point with that of the national 
executive branch and his state‘s executive branch.  Thus, a legislator‘s partisan agreement 
or disagreement with their governor is a critical aspect of the theory.  In the next section, 
data on the importance of intergovernmental context is discussed.  An added benefit of 
this examination is that it suggests a few distinguishing points between the conventional 
wisdom that Republicans devolve and the intergovernmental theory. 
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 One staffer digressed to talk about how different the practice of policymaking is from the way it is taught 
in political science classes.  ―In school you learn about the principles of federalism and when centralization 
versus decentralization is better.  But, that‘s not at all how it works here.‖   
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Intergovernmental Context 
 In the previous section, I examined the centralization and decentralization 
strategies and choices of legislators.  Legislator actions with respect to delegation to the 
states, according to the intergovernmental theory, are contingent upon the party of the 
president and the party of their state governor.  Since health insurance reform proposals 
were debated under a Democratic president, Democrats, both DD and DR legislators, in 
the 111
th
 Congress were in favor of centralization and Republicans, RD and RR 
legislators, preferred decentralization.  On the surface, then, delegation to the states 
appears to fit with the conventional wisdom that Republicans prefer to devolve authority 
and Democrats are more comfortable with a large centralized government.  In this 
section, I assess whether these partisan issues were just about the partisan ideology of 
legislators or if, as my theory predicts, it was more about their intergovernmental context, 
namely taking into consideration the partisan relationship between legislators and their 
governors.        
Media reporting of the hearings provided little discussion of the 
intergovernmental possibilities for health insurance reform, instead, focusing on whether 
the process was bipartisan or purely partisan, open and transparent or behind closed-
doors, how Obama‘s performance rated with respect to health reform, and whether 
special deals were wrought and with whom.  From my interviews, one staffer remarked 
that the media ―had it all wrong,‖ in terms of the negotiations and focused ―way too much 
on partisan issues.‖  The participant elaborated by stating that although there were 
definite and challenging partisan differences, it was not the horse race as depicted in the 
media.  Instead, the process was a grueling foray into a complicated and fractured health 
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care system that relied on a number of substantive experts on Medicaid, health insurance, 
public health, health law, and constitutional law, to name a few.  One staffer described 
the process as involving ―silos of people working on different issues‖ and another further 
emphasized that although ―policy was important, the politics were important, too.‖  Thus, 
political maneuvering existed that was not highlighted by the media.
96
       
All twelve staffers declared that dealing with Democrat versus Republican issues 
was ―challenging‖ during negotiations and that Democrats have more faith in a central 
government and Republicans ―are generally more for state based‖ approaches.  Every 
Senate and House staffer mentioned this partisan difference as important with respect to 
intergovernmental delegation, seemingly in support of the Republican devolution 
argument.  But, when I would question them as to what would happen if there were a 
Republican president and Democratic leadership in the states, most staffers agreed that it 
was more nuanced than Republicans prefer to devolve.
97
  One staffer even mentioned that 
they have an example of this in ―No Child Left Behind, where Republicans under a 
Republican president took authority away from the states.‖    
―Republicans are generally more for state based policies.  Republicans, though, 
will nationalize if they feel like states are not doing what they want,‖ stated one staffer.  
―It is a political calculus vis-à-vis the position [of the states] to the federal government,‖ 
said a second.  In other words, whether or not a legislator prefers to centralize authority 
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 Throughout the fall of 2009, media reports on House negotiations focused on Blue Dog Democrats who 
―remained on the fence‖ regarding health care reform (Bettelheim and Hunter 2009) and discussed Pelosi‘s 
strategy with respect to the ―end game of the conference‖ and staking out a bargaining position with the 
Senate (Pelosi quoted in Norman 2009).  Reports on the Senate focused on Kennedy‘s health, Byrd‘s 
health, 60 votes, and, later, on Brown‘s win in a liberal state, which was described by one reported as ―a 
bolt of lightning [that] has struck the entire American political system‖ (Maddow 2010) and by another as a 
race that  ―could literally decide the fate of the Democrats' health care reform legislation‖ (Baier 2010).   
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 One staffer refused to consider the implications of the counterfactual of a Republican president during 
health insurance reform.  That staffer said that it was not a useful way to spend time, since so many factors 
go into what happens politically. 
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with the national executive branch or decentralize policy to the states actually depends 
upon whether the states will provide outcomes the legislators favor. ―If the governor is of 
a different party, there is concern when doling out authority to the states….What the 
governor will do with the policy matters,‖ commented one participant, which was 
supported by another remarking that ―the relationship between governor and legislator is 
critical.‖  Both Democratic and Republican staffers expressed these sentiments.  One 
Republican staffer elaborated, ―partisanship is an issue, if your governor is a D and you 
are an R, it‘s very different than if your governor is an R.‖  
These staffer statements provide strong support for the idea that 
intergovernmental context matters, using a similar language as the intergovernmental 
theory to describe the partisan relationship.  Specifically, DD, DR, RD, and RR 
legislators face different strategic calculations as they consider whether to support 
national policies that centralize versus decentralize authority.  The differences in these  
strategies can be further viewed by considering committee actions and votes.          
The three committees‘ markups of the single House bill, for instance, present one 
perspective on some of this maneuvering.  In particular, a number of amendments 
provide insight into possible differences in how Democrats felt about yielding authority 
to the states in national health insurance reform.  The votes on amendments in the 
committees are compiled in Table 5-3.  For all three committees, the pattern of choices 
generally matches with that of my argument, with a few exceptions as noted below.   
In the Energy and Commerce Committee, there were 35 Democratic members, 16 
of which represented states with Republican governors (DR legislators, or mismatches).  
As shown in the table, all Democrats voted against the amendment that decreased the  
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STUPAK Michigan D ec 0   0 
BOUCHER Virginia R ec 0 
 
. 
ESHOO California R ec 1 
 
0 
GREEN Texas R ec 1 
 
0 
CAPPS California R ec 1 
 
0 
HARMAN California R ec 1 
 
0 
GONZALEZ Texas R ec 1 
 
0 
MATHESON Utah R ec 0 
 
0 
MELANCON Louisiana R ec 0 
 
0 
BARROW Georgia R ec 0 
 
0 
HILL Indiana R ec 1 
 
0 
MATSUI California R ec 1 
 
0 
CASTOR Florida R ec 1 
 
0 
MURPHY Connecticut R ec 1 
 
0 
MCNERNEY California R ec 1 
 
0 
WELCH Vermont R ec 1   0 
KILDEE Michigan D ed 1 0 0 
ANDREWS New Jersey D ed 1 0 0 
MCCARTHY New York D ed 1 0 0 
BISHOP New York D ed 1 0 0 
SESTAK Pennsylvania D ed 1 0 0 
ALTMIRE Pennsylvania D ed 0 0 0 
HARE Illinois D ed 1 0 0 
MILLER California R ed 1 0 0 
WOOLSEY California R ed 1 1 0 
HINOJOSA Texas R ed 1 0 0 
DAVIS California R ed 1 0 0 
GRIJALVA Arizona R ed 1 1 0 
HIRONO Hawaii R ed 1 0 0 
COURTNEY Connecticut R ed 1 0 0 
TITUS Nevada R ed 0 0 0 
CHU California R ed 1 0 0 
TANNER Tennessee D wm 0 0   
KIND Wisconsin D wm 0 0   
STARK California R wm 1 0   
LEWIS Georgia R wm 1 0   
BECERRA California R wm 1 0   
DOGGETT Texas R wm 1 0   
POMEROY 
North 
Dakota R wm 0 
0 
  
THOMPSON California R wm 1 0   
LARSON Connecticut R wm 1 0   
BERKLEY Nevada R wm 1 0   
MEEK Florida R wm 1 0   
DAVIS Alabama R wm 1 0   
SANCHEZ California R wm 1 0   
Committees: ec, Energy and Commerce, ed, Education and Labor, wm, Ways and Means.  Votes are: yea, 1 and nay, 0. 
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authority of HHS (Barton Amendment on Day 5), as would be expected by the theory.  
And, of the five Democrats who voted nay to report the amended bill to the floor, all but 
one were DR legislators, or partisan mismatches with their state governors.  This last 
point is in contrast to that expected by the theory of intergovernmental design if I assume 
voting against the bill reveals that it is distant from their preferred choice (those 
legislators should prefer centralization); however, the other 12 DR legislators and 18 DD 
legislators voted in accordance with the intergovernmental theory.
98
  Moreover, no 
Republicans voted to report the bill and all voted in favor of decreasing the authority of 
HHS.   Thus, votes in the Energy and Commerce committee suggest support of the 
hypotheses regarding DD, DR, RD, and RR legislators‘ choices.   
In Education and Labor, one amendment increased state flexibility (Kucinich 
amendment for state waivers) and one amendment decreased the authority of Health and 
Human Services (Thompson amendment to strike the national health insurance 
exchange).  Of the 14 Democrats who voted in favor of increasing state-level authority, 
only two were DR legislators (Woolsey, D-CA and Grijalva, D-AZ).  In addition, all 
Democrats voted against decreasing the authority of the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services.  In Ways and Means, 11 of 26 members were DR legislators.  Three Democrats 
voted against reporting the bill to the floor (see Table 5-3):  Tanner (D-TN, a DD 
legislator), Kind (D-WI, a DD legislator), and Pomeroy (D-ND, DR legislator).
99
  Thus, 
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 A simple logistic regression with committee member‘s votes as the dependent variable and the 
intergovernmental team as the categorical independent variable reveals that DR legislators are significantly 
less likely (at the p≤.05 level) to vote in favor of amendments that increase the authority of the states in 
comparison to DD legislators.  The odds ratio is 0.204 (with a standard error of 0.169) for DR legislators 
compared to DD legislators as the base category.   
99
 If I assume once again that a vote against reporting the bill to the floor is an action suggesting these 
legislators felt the bill was too distant from their ideal point, the intergovernmental design theory would 
predict that legislators voting against the bill would more likely be DD legislators.  There is, of course, a 
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although not true for every single legislator, on average the hypotheses regarding how 
legislators would vote regarding centralization and decentralization hold across all three 
House committees:  Democrats voted in favor of and Republicans against centralization. 
An examination of Senate committee votes in the HELP and Finance committees 
presents more of a challenge.  Unfortunately, the text of the HELP amendments could not 
be located via electronic searches and the language and delegation choices specifically 
examined.  Over 788 amendments were filed for the HELP bill markup, 721 of which 
were offered by Republicans.  Of the Republican amendments, 161 were accepted (36 of 
the 67 Democratic-authored amendments were also accepted), although see Enzi‘s (R-
WY) statement regarding the lack of Republican involvement in proposal formation in 
his Finance committee statements.  On July 15, 2009 the HELP committee voted to report 
their version of the health insurance reform package to the floor on a straight party line 
vote (13 to 10).  Although the HELP proposal includes state-based health exchanges (in 
contrast to the House nationalized health insurance exchange), it appears that it did not 
decentralize authority enough to attract any Republican votes.    
The Finance committee bill also created state-based health insurance exchanges 
and, according to the decentralization measure described above, is more decentralized 
than the HELP plan.  The Republican-filed amendments in the Finance bill during 
committee negotiations included many that provided expansions in the authority of the 
states in the overall bill.  There were over 564 amendments filed for the Finance bill 
markup, of which 302 included at least one Republican author.
100
  The Finance 
                                                                                                                                                 
difficulty in ascertaining whether a vote against reporting a bill to the floor is actually a vote against 
centralization. 
100
 These amendments were obtained from Slate.com‘s website.  
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committee voted to report their proposal to the floor of the Senate on October 13, 2009 
with a 14-9 vote.  The only Republican voting with the Democrats on the committee was 
Olympia Snowe (R-ME), an RD legislator.  Snowe‘s support of the Finance bill is in 
contrast to the intergovernmental theory, where RR legislators are pivotal with respect to 
decentralization and RD legislators are indifferent (but prefer to vote with their co-
partisans).  Overall, Senators‘ actions in committees are not consistent with the 
theoretical hypotheses—RR legislators were not included in the Senate coalition.  Only 
staffer comments about the deliberations behind those actions suggest support for the 
intergovernmental theory.   
Recall also, the coalition bargaining theory expressly points to the process of 
invoking cloture where Republicans would be necessary in the Senate—not where a 
simple majority is needed, such as to either pass a proposal out of committee or votes on 
final passage on the floor.  Furthermore, the theory is even more specific with respect to 
the fact that those Republican votes would only be needed if DD and DR legislators in 
the Senate together do not equal 60 votes.  In the next section, I examine the extent to 
which the differences in chamber rules and majoritarian thresholds influenced the 
proposals that emerged from the House and Senate, as well as the final enacted health 
insurance reform package.     
Chamber Rules 
In the last few months of 2009 when committee deliberations and floor votes took 
place, DD and DR legislators did have the 60 votes needed to close debate on the floor, 
although, earlier in the process this fact was not clear.  For the first four months of 2009, 
Democrats had only 58 votes, which increased to 59 when Specter (R D-PA) switched 
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from the Republican to the Democratic party, and finally 60 when Franken (D-MN) was 
seated.  To invoke cloture, the 60 votes derives from the rule that three-fifths of the 
Senators duly chosen and sworn must vote in favor of a motion to close debate.  Byrd (D-
WV) and Kennedy (D-MA), due to ill health, were often not present in 2009.  Only after 
Kennedy‘s death in August and the appointment of Paul Kirk (D-MA) to fill the vacancy, 
were Democratic senators able to reach the ―razor edge of 60 votes‖ on days when Byrd 
was strong enough to be present for a vote.  The ―razor edge‖ quote is taken from a 
staffer who remarked that the opportunity of any one senator to obstruct policy on the 
floor by filibustering created challenges for the health insurance reform process in the 
Senate.  In this section, I examine the extent to which inter-chamber differences in the 
majority thresholds required to make progress on reform influenced the packages they 
developed.      
Health policy staffers emphasized differences in the House and Senate voting 
processes. Senate ―structure‖ and ―the 60 votes needed‖ gave Republicans more leverage 
during proposal negotiations in the Senate than in the House, according to staffers.  This 
influence led to the crafting of proposals in both the HELP and Finance committees that 
were much more decentralized than the House package.  The Finance committee 
chairman, Baucus (D-MT), for instance, included three Republicans in the group of six 
Senators who hashed out the Finance package over months of negotiation through 
2009.
101
  It is only in hindsight that Democrats, in the brief time span in which the Senate 
bill (consisting mainly of the Baucus Finance proposal) was debated and passed on the 
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 The group of six senators (―Gang of 6‖) included Democratic Max Baucus (Montana), Jeff Bingaman 
(New Mexico) and Kent Conrad (North Dakota); and Republicans Charles Grassley (Iowa), Mike Enzi 
(Wyoming) and Olympia Snowe (Maine).  Senator Hatch dropped out in July, 2009, later stating that he 
had left the group because he knew it would not be a true bipartisan effort (see Hatch‘s comments in 
Finance Committee markup).  
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floor, did not need to rely on Republicans to move the policy out of the chamber.  While 
various packages were considered and amended, Democrats would need at least one or 
two Republicans to join them or the policy could have been obstructed by one Senator 
with a filibuster.  In other words, finding less support for the theoretical hypotheses about 
how legislators should vote in the Senate, given the frequency of the DD and DR teams 
across the 111
th
 Congress is expected.   
Staffers perspectives on the differences between the House and Senate and the 
strategies senators used to craft their proposals provide support for an assumption upon 
which the individual-level coalition bargaining model is built, that the majoritarian 
threshold in a chamber is critical for passing policy.  For instance, one House Democratic 
staffer remarked that the House ―can be more aggressive [than the Senate] because of 
rules and procedure.‖ All staffers from the House and Senate also commented on the 
―challenge of 60‖ in the Senate versus the simpler majority rules process in the House. 
[Senators] ―got things through [via] the power of delegation—because you can‘t get 
things through the Senate without it.  In the House it‘s different, since majority rules.  
One member doesn‘t have the power [like in the Senate], it‘s more of a ‗go along to get 
along‘ place.‖   
In other words, the higher majoritarian threshold in the Senate has consequences 
for the delegation strategies employed in Senate packages in comparison to the House.  In 
the House, the pivotal legislator in the intergovernmental theory under a Democratic 
majority party and Democratic president are DR legislators, who strictly prefer 
centralization.  In the Senate, when Democrats have the 60 votes to invoke cloture, the 
DR legislators are also pivotal, but when they do not, the pivotal legislator, or legislator 
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who must be enticed to vote to invoke cloture, is an RR legislator.  To appeal to RR 
legislators, the Senate must craft a policy that is decentralized enough to get the needed 
votes, but not decentralized as much as to lose critical DR legislator votes.  Thus, the 
differences in House and Senate proposals and a potential reason why Baucus courted 
Republican legislators as his committee crafted a proposal can be explained by the 
intergovernmental theory.       
Of course, however, there were many other features of the process that emerged 
in discussions with staffers.  Next, I discuss the interesting attributes of the process that 
were not included in the intergovernmental theory of federal delegation design, including 
pre-emptive strategies regarding House-Senate compromises, differences in House versus 
Senate electoral concerns, and the trouble with governors. 
Other Concerns 
―The Senate bill was a bitter pill to swallow, but the best [the House] could get.‖  
This quote from one staffer highlights the interesting inter-chamber dynamics that were 
in play throughout the 111
th
 Congress.  For example, early in 2009 the House included 
reconciliation instructions in their budget bill, specifically mentioning health policy.  This 
strategic step by House Democrats offered an alternative for the Democratic majorities in 
both chambers.  By using the reconciliation process, which is subject to time limits (i.e., 
cannot be filibustered), only a simple majority is needed to pass such a package in both 
the House and the Senate.      
For most of the health insurance reform process, however, reconciliation was not 
considered to be a serious alternative for two major reasons.  First, Democrats expressed 
the desire for bipartisanship.  Relying on reconciliation would eliminate bipartisanship 
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and possibly give Republicans ammunition to alienate voters from Democrats.  And, 
second, is the fact that reconciliation is not an easy process.  Reconciliation bills cannot 
be used to build new policies or programs, only to ―reconcile‖ existing programs with the 
budget.  Specifically, each provision in a reconciliation package must have a current 
budgetary effect (the Byrd Rule).  I return to how reconciliation offered opportunities for 
Democrats in 2010 below, but first discuss other inter-chamber dynamics.         
Health policy staffers, for example, highlighted a difference in how Senators 
versus House members feel about the states.  ―There is a comfort in the Senate regarding 
the states that‘s not there for the House,‖ said one staffer.  ―Senators are just more 
inclined [than House members] to give discretion to the states,‖ said one participant. ―In 
the Senate there‘s more of a desire to isolate states…[you] can rummage through [any 
number] of laws and find the formulas that do so….‖  This special deals for special states 
difference in the Senate may be due to the fact that ―governors and Senators share the 
same constituents‖ or because ―what works in New York or Florida, won‘t work in [that 
staffer‘s member‘s dissimilar state].‖  Although it is possible that there is a difference in 
the ―comfort-level‖ of the Senate with delegation to the states, this explanation does not 
hold up to a brief comparison with the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002, where Senate 
debate highlighted concerns over delegating expansive authority to the states (in 
comparison to the House which included unprecedented state flexibility in its bill). 
Instead, I argue that decentralization of policy in the Democratic Senate, given the 
Democratic president, sets the stage for policy coalition formation in that chamber where 
Republican senators are needed to pass policy; coalitions that can be formed by 
decentralizing certain aspects of the policy to states, or even ―isolating‖ certain states.  In 
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addition, though, a staffer mentioned that Senators and governors have ―the same 
issues,…but [House members] are much more concentrated [in one area of a state] and 
face different concerns.‖  In a similar vein, a Senate staffer added that ―getting re-elected 
is different for House members.‖  These remarks bring up a potentially key facet of 
national legislators‘ constituencies, namely, that Senators represent an entire state and 
House members (with the exception of At-Large members) only a portion of the state.   
It is possible that House members view state delegation differently, and with more 
alarm about the potential outcomes, than do Senators.  Governors will lead a state-level 
executive branch in implementing a policy with an eye toward the entire population of 
their state.  House members, though, may prefer an even more localized approach, since 
their district may differ substantially from the rest of the state.
102
  This difference may, 
for instance, be due to crucial rural-urban differences between districts in certain states.  
Staffers mentioned, for instance, that Senators with urban-rural splits, for the most part, 
stayed out of the health insurance reform debate.
103
  This aspect of intergovernmental 
delegation is not considered in this study but deserves additional scholarly attention in the 
future.        
Finally, many health policy staffers brought up the idea that House members, in 
particular, were concerned about compromise legislation that would emerge from a 
House-Senate conference even before either chamber had successfully voted for a bill.  In 
particular, House members were worried that the Senate would decentralize authority to 
the states too much for their tastes.  In order to combat this potential Senate bill, House 
                                                 
102
 This could even explain why the House decentralized No Child Left Behind, since many provisions 
were delegated to local education agencies.   
103
 Interestingly, the one member‘s staffer who refused to discuss federalism issues and health insurance 
reform is from a state with an urban/rural split. 
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members preemptively structured their bill with strong centralization provisions in the 
hope that the compromise between the two chambers in a conference would result in 
legislation they would prefer.  In the end, given the structure of the Senate in the 111
th
 
Congress and the contentiousness of the policy debate, the House became concerned 
instead with the ability to get a compromise conference report back through the Senate.  
If the approved House bill and approved Senate bill went to a conference, the resulting 
committee report aligning the two into one piece of legislation would need to go up for 
another vote in both chambers.  Given the lack of the 60 votes needed by the Democrats 
in the Senate after January 19
th
 (and the fact that the Senate bill had only been approved 
December 24
th
), the House needed to consider a new strategy. 
Since the House had included reconciliation instructions in the enacted budget bill 
from the early days of the 111
th
 Congress, one option remained.  House members could 
―swallow‖ the ―bitter pill‖ that was the approved Senate bill, pass a careful reconciliation 
bill that modified the new legislation, and hope that the Republicans in the Senate could 
not find procedural concerns with the reconciliation package, allowing for a simple 
majority in the Senate to pass the reconciliation measure.
104
  What these interesting 
dynamics between the House and Senate suggest, though, is that future work should take 
into account bicameral differences in the pivotal actors and how such differences may 
influence strategic policymaking choices.          
Theory of Federal Policy Design versus Rival Arguments 
In summary, a review of information accessed in congressional archives, obtained 
through document review, and garnered through elite interviews is, for the most part, 
consistent with the theory of federal policy design and intergovernmental delegation.  
                                                 
104
 In fact, the Senate did find procedural concerns necessitating a return to the House with another vote. 
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The House produced a centralized policy, the Senate a more decentralized proposal, 
legislators were concerned about the partisan relationship between themselves and their 
governors and the policy outcomes that governors would yield, in addition to the 
criticality majoritarian thresholds in the House and Senate. 
There are also alternative arguments for why Congress centralizes and 
decentralizes authority.  These include the following:  
 Policy type determines delegation options, where redistributive policies 
are centralized and developmental policies are decentralized (Peterson 
1995). 
 Republicans prefer to devolve and Democrats to centralize (empirical 
studies reviewed in Peterson 1995, also see Krause and Bowman 2005)  
 Republicans (Democrats) prefer to devolve only when the states are 
mostly Republican (Democrat), otherwise they centralize, also known as 
partisan congruence (Krause and Bowman 2005). 
 Congress will refrain from state mandates during election years, what I 
refer to as electoral trepidation (Nicholson-Crotty 2008).   
 
In Table 5-4, the predictions from the various arguments with respect to 111
th
 
Congress and health insurance reform are detailed.  As discussed earlier, the House, 
based on the DR pivotal legislative team, is expected to choose to delegate authority to 
the national executive branch and the Senate, with the possible RR pivot, to allocate more 
authority to the states.  In addition, these chamber-level predictions are based on 
individual-level behavior of legislators as delineated in Chapter 2.  Specifically, and in 
the context of the 111
th
 Congress, DR legislators prefer to centralize authority, or 
delegate to the national executive branch, DD legislators are indifferent, but prefer to side 
with their co-partisans, RR legislators prefer to decentralize or delegate authority to the 
states, and RD legislators vote with their co-partisans.     
Since my case involves only one policy type, I cannot examine the extent to 
which policy type determined delegation strategies in health insurance reform, but the 
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predictions are listed (redistributive policies would centralize and developmental policy 
decentralize).  As described in the previous section, the Republican Devolution argument 
predicts the House and Senate would nationalize authority, since they had Democratic 
majorities even though the individual legislators prefer national delegation if they are 
Democrats and state delegation if they are Republicans. 
Table 5-4:  Differences in Theoretical Predictions for Health Insurance 
Reform and the 111
th
 Congress 
Theory House Senate Individual Members 
Intergovernmental Design National States DR:  National 
      
DD:  Indifferent 
RR:  States 
      RD:  Indifferent 
Policy Type*                          
-----------Redistributive National National National 
----------Developmental  States States States 
Republican Devolution National National 
D:  National 
R:  States 
Partisan Congruence States States no prediction 
Electoral Trepidation National States House:  National 
      Senate Class I:  States 
      Senate Class II:  States 
      Senate Class III:  National 
*In the case of health insurance policy reform, I am unable to examine how policy type influenced 
delegation strategies 
 
On the next row, the Partisan Congruence argument predicts that both the House 
and the Senate, with their Democratic majority party and the Democratic president would 
prefer to decentralize authority to the states because the states in 2009 were 
predominantly led by Democratic governors.  The partisan congruence theory does not 
offer predictions as to what individual legislators would prefer.  The Electoral 
Trepidation predicts that the House will prefer to centralize, since every member faces an 
upcoming election, but that the Senate will prefer to decentralize, since only members 
from Class III face an election soon after enactment.       
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Of note, is that these theories differ in three ways.  First, only the theories of 
intergovernmental design and electoral trepidation expect there to be differences in 
delegation choices between the Senate and the House.  Second, under electoral 
trepidation, but not the other three arguments, there should be differences in delegation 
preferences between the House and the Senate (specifically those Senators not facing an 
election in November 2011).  Last, the delegation choices do differ between the theories.  
Specifically, decentralization to the states is the choice of the Senate as predicted by 
intergovernmental design, partisan congruence (due to the preponderance of Democratic 
states), and electoral trepidation, but not Republican devolution.  Centralization of the 
policy by the House with implementation to the national executive branch is the 
prediction of intergovernmental design, Republican devolution, and electoral trepidation.   
 Overall, the partisan congruence theory does not fit well with the finding that the 
House and Senate bills differed in the degree of decentralization, in particular that the 
House would choose to centralize authority.  The choices of individual legislators do 
align with the Republican devolution argument, though.  As previously noted, under a 
Democratic president the predictions of the theory of intergovernmental delegation and 
Republican devolution are observationally equivalent.  Republicans will prefer to 
delegate to the states and Democrats will prefer to centralize.  Where these two theories 
differ, is in the expectation for the Senate and House bills.  Since Democrats prefer to 
centralize, according to the Republican devolution hypothesis, then the Democratic 
Senate bill should centralize authority, which it does not.   
 In fact, the only other theory that would predict chamber bills that differ in 
authority allocation is the electoral trepidation argument.  I turn to additional data from 
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staffer interviews to examine whether there was a difference in how Senators delegated 
contingent upon when they would be elected.   
Electoral Concerns 
According to staffers, election and electoral concerns played a lesser role in the 
process of crafting the health insurance reform bills and laws.  Only three respondents 
made mention of the importance of elections and none of them were with respect to 
worrying about the repercussions from having overstepped the role of the national 
government.  One respondent discussed the results of the next election as a crucial issue 
for implementation of health insurance reform, but no staffers mentioned any differences 
between Senators who were facing an election in 2010 and those who were not.   
 This data could be viewed as unsupportive of the electoral uncertainty hypothesis.  
It is also possible; however, that with elections looming for House members and some 
Senators, staffers chose not to discuss these issues, or felt they were moot so close to an 
election.  In the transcript of the March 2010 floor debate, one House member remarked 
on electoral concerns. Scott (D-VA) said ―[t]here are many people out here who have 
been warning and threatening us as to, if we vote on this bill, what will happen to us in 
the November elections.  Well, that is not the question…the question is, what will happen 
to the American people if we do not vote on this bill?‖    
This is not to say that electoral concerns did not figure into the calculus of 
legislators.  Instead, legislators did not voice a concern that stepping on states toes with 
an unfunded mandate would have electoral repercussions; or that even if it did, they 
would have done things differently.  Moreover, stepping out of the health insurance 
reform debate, electoral trepidation cannot explain why the House decentralizes and the 
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Senate centralizes under other majorities and presidents.  Overall, the theory of 
intergovernmental delegation most consistently fits with the stories told indirectly by 
legislators through their actions and rhetoric and directly by the health policy staffers.   
Data Analysis Summary     
Overall, archives, documents and interviews provide support for the theory of 
intergovernmental policy design and strong evidence for crucial pieces of my theory—the 
perceptions of legislators regarding delegation to the states, the importance of voting 
rules in determining who is pivotal, and the necessity of considering how state leaders (in 
particular, governors) will implement national policies delegated to them.  First, Congress 
considers the states as one delegation option, and crafts policies involving delegation to 
both the national executive branch and the states as joint partnership policies.  Second, 
the relationship between legislators and their governors is a key aspect to federal 
policymaking.  And, third, the majoritarian requirements in the House and the Senate are 
crucial to negotiations.  Strong support for electoral trepidation was not found in the data.  
On the surface, there was support for Republican devolution, but additional questioning 
of staffers calls that into question.  Finally the partisan congruence argument does not 
provide specific hypotheses about Senate choices, and yet those choices were crucial for 
health insurance reform.           
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The majority of scholarly work following the recent health insurance reform 
process has focused on the role of Obama and his decisions with respect to setting the 
agenda and then handing the reins to Congress to fill in the details of the policy (e.g., 
Jacobs and Skocpol 2010 or Oberlander 2010).  Yet, few have studied how Congress 
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worked out these details.  This study focuses on a crucial aspect of this process—the 
congressional intergovernmental design of health insurance reform.  The media portrayal 
of health insurance reform negotiations and actions was one of partisan bickering, 
Democratic infighting, and strict vote counting, with arm-twisting, when needed.  An 
analysis of the final floor votes and committee reports to the floor validate these claims.  
Democrats and Republicans in the House and the Senate were almost completely unified 
in committee and final floor votes.   
A more thorough inspection of voting on amendments and what legislators said in 
committees in the House and the Senate, however, reveals that although electioneering 
and partisan issues likely played a role in health insurance reform votes, there were 
intergovernmental nuances at work also.  Specifically, the states heavily influenced the 
crafting of the health insurance reform, even though, as one staffer remarked, there was a 
relative dearth of lobbying efforts on the part of the states.
105
  Individual legislators 
considered the impact of policies on their own states during committee meetings where 
various solutions and options were hashed out with experts.  And, based on interview 
data, the ideological match between a state‘s leadership and the legislator was important 
for legislators as they considered what would happen if states implemented various 
features of health insurance reform.   
Interestingly, these interviews also touched on a rival explanation—partisan 
ideologies.  In the opinion of the staffers, across time Republicans prefer to devolve 
authority to the states and Democrats are more comfortable with centralizing authority.  
When further questioned about what differences there may be if a Republican resided in 
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 Jacobs and Skocpol (2010) posit that the Obama administration effectively neutralized lobbying efforts, 
including engaging directly with governors.  One Republican staffer backed up this claim and stated that 
because the governors could never form one collective voice, the cacophony resulted in no action at all. 
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the White House, such as during No Child Left Behind, staffers responded that of course 
things would be different and this comfort level would disappear for Democrats.   
So, although ideology is important, it is the congruence (borrowing Krause and 
Bowman‘s term) that matters.  My argument differs from Krause and Bowman, though, 
by saying that individuals within Congress and their states matter (not the aggregate 
partisanship of Congress and the states)—and that pivotal members in House and Senate 
are crucial for intergovernmental delegation choices.  The differences in the House and 
Senate state versus national delegation choices in this respect provide support for my 
intergovernmental delegation theory compared to Krause and Bowman‘s partisan 
congruence argument.   
Specifically, Krause and Bowman‘s theory conjectures that when the average 
aggregate partisanship of national political institutions is more in line with the average 
partisanship of all states, we will see decentralization.  If this is taken to mean that 
Democrats prefer to decentralize during the 111
th
 Congress with the mostly Democratic 
states in 2009-2010, the differences in the House and Senate choices remain unexplained.  
My argument about intergovernmental context begins from the foundation provided by 
Krause and Bowman—a preference for closer agents—but adds institutional complexity 
and considers individual legislators in the House and the Senate and the implications of 
their constraints and choices.              
 The lack of differences in the preferences of the various classes of senators does 
not support the electoral trepidation hypothesis either.  Finally, a limitation of studying 
one policy is that I cannot consider whether policy type matters for delegation to the 
states versus national actors.  Interview responses point to the possibility that it is not the 
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type of policy, per se, but the historical context or status quo of the policy.  The fact that 
the states had been regulating insurance markets for many years meant that the states 
would likely be chosen to regulate them in the 2009-2010 health insurance reform policy.  
The influence of the status quo delegation choice is not evaluated in this project and 
deserves additional attention in the future.   
 There are two issues not highlighted in this chapter, but that deserve mention—
the role of the executive branch in crafting legislation and the individual mandate.  First, 
although Obama‘s team may have lent a helping hand as various proposals were 
considered, the proposals considered here are those that received a vote in either a 
committee or on the floor, thus needing to pass muster with legislators.  In other words, 
whether from the White House or other policy consultants, a proposal would still need to 
be considered by legislators and either supported or rejected.  My theory hinges on this 
consideration and decision process, not on how legislators got ideas for the structuring 
and language of the policies in the first place.   
 Second, I do not delve into the crafting of the individual mandate, which is the 
key that holds the entire health insurance reform package together.  Without the 
individual mandate, the necessary spreading of risks across the population will not occur, 
only those who need insurance will buy it, insurance companies will need to increase 
costs to consumers, and the downward spiral of insurance and health care commences 
(when the people who need insurance the most cannot afford it).  There are two reasons 
why there was no need to investigate the role of the individual mandate for 
intergovernmental delegation:  1) both centralized proposals and decentralized proposals 
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included some type of mandate for the population and 2) the authority overseeing the 
implementing of each mandate was included in the coding of the bills and laws.  
 In addition, this chapter sidesteps whether liberals wanted a public option and 
conservatives wanted a lower price tag.  Instead, I focus on the intergovernmental 
architecture of the overarching policy solutions—a state-based versus national-level 
health insurance exchange (perhaps states could obtain a waiver to include a public 
option in their exchange) or the Medicaid expansion (increasing the national 
government‘s role in state Medicaid programs), for instance.   
Finally, what does it mean that I interpret legislators‘ voting behavior and 
committee actions as preferences over the delegation of authority?  In short, a policy 
problem often has multiple specific solutions.  Some of those solutions may be favored 
by liberals, others by centrists, and still some by conservatives.  The set of actors placed 
in charge of implementing those solutions play a distinct role in the way, shape, and form 
of the policies as they play out in the real world.  Congress can create a health insurance 
exchange program that is run by the states, resulting in fifty different varieties of health 
insurance exchanges as they did or choose to create one national health insurance 
exchange run solely by the national executive branch, resulting in a different outcome.  
Those states with preferences for a significant role of the health insurance exchange will 
likely implement their policy differently than will states that prefer a minimal exchange.  
By focusing on national versus state delegation choices, I consider the extent to which 
whether legislators‘ preferences align with those of their state‘s matters and find here 




Case Study Data Collection Methods 
 
Archival records include resources from the Congressional Research Service, 
Voteview.com, the National Conference of State Legislators, and United States Senate 
and House of Representatives online data.  For the purpose of this analysis, legislators‘ 
floor votes on the Tri-Committee bill (House votes on H Res 903 and HR 3962 on 
11/7/2009), ACA (Senate votes on HR 3590 on 12/23-24/2009), ACA (House votes on 
HR 3590 3/21/2010), HERCA (House votes on HR 4872 on 3/25/2010), and HERCA 
(Senate votes on HR 4872 on 3/23-3/25/2010), including the various procedural votes on 
these measures were collected from all floor votes cast in the 111
th
 Congress from 
Voteview.com.     
 
From November 1, 2008 through April 1, 2010 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJ) 
Daily News Digests and the Commonwealth Fund Washington Health Policy Week in 
Review were archived.  The RWJ daily digest provides summaries and links to selected 
articles from major journals and news publications and the Commonwealth Fund‘s 
weekly review provides stories from the Congressional Quarterly‘s CQ Health Beat.  The 
full texts of the stories within both digests were saved and all were reviewed for content 
related to how a legislative package was written and amended, as well as how individual 
legislators described their support or rejection of the provisions therein.  To examine 
these same features within news and related documents, a LexisNexis search of major 
news sources was employed using the search terms:  ―health care reform‖, ―health 
insurance reform‖, or ―health overhaul‖ and ―congress‖ or ―legislat.‖  Major news 
sources included the New York Times, the Washington Post,   Fox News Network, 
National Public Radio, MSNBC, and CNN.  In addition the Office of Management and 
Budget and the Congressional Budget Office Director blogs during the time span were 
examined and saved if found to be relevant to the health care reform and the legislative 
processes.  Finally, the same search procedure was used with Google‘s search engine and 
restricting results to the time period of January 1, 2009 through April 1, 2010.   
 
The LexisNexis search resulted in the following sample from the:  New York Times 641 
pages, Washington Post 863 pages, Fox News Network 127 pages, National Public Radio 
552 pages, MSNBC 267 pages, and CNN 393 pages.  The Google search resulted in 422 
non-similar pages that included results from Huffington Post, the National Review, and 
various advocacy groups, among others.  These pages were then searched for the terms 
―congress,‖ ―legislat,‖ ―house,‖ ―senat,‖ ―member,‖ and ―rep‖ and reviewed for content 
related to legislative decision-making. 
 
To collect the transcripts of the relevant floor debates and hearings, I began with the 
Congressional Research Service summaries of each measure.  Within these summaries, 
the debates and hearings are listed.  In addition, I used LexisNexis to search for 
legislative action in the 111
th
 Congress and searched the websites of the committees with 
jurisdiction for relevant hearings.  The transcripts were searched for the terms ―congress,‖ 
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―legislat,‖ ―house,‖ ―senat,‖ ―member,‖ and ―rep‖ and reviewed for content related to 
legislative decision-making.  Unfortunately, as of March 1, 2011, some congressional 
hearing transcripts remain unavailable.  These include a handful of Ways and Means 
committee meetings, though not markups, and HELP markups.  Video archives of the 
HELP panels are available, but were not reviewed for this project.  After deleting action 
less relevant for overall health care reform (e.g. teen pregnancy, veteran health), this 
resulted in a collection of seventy five hearing documents and twenty days of floor 
debate.  Hearing documents included multiple and single sessions, depending upon how 
they were archived.  Floor debates were read in their entirety from the Congressional 
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University of Michigan Doctoral Dissertation Title:  The Federal Policy Design Dilemma: The 
Structure of Federal-State Policy Authority 
 
Project Overview: 
 A major problem identified in public health is the ―patchwork‖ of state and federal policies: some 
federal laws give authority to implement a policy to both the state and federal agencies, while other 
laws leave gaping holes with respect to responsibility of implementation. 
 
 This is important because it affects health outcomes for our population: Whether states or the federal 
government are the lead, the support, or sole actors involved in a policy, whether states can tailor 
policies to their population, and whether federal law sets a ceiling or a floor for policy alter the ability 
of public health practitioners to do their work.   
 
 This project untangles this governmental structure of authority by moving upstream from the problems 
practitioners face to the decisions made by policy actors who shape authority in the language of the 
law. 
 
For example, in the 1965 Social Security Amendments two 
health care programs were created—Medicare, a national 
policy of health insurance for the elderly, and Medicaid, a 
national-state partnership of health insurance for the poor.  
What forces or ideas drove the decisions to structure these 
programs in this way?   
 
Background—there is tremendous variation among who receives authority in federal law and how much 
authority they receive: 
 From 1973 through 2008, on average 3 out every 4 significant national laws delegated 
some of its provisions to the States.   
 The authority in provisions varied dramatically from year to year and law to law and 
included 100% delegation to the States, 100% joint federal-state partnerships, 100% 
delegation to national-level actors, and almost everything in between.  
 We are left with an open question: what considerations do policy makers make 
when deciding who gets the authority to implement a policy?   
 
Research Process—By shedding light on how authority decisions are made as laws are crafted, the federal 
and intergovernmental design of policies can be understood and improved to provide better population 
health outcomes including reducing health disparities across states.  As part of my doctoral dissertation, I 
am examining the design of federal-state authority in the recent health care reform bills and final law. 
Two sets of questions are asked: 
 
1. What was the process of crafting the authority structure of the health insurance exchanges in the 
House bill and the Senate bill (federal versus state-based)? 
2. Please describe any negotiations regarding state-based versus federal authority in the time leading 
up to and after passage of 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
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Individual Legislators and Intergovernmental Delegation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In Chapter 2, I developed a theory of how Congress delegates policy 
responsibility across federal levels.  There are three components to the theoretical 
argument—an aggregate-level model of Congress making decisions, an individual-level 
model of how legislators bargain over the decentralization of authority to form successful 
policy coalitions, and an informal consideration of the influence of uncertainty over the 
partisanship of national and state implementers during implementation.  Earlier chapters 
examine the aggregate-level model and national and state political uncertainty through a 
large-N analysis, as well as the underlying mechanisms in both models via an in-depth 
case study of health insurance reform.  A closer analysis of the individual-level model 
and theoretical implications remains.  By studying legislators‘ voting behavior, I assess 
whether policy coalitions in the House and Senate include the participants the 
intergovernmental theory of federal policy design predicts.   
In particular, the individual-level theory is based on how legislators compare their 
most preferred policy outcome to that of their state leadership and the national executive 
branch to determine how much authority is delegated to the states.  As legislators attempt 
to successfully pass a policy in their chamber, they bargain over how much authority the 
states receive in national law.  This process of legislative coalition formation reveals a    
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pivotal intergovernmental team in the House and the Senate.  In the House, the pivotal 
team is the non-indifferent majority intergovernmental team.  In the Senate, the pivotal 
team, due to the threat or presence of a filibuster, is the non-indifferent minority party 
intergovernmental team. 
 By non-indifference, I refer to the fact that in the model an intergovernmental 
team may strictly prefer centralization, decentralization, or they may be indifferent.
106
  
The indifferent teams are those where the location of the ideal point for the national and 
state implementers is the same.  Since I use party labels as the legislators‘ proxy for the 
ideal points of these actors, this means that when there is a Republican president, those 
intergovernmental teams that also have Republican governors (Republican legislators 
from states with Republican governors, RR legislators, and Democratic legislators from 
states with Republican governors, DR legislators) are indifferent over state authority 
allocation.  The teams that are not indifferent, though, are those teams with the opposite 
party label as that of the president.  Thus, when there is a Republican president, the non-
indifferent teams are DD and RD legislators and when there is a Democratic president, 
the non-indifferent teams are DR and RR legislators.   
  In Chapter 2, by relying on these preference alignments, majority party agenda 
setting, and the assumption that intergovernmental teams receive a utility boost when 
they form coalitions with their co-partisans (e.g., RR with RD or DD with DR), the 
individual-level model provides information about the makeup of policy coalitions in the 
House and the Senate under different conditions.  For example, under a unified 
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 Recall from Chapter 2, the optimal state authority allocation ( *) = (N-L)/(N-S), where N represents the 
location of the national executive branch‘s ideal point, L, the legislator‘s ideal point, and S, the legislator‘s 
state governor‘s ideal point.  In this equation, when the legislator is of the same party as the national 
executive branch, *=0 (centralization), when the legislator is of the same party as his state, *=1 
(decentralization), and when N=S, the legislator is indifferent over .   
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Democratic government, successful House coalitions will include DD and DR legislators 
and will centralize authority with the national executive branch.  Success, in this case, is 
defined as the ability to garner enough votes on the floor to pass the policy.  A successful 
Senate bill, on the other hand, will have the support of DD and DR legislators plus some 
RR legislators in order to reach 60 votes and invoke cloture, if needed.  Even when 
filibusters are not realized, Senators must concern themselves with the possibility that 
any one legislator can block legislation on the floor.  By having at least 60 votes available 
in a policy coalition, Senators are prepared to face this threat of obstruction.  
TESTING THE THEORY 
 In this chapter, I conduct systematic empirical tests of the arguments in the 
individual-level model across two separate novel data sets spanning congressional 
policymaking from 1973-2008.  The first dataset is an extension of the data developed in 
Chapter 3.  I collect data on individual legislators‘ party, vote choice, and state 
governor‘s party and analyze the vote on final passage for each of the laws coded from 
1973 through 2008 in both the House and the Senate.  This dataset provides information 
about which legislators voted for and against final passage.  The set of legislators voting 
for passage indicates the composition of successful policy coalitions in the House and 
Senate across the laws included.  By analyzing vote choice, in the context of the 
intergovernmental party teams of the legislators, I can assess the individual-level 
hypotheses from Chapter 2.  These hypotheses include: 
Hypothesis 6-1 (from Hypotheses 5-8 in Chapter 2):  When the House majority party is 
Republican; both Republican intergovernmental teams (RD and RR) will be more likely 
to vote for a measure on the floor, regardless of the party of the president. 
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Hypothesis 6-2 (from Hypotheses 5-8 in Chapter 2):  When the House majority party is 
Democratic; both Democratic intergovernmental teams (DD and DR) will be more likely 
to vote in favor of measures on the floor, regardless of the party of the president.   
Hypothesis 6-3 (from Hypothesis 10 in Chapter 2):  In the Senate, under a Democratic 
president and a Republican majority party, DR legislators will more likely vote with 
Republicans than will DD legislators. 
Hypothesis 6-4 (from Hypothesis 9 in Chapter 2): In the Senate, under a Democratic 
president and a Democratic majority party, Republican legislators from states with 
Republican governors (RR legislators) will more likely to vote with the majority party 
than will RD legislators (Republican legislators from states with Democratic governors).   
Hypothesis 6-5 (from Hypothesis 9 in Chapter 2):  In the Senate, under a Republican 
president and a Republican majority party, Democratic legislators from states with 
Democratic governors (DD legislators) will more likely vote with the Republican party 
than will DR legislators (Democratic legislators from states with Republican governors).   
Hypothesis 6-6 (from Hypothesis 10 in Chapter 2):  In the Senate, under a Republican 
president and a Democratic majority party, RD legislators will more likely vote with 
Democrats than will RR legislators.   
 In the Senate, the theoretical model is based specifically on the ability to invoke 
cloture.  Previous studies have shown that a substantial percentage of legislators switch 
their votes between cloture and final passage (Butler and Sempolinski 2010).
107
  Since 
my theory specifically deals with cloture coalitions in the Senate, I narrow the focus of 
the tests of the Senate hypotheses by just considering voting behavior on the motion to 






  In this second dataset, I consider 
Senator voting behavior across all cloture votes from 1973-2008, given their 
intergovernmental team, the majority party in the Senate, and the party of the President. 
By studying cloture votes, I more closely examine hypotheses 6-3 through 6-6.    
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 Butler and Sempolinksi (2010) find that 11.5% of votes on successful cloture motions are switched to 
―nay‖ at final passage. 
108
 Although cloture procedures were changed in 1975 (the 94
th
 Congress), the conclusions of my theory do 
not change based on whether a 2/3 or a 3/5 majority is needed due to the frequency of the 
intergovernmental teams in the 93
rd
 Congress, so I include all Congresses.  Analyses excluding the 93
rd
 
Congress do not noticeably alter the findings or conclusions drawn. 
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 Although the theoretical model in Chapter 2 assumes 4 unitary actors representing 
the 4 intergovernmental teams (DD, DR, RD, and RR legislators), the likelihood that all 
DD legislators or all RD legislators act en bloc is low.  Rather, myriad pressures buffet 
legislators as they determine how to vote on a particular motion or measure.  What I do in 
the analyses below is to assume the formal individual-level model provides a foundation 
for how legislators vote.  Thus, the hypotheses listed above assume a higher probability, 
instead of a deterministic prediction, that particular legislators act in the predicted ways 
given the intergovernmental teams of which they are a part. 
 A second assumption is needed to move from the theoretical model to an 
empirical analysis.  Specifically, I assume that the majority party in a chamber controls 
the agenda and is more likely to bring motions and measures to the floor that are in the 
party‘s interest (Cox and McCubbins 2007).  This does not assume that all Democrats 
under a Democratic majority vote for a measure.  Instead, I assume that if a bill is 
brought up for a vote under a Democratic majority, Democrats, on average, are more 
likely to vote in favor of the measure than against it.  This assumption, though, creates a 
problem for assessing my theoretical argument in the House, which I discuss in detail 
below.  In the following section, I describe the research design and data used to test the 
hypotheses above. 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 By looking at the voting behavior of legislators, given their intergovernmental 
team, this chapter examines whether the pivotal team identified by the theory is actually 
more likely to vote with the enacting coalition than a comparison team.  To evaluate 
which intergovernmental teams populate successful policy coalitions, this study utilizes a 
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recorded vote as the unit of analysis.  The votes on final passage include 75,958 votes on 
172 separate measures from 1973-2008 for the significant legislation described in 
Chapters 3 and 4.
109
  The votes on motions to invoke cloture include 65,724 votes on 686 
motions across the time period.  For each of the analyses, the dependent variable is a 
dichotomous ―yea‖ or ―nay‖ vote choice by each legislator voting on that measure or 
motion.
 110
  The analyses begin with an examination of votes on final passage (Final 
Passage) and conclude with cloture vote choices in the Senate (Cloture Vote).  
Conditional Analyses 
To examine the theoretical predictions above, it is necessary to collect the 
partisanship of the president and Senate and House majority party for each year in the 
dataset for both types of analyses.  I collect this information from the House and Senate 
Archives and Woolley and Peters (2009-2011).
111
  Republicans are coded as a 1, 
Democrats as a -1 and Independents as a 0.  These party labels provide the conditions 
under which the various hypotheses are expected to hold, which I discuss in detail below.       
Dependent Variable 
 For both analyses, the dependent variable is the vote choice of each voting 
legislator.  In the Final Passage analysis, the choice is either a ―yea‖ or a ―nay‖ on the 
final floor vote for the significant legislation across the time period (coded 1 and 0, 
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 Seven measures from Chapters 3 and 4 did not receive a recorded vote in either the Senate or the House 
and passed each chamber with a voice vote.  These measures include the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 
1982 (P.L. 97253), the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (P.L. 97425), the Government Securities Act of 
1986 (P.L. 99570), the Hurricane Katrina Emergency Relief Act (P.L. 109061), the Tax Relief and Health 
Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109432), and the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (P.L. 109435) and are 
not included in the analyses in this chapter. 
110
 If a legislator did not vote ―yea‖ or ―nay‖ on the measure, for whatever reason, I coded the vote as 
missing. 
111
 The House historical party divisions were found at 
http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/partyDiv.aspx and the Senate at 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm.  Both websites were last 
accessed on May 17, 2011.  The party of the president was collected from The American Presidency 
Project‘s website at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/presparty.php  last accessed on May 17, 2011. 
206 
respectively). Using THOMAS, I created a list of major actions of each law in the 
dataset.  From this list, I collected the date of votes on final passage (and the specific 
measure voted on) in the House and the Senate.  These votes on final passage were then 
matched to the appropriate vote in Voteview.com, yielding a collection of legislator‘s 
votes on final passage for each law in the dataset.  In total, of the 75,958 votes cast, 
62,870 were in the House and 13,088 in the Senate.  In sum in this dataset, I have a 
collection of vote choices for legislators, the intergovernmental team for each legislator, 
and the majority party in the House and Senate, as well as the party of the President.     
 In the Cloture Vote analysis, I collected information on all cloture votes taken in 
the 93
rd
 through the 110
th
 Congresses from the Senate Virtual Reference Desk Cloture 
List Tables.
112
  These cloture votes were matched with the Voteview.com roll call votes 
by name of the motion or measure, motion or measure number, vote tally, and date.  The 
information provided by these two resources includes how each Senator voted on all 
cloture votes across the period.  These Senators were then matched by year to their state 
governor using Klarner‘s (2007) data on state political institution‘s partisanship for 1973-
2007 and the National Governors Association lists of governors for 2008.   
Thus, for each cloture vote taken in the time period of the study, I have an 
individual legislator‘s vote choice coded as 0 or 1 for ―nay‖ and ―yea,‖ the legislator‘s 
party, his or her governor‘s party, and the party of the president and Senate majority for 
the year the vote was recorded.  In the Cloture Vote analysis data, 27,878 of the total 
65,724 votes to invoke cloture were successful.
113
  As can be seen in Figure 6-1, of the 
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 Accessed at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm from April 
15-May 15, 2011. 
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 Across this time period there were an additional 6,619 votes on nominations, which I excluded from my 
analyses. 
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686 total motions to invoke cloture over the time period, the most frequent were recorded 
in 2007 (61 votes in total), followed by 2008, 2002, and 1999 (49, 35, and 35 total votes 
on motions to invoke cloture, respectively). 
Figure 6-1:  Cloture Votes from 1973-2008 
   
Explanatory Variable 
 To assess whether or not there is support for the hypotheses in the voting behavior 
of legislators, I examine whether those legislators who vote with the enacting coalition in 
the Final Passage analysis or with the majority party in the Cloture Vote analysis are 
from the intergovernmental team predicted to be pivotal by the theory.  I assume the 
enacting coalition includes the majority of the majority party.  This assumption can be 
examined empirically by considering the coefficients and significance on the majority 
party intergovernmental team variables in comparison to the baseline minority party 
team.  Under a Democratic majority, Democratic intergovernmental teams DD and DR, 
on average, should have higher odds than either minority party intergovernmental team of 
voting to enact legislation or close debate such that the policy agenda can progress 





































 To analyze how each intergovernmental team votes, on average, the main 
explanatory variable is a categorical measure of intergovernmental teams.  I construct this 
intergovernmental team variable by matching each legislator to his or her governor for 
every year in the dataset and create a categorical coding for legislators, where DD, DR, 
RD, and RR legislators are coded as 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively.  In addition, I code 
independent legislators and governors as a 5.
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By constructing the explanatory variable in this manner, I can assess the extent to 
which a pivotal team is more likely to vote ―yea‖ than another comparison team.  
Although the comparison in the House is whether Democrats from either 
intergovernmental team (DD and DR) are more likely to vote for enactment than their 
Republican counterparts when in the majority (and vice versa), in the Senate one 
particular minority party intergovernmental team is theoretically considered to be pivotal 
and the other minority party intergovernmental team is not.  By separating the 
intergovernmental teams in this categorical fashion, I can assess the extent to which 
legislators in the pivotal minority intergovernmental teams are more likely to vote for 
enactment or to invoke cloture than the other minority intergovernmental team.  Which 
team is considered to be pivotal in the Senate is dependent on the conditions noted in 
Hypotheses 6-3 through 6-6.  Pivotal members, therefore, are defined by the fact that 
without those particular members, a motion or measure will not secure the needed votes 
for passage.   
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 In addition, I create a second coding where these independent legislators are folded into the 4-
categorical variable depending on the party with which the legislators caucused.  Thus, an IR legislator (an 
independent legislator from a state with a Republican governor) is coded as RR if the legislator caucused 
with the Republicans and a DR if he caucused with the Democrats.  If an actor could not be assigned as 
more left leaning versus right leaning, they were dropped from the analysis.  Analyzing the data in this way 
does not change the substantive findings.  It does, however, prohibit an opportunity to consider how 
independents vote; therefore, I use the 5-category variable in the results section. 
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For example, when there is a Republican president and a Democratic majority in 
the Senate, the pivotal minority team is that of RD legislators and not RR legislators.  
This means that without RD legislators, the motion or measure in the Senate will not 
pass.  Hypothesis 6-6 predicts that RD legislators, then, are more likely to vote with 
Democrats instead of with their co-partisans.  To examine whether this prediction is 
supported in the data, I analyze whether the likelihood that RD legislators vote for 
enactment or to invoke cloture is greater than that of the appropriate comparison group.  
The appropriate comparison group is that of RR legislators, since they are co-partisans, or 
from the same party.  If intergovernmental teams do not influence voting, the coefficient 
on the RD team variable would not be significantly different from zero.             
The expectations for the intergovernmental team categorical variable under the 
various conditions detailed in the hypotheses are summarized in Table 6-1.  The 
theoretical argument posits that the party of the president does not matter for how the 
majority party forms successful policy coalitions in the House, but does matter for the 
Senate (first row of the table).  For Hypothesis 6-1, in the House under a Democratic 
majority party, the prediction is that Democrats vote more often with each other, or for 
enactment, than with the Republican intergovernmental teams (first column in Table 6-1).   
In other words, I expect that when Republicans are in power in the House, a 
comparison of the likelihood of voting for final passage on a bill is higher for 
Republicans (both RD and RR intergovernmental teams) than for Democrats (both DD 
and DR teams).   For Hypothesis 6-2 (second column, Table 6-1), under a Democratic 
majority, the expectation is that Democratic House members vote more often for 
enactment than do the Republican teams (the baseline category).  For the House analysis, 
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I fold the two Democratic intergovernmental teams and the two Republican 
intergovernmental teams into one measure, to assess this party influence.   
Recall, however, that I assume the majority party sets the agenda.  In the House, 
Hypotheses 6-1 and 6-2 refer to the combination of Republican intergovernmental teams 
(6-1) and Democratic teams (6-2); therefore, for these two hypotheses, I combine 
intergovernmental teams into a simple party dummy (0 for Democrats and 1 for 
Republicans).  Testing the House hypotheses in this dataset is problematic.  First, because 
the coefficients should be positive by assumption given that the dependent variable is an 
up or down vote on the floor, and second, because my theory is indistinguishable from 
voting along party lines in this particular chamber. Thus, this analysis simply assesses 
whether or not the majority party is likely to vote for the measures brought to the floor by 
party leaders.  Examining the Senate hypotheses, though, can reveal support for the 
Senate predictions that differ substantially from party line voting.  
Table 6-1 Theoretical Expectations for Intergovernmental Team Variable 
President R or D R or D D D R R 
Majority Party R D R D R D 
Pivot R D DR RR DD RD 
Chamber House House Senate Senate Senate Senate 
Hypothesis: 6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4 6-5 6-6 
DD baseline + baseline majority + majority 
DR baseline + + majority baseline majority 
RD + baseline majority baseline majority + 
RR + baseline majority + majority baseline 
Baseline is the comparison category for each analysis and majority refers to the majority party intergovernmental 
teams.  The majority teams are expected to have a positive and statistically significant coefficient for each model.  
The direction of these coefficients simply means that the majority party is more likely to enact (in the Final Votes 
analysis) or vote in favor of motions to close floor debate (in the Cloture Vote analysis). 
 
 In contrast to the House, the theory suggests specific findings in the Senate that 
differ from straight party line voting.  Columns 3 through 6 in Table 6-1 summarize the 
theoretical expectations in the Senate under different conditions.  Specifically, a unique 
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intergovernmental team is posited as pivotal under each set of conditions.  A pivotal 
team, from the theory, is that team necessary to form a successful policy coalition and is 
shown in the table as a gray shaded cell.   
 Beginning with Column 3, under a Democratic president and a Republican 
majority party, DR legislators are pivotal and, in Column 4, under a Democratic president 
and Democratic majority, RR legislators are pivotal.  This means that under a Democratic 
president and Republican majority DR legislators would be expected to have higher odds 
of voting for the measure or motion than DD legislators.  With a Democratic president 
and Senate majority, RR legislators would have higher odds of voting for the measure or 
motion than RD legislators.  Switching to the expected pivots under Republican 
presidents, in Column 5 with a Republican majority, DD legislators are pivotal (positive 
coefficient in comparison to DR legislators) and in Column 6 with a Democratic Senate 
majority, RD legislators are pivotal (positive coefficient in comparison to RR legislators). 
 What voting behavior is expected of the pivotal intergovernmental teams?  As 
discussed above, outside of the formal model not every legislator within a team is 
expected to vote in the same fashion.  Instead, legislators within a team are predicted to 
be more likely to vote in a particular way.  Moreover, to reach 60 votes and maintain the 
supermajority needed to invoke cloture if one Senator mounts a filibuster, the majority 
party (comprised of both majority intergovernmental teams) need only entice enough 
legislators from the pivotal minority intergovernmental team to join the policy coalition 
to reach that threshold (given, of course, the possibility that some majority party 
members may not vote along with the party).  The expectation, then, is that legislators 
from the pivotal minority party intergovernmental team, under each condition, will be 
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more likely to vote with the majority party than the other minority intergovernmental 
team (the non-pivotal minority team). 
 These expectations are included in the table as a positive sign, or that a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient is expected, in comparison to the baseline group:   
 Column 3:  DR legislators will vote with the Republican majority more often than 
DD legislators under a Democratic president (Hypothesis 6-3). 
 Column 4:  RR legislators will vote with the Democrat majority more often than 
RD legislators when there is a Democratic president (Hypothesis 6-4). 
 Column 5:  DD legislators will vote with the Republican majority more often than 
DR legislators when there is a Republican president (Hypothesis 6-5). 
 Column 6:  RD legislators are more likely to vote with the Democratic majority 
than RR legislators when there is a Republican president (Hypothesis 6-6).      
 
This chapter analyzes two separate datasets of vote choices in the Senate.  One 
dataset is on the final passage of significant legislation and the other is on motions to 
invoke cloture.  Given the theoretical focus on coalitions able to invoke cloture, I expect 
to find stronger results in the Cloture Vote analysis than in the Final Passage analysis.  
Specifically, in votes on final passage in the Senate, a simple majority is all that is 
required, thus, at this stage of voting the pivotal minority intergovernmental teams in the 
Senate are less informative.  This is not to say that legislators from the pivotal team are 
not considered to be important at the earlier stages of congressional action for these 
measures.  On the contrary, if a legislator mounted a (or threatened to) filibuster earlier in 
the process, the pivotal minority intergovernmental team is crucial to a successful policy 
coalition.  Since these votes are on final passage, which assume or select away the earlier 
stages of legislative action, and because legislators can switch their votes at any time, I 
expect the influence of the pivotal minority intergovernmental team to be diluted in the 
Final Passage analysis.  
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 These theoretical predictions also require partisan labels of the president and 
Senate and House majority party for each year in the dataset.  With these partisan labels, I 
run each analysis given the various conditions of government (see Table 6-1).  In the 
House, these conditions include a model under Republican majority and another under 
Democratic majority.  In the Senate, there are four conditions to assess:  Democratic 
president with Republican Senate majority, Democratic president with Democratic Senate 
majority, Republican president with Republican Senate majority, and Republican 
president with Democratic Senate majority.   
Control Variables 
 I do not include control variables in the Final Passage and Cloture Vote analyses 
reported in the tables.
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  Given the variety of underlying policy areas and different 
annual environmental conditions, those factors expected to explain legislative voting 
behavior, such as constituency pressures or personal preferences are expected to wash out 
and not influence the substantive conclusions of the analyses.
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 I estimate three overarching models, two for the Final Passage analysis (one in 
the House and one in the Senate) and one model for the Cloture Vote analysis.   
 Final Passage Analysis: Logit (pi) = log [p(vote ―yea‖)/1-p(vote ―nay‖)]i,t  = β0 + 
β1INTERGOVERNMENTAL TEAMi,t + ε, if majority party is 
                                                 
115
 In the Final Passage analysis, I also run a set of models that include various controls from Chapter 4.  
These variables include the explanatory variables from that chapter‘s empirical analyses:  preference 
distance from pivotal legislative team to the state and the president, as well as state and national political 
uncertainty.  In addition, I include the same control variables as in Chapter 4:  lagged federal deficit as a 
percent of GDP, lagged state fiscal health (operationalized as state revenue growth as a percent of GDP), 
traditional state policies (0,1), and activist public mood (0,1).  I omit unified government, since this 
variable is collinear with the conditions of national government needed to assess the hypotheses.  The 
results of these models are not significantly different from those discussed in this chapter, thus, I report the 
parsimonious theoretic model instead.  
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 Environmental conditions can include diverse factors such as fads that increase the consumption of 
certain goods or products, climate, monetary concerns, or even a variety of disasters, among other things.  
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Republican/Democrat for the House and if majority party is Republican/Democrat 
& if party of President is Republican/Democrat in the Senate.   
 
 Cloture Vote Analysis: Logit (pi) = log [p(vote ―yea‖)/1-p(vote ―nay‖)]i,t  = β0 + 
β1INTERGOVERNMENTAL TEAMi,t + ε, if majority party is 




Given the various conditions to be assessed, these models result in two equations in the 
House: 
1. Final Passage logit under Republican majority and 
2. Final Passage logit under a Democratic majority. 
 
And eight equations in the Senate: 
  
1. Final Passage logit under a Democratic president with a Republican majority,  
2. Final Passage logit under a Democratic president with a Democratic majority,  
3. Final Passage logit under a Republican president with a Republican majority,  
4. Final Passage logit under a Republican president with a Democratic majority, 
 
5. Cloture Vote logit under a Democratic president with a Republican majority,  
6. Cloture Vote logit under a Democratic president with a Democratic majority,  
7. Cloture Vote logit under a Republican president with a Republican majority, and 
8. Cloture Vote logit under a Republican president with a Democratic majority. 
 
Each equation estimated in this chapter serves a particular purpose, to assess one of 
the theoretical hypotheses.  The number of equations derives from the variety of 
conditions to be assessed and the different baseline comparison groups needed in the 
Senate.  It is possible to analyze these different conditions and groups with one 
interactive model, where the intergovernmental team variable is interacted with the 
majority party (for the House model) or the majority party and the party of the President 
(for the Senate model).  Interpreting the three (and four)-way interactions, given the 
categorical nature of the intergovernmental team variable, though, seems both more 
cumbersome and less useful.   
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First, the coefficients from a three- or four-way interactive logit model are less than 
informative.  Second, comparing the appropriate baseline group with the particular 
pivotal team in each condition would require algebraic manipulation to report the log 
odds of probability of voting in favor over the probability of voting against for each pivot 
versus comparison group.  By estimating each condition separately with the appropriately 
selected comparison group, the coefficient on the pivotal team under that particular 
condition is that of the pivotal team votes with the enacting coalition, or with the majority 
party, compared to the other minority intergovernmental team.  In sum, separately 
analyzing each condition allows for a straightforward picture of the different comparison 
groups and eases the presentation of the findings in a simple regression output table.     
RESULTS 
 In Table 6-2, I display the results of the two models examined in the House of 
Representatives for the Final Passage Analysis.  The models in this table allow me to 
assess the hypothesis that the majority intergovernmental teams are the participants in 
successful policy coalitions in the House.  The majority intergovernmental teams are 
considered pivotal by my theory and are shaded in the table.  Models H-1 and H-2 in 
Table 6-2 provide support for the House hypotheses (Hypotheses 6-1 and 6-2).  As 
expected, in Model H-1 under a Republican majority party in the House, the Republican 
intergovernmental party teams together are more likely than the base Democratic teams 
to vote for passage with log odds of 1.983 for Republican legislators.  This finding is 
highly statistically significant and reveals that Republicans are 627% (exp(1.983)=7.267)  
more likely to vote for passage than Democrats when Republicans are in the majority, 
suggesting support for Hypothesis 6-1.  In Model H-2, the odds ratio is 3.427 
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(exp(1.232)=3.427) and statistically significant, meaning that Democrats have 243% 
higher odds of voting for final passage than Republicans when Democrats have the 
majority in the House. 
Table 6-2:  House Votes on Final Passage 
 Model H-1 Model H-2 
President     
Majority Republican Democrat 
Pivot R D 
Teams DD & DR (base) 1.232**** 
  (base) (0.195) 
Teams RD & RR 1.983**** (base) 
  (0.390) (base) 
Independents -0.019   
  (0.610)   
Constant 0.425* 0.596**** 
  (0.217) (0.138) 
N 21797 41071 
Wald Chi
2
 42.588 40.085 
Analyses are logit with standard errors clustered by public law number and p-values noted 
as ^p≤0.10, *p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001, ****p≤0.0001. 
 
 Taken at face value, the results in Table 6-1 provide support for the House 
hypotheses derived from my theoretical model.  It is important to remember, however, 
that the results in Table 6-1 also support the assumption that the majority party is more 
likely the enacting coalition than the minority party, or that members of parties vote 
together.  As described above, in the House, my theory cannot be distinguished from 
straight party line voting, because I expect no difference in how co-partisan 
intergovernmental teams vote.  In my theory, DD and DR legislators should vote together 
as should RR and RD legislators.  I must turn to the Senate to assess whether the 
intergovernmental theory of coalition formation holds any traction in the data. 
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 In Table 6-3, I present the findings for the analysis of votes on final passage for 
the 172 pieces of significant legislation in the Senate.  At a glance, the results from the 
Senate models of votes on final passage align with the findings from the House analyses.  
Specifically, majority party intergovernmental teams across all four models, though not 
grouped together as in the House, are significantly more likely to vote for passage than 
the baseline minority party intergovernmental team across all four models.  This finding 
supports the enacting coalition assumption.  In particular, in each model, both majority 
party intergovernmental teams are significantly more likely to vote in favor of final 
passage (and in later models to invoke cloture) than the excluded minority team.  Across 
the four specifications, the log odds range from a low of 0.8 (in Model S-4 for 
Democratic teams) up to 2.2 (in Model S-3 for Republican teams), indicating that 
majority teams have much higher odds of voting for passage than the minority team (and 
if the comparison group is converted to the other minority party team, similar large 
positive and significant results hold).  These findings are all statistically significant 
beyond the p 0.0001 level.   
 The Senate models, though, are designed to test whether the pivotal 
intergovernmental team has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in 
comparison to the other minority intergovernmental team.  I discuss the findings related 
to these hypotheses, specifically Hypotheses 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, and 6-6, next.  The pivotal 
team in each model in Table 6-3 is demarcated by gray shading.  The expectation is that 
these pivotal teams, which are minority party intergovernmental teams, should have a 
positive coefficient when compared to the other minority party intergovernmental team 
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(the baseline).  Model S-1 assesses Hypothesis 6-3, Model S-2 examines Hypothesis 6-4, 
and Models S-3 and S-4 consider Hypotheses 6-5 and 6-6, respectively.   
Table 6-3:  Senate Votes on Final Passage and Pivotal Party 1973-2008 
DV: final passage vote 
(0,1) 
Model S-1 Model S-2 Model S-3 Model S-4 
President Democrat Democrat Republican Republican 
Majority Republican Democrat Republican Democrat 
Pivot DR RR DD RD 
Team DD (base) 1.830**** 0.125 0.841****  
  (base) (0.137) (0.127) (0.094) 
Team DR -0.162 2.070**** (base) 0.995**** 
  (0.150) (0.192) (base) (0.109) 
Team RD 1.527**** (base) 1.457**** 0.268**   
  (0.224) (base) (0.153) (0.092) 
Team RR 1.654**** -0.030 2.244*** (base)    
  (0.198) (0.134) (0.207) (base)    
Team Independent  0.413 -0.084 -0.345 
    (0.532) (0.516) (0.362) 
Constant 1.102**** 0.542**** 0.690**** 0.995**** 
  (0.121) (0.077) (0.094) (0.067) 
N 2154 2611 2515 5806 
Wald Chi
2
 148.85 282.39 201.10 133.03 
Analyses are logit with robust standard errors and p-values noted as ^p≤0.10, *p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, 
***p≤0.001, ****p≤0.0001.  
 
  As can be seen in the table, only those models under Republican 
presidents have a positive coefficient.  And, of those two models, only Model S-4 
(Republican president with a Democratic majority party) has a pivotal team with a 
statistically significant positive coefficient.  Specifically, RD legislators have 30.6% 
(exp(0.268)=1.306) higher odds of voting for final passage under a Republican president 
with a Democratic majority than RR legislators, providing support for Hypothesis 6-6, 
but not for Hypotheses 6-3 through 6-5.  The model estimating the influence of the DD 
pivotal team on the likelihood of final passage (Model S-3) fails to reject the null that DD 
pivotal legislators, on average, do not vote in a significantly different manner than DR 
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legislators.  Models S-1 and S-2 similarly fail to reject the null hypothesis for the pivotal 
team variables.        
 Although the findings in Table 6-3 provide no support for Hypotheses 6-3 through 
6-5, since those particular analyses focus on votes on final passage, they are not 
particularly surprising.  As explained earlier, the influence of the pivotal minority 
intergovernmental team on votes over final passage are expected to be more dilute than in 
votes on motions to invoke cloture.  Table 6-4 presents the empirical results to 
specifically explore whether the pivotal minority party team votes in a significantly 
different manner than the other minority intergovernmental team on cloture votes.   
Column 1 presents the results for the model estimated under a Democratic 
president and Republican Senate majority, with the left-hand side of the column 
including all cloture votes and the right-hand side only successful cloture votes.  As 
before, the pivotal intergovernmental team is shaded dark gray, with the baseline 
comparison group a lighter gray.  The results in this analysis of cloture votes are highly 
consistent with the theoretical expectations.  As predicted by the theory, the pivotal DR 
team, the pivotal RR team, and the pivotal RD team have statistically significant higher 
odds of voting to close debate than their co-partisan baseline group in each specific 
model.  In model S-1, the model of all cloture votes under Democratic presidents when 
there is a Republican Senate majority, there is a 9.2% (exp(0.088)=1.092) higher odds 
that pivotal DR legislators will vote with Republicans on motions to invoke cloture than 
do DD legislators (with a p-value = 0.094).  The sign on the coefficient for this variable is 
still positive in model S-2 of only successful cloture votes, but is not statistically 
significant.   
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Under a Democratic president and Democratic Senate majority (model S-3), the 
odds are 16.6% (exp(0.154)=1.166) higher that pivotal RR legislators will vote with 
Democrats to close debate than RD legislators.  This finding increases in size and 
precision in the model of only successful cloture votes (Model S-4), where the higher 
odds increase to 35.4% (exp(0.303)=1.354).  Similarly, in Model S-7, the pivotal RD 
legislator variable under Republican presidents and Democratic Senate majorities has a 
positive coefficient and is statistically significant, yielding 16.6% 
(exp(0.154)=1.166)higher odds that RD legislators vote to close debate than do RR 
legislators.  Again, restricting the analysis to successful cloture votes results in a positive, 
but not statistically significant, coefficient (Model S-8). 
In other words, for the most part, as Senators attempt to create a policy coalition 
which would allow them to close debate on the floor, the majority party more often 
entices the intergovernmental pivot to join their coalition than the other minority 
intergovernmental team.  This finding is in accordance with the conclusions of the formal 
coalition bargaining model in Chapter 2.  The results from one condition, Republican 
Presidents with Republican Senate majorities; however, does not support this claim and 
specifically fails to demonstrate support for Hypothesis 6-5.  In the model assessing all 
cloture votes, the coefficient is close to zero (Model S-5) and in the estimation including 
only successful cloture votes, the coefficient is in the opposite direction than expected 
(negative) and is statistically significant.  This finding indicates that, contrary to 
Hypothesis 6-5 where pivotal DD legislators are expected to vote more often with 
Republican legislators than do DR legislators, DD legislators vote less often to close 
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debate with Republicans than do DR legislators.  This finding suggests that DR 
legislators may represent the pivotal vote under this particular condition.   




























President Democrat Democrat Republican Republican 
Majority Republican Democrat Republican Democrat 
Pivot DR RR DD RD 
Team DD (base) (base) 2.570**** 2.474**** 0.005 -0.207* 1.925**** 1.234**** 
  (base) (base) (0.081) (0.161) (0.052) (0.091) (0.037) (0.065) 
Team DR 0.088^ 0.056 2.971**** 2.299**** (base) (base) 2.095**** 1.573**** 
  (0.053) (0.119) (0.102) (0.181) (base) (base) (0.042) (0.080) 
Team RD 2.267**** 0.979**** (base) (base) 1.278**** 0.813**** 0.154*** 0.061 
  (0.066) (0.151) (base) (base) (0.056) (0.104) (0.033) (0.056) 
Team RR 2.334**** 1.263**** 0.154^ 0.303* 1.269**** 0.918**** (base)    (base)    
  (0.060) (0.145) (0.093) (0.149) (0.058) (0.109) (base)    (base)    
Team I   0.105 0.168 0.100 -0.346 0.443 -0.724**  
      (0.425) (0.639) (0.214) (0.344) (0.193) (0.276) 
Constant -0.468**** 1.572**** -0.970**** -0.168^ 0.099* 1.358**** -0.207**** 1.054**** 
  (0.042) (0.096) (0.056) (0.090) (0.038) (0.068) (0.024) (0.040) 
N 14774 4940 5922 1890 13115 6323 31913 14725 
Wald χ
2
 3030.75 128.549 1649.54 342.54 1047.35 188.82 4918.42 741.75 
Analyses are logit with robust standard errors and p-values noted as ^p≤0.10, *p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001, 
****p≤0.0001.  Cloture votes on nominations are excluded from the analyses. 
 
Another notable set of findings in Table 6-4 are those regarding the difference 
between all cloture votes (the odd numbered models) and successful ones (even 
numbered models).  I expected that an analysis of successful cloture coalitions would 
reveal stronger results than estimations including both successful and unsuccessful 
attempts to close floor debate.  The results with respect to this consideration are 
inconsistent with that expectation.  In the central set of columns (Models S-3 through S-
6), the coefficients for the variables of interest, as expected, gain strength and precision.  
The results from the outermost columns (S-1, S-2, S-7, and S-8), though, do not.  These 
findings suggest that Senators may first rely on each other‘s intergovernmental context 
(DD, DR, RD, and RR), given the President‘s party, as they go about overcoming a 
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filibuster.  Perhaps in the end, though, other factors come into play, such as buying off 
certain senators with distributive goods in their district or deleting provisions of interest 
to a particular legislator.     
In summary, the results reported in Table 6-4 indicate three overall conclusions.  
First, in general, the hypotheses derived from the intergovernmental bargaining coalition 
model are supported.  Specifically, across all but one condition I find support for the 
hypotheses.  Only Hypothesis 6-5 is contradicted by the estimation results.  Second, and 
unexpectedly, there may be variation in the formation of cloture coalitions that are 
successful versus all attempts to invoke cloture.  This potential difference is suggested by 
the loss of significance in the pivotal team variable‘s coefficient under both sets of 
―divided‖ government, or Democratic presidents with a Republican Senate majority and 
Republican presidents with a Democratic Senate majority (Models S-1 to S-2 and S-7 to 
S-8) and gain in precision under both sets of ―unified‖ government, or Democratic 
presidents with a Democratic Senate majority and Republican presidents with a 
Republican Senate majority (Models S-3 to S-4 and S-5 to S-6).                  
 Third, when the Senate majority and president are both Republican, the cloture 
coalition appears to include the indifferent minority party intergovernmental team, DR 
legislators instead of members from the predicted pivotal team of DD legislators.  To 
investigate this finding further, I consider the other national institution heretofore ignored 
in these analyses—the House.  In the case study from Chapter 5, elite interviews indicate 
the importance of designing policy in one chamber in anticipation of a conference and the 
need to compromise with the other chamber.   
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 Table 6-5 shows a cross-tabulation of House and Senate majorities under different 




 Congresses.  Under Democratic presidents, when 
there is a Democratic Senate, all Houses also have Democratic majorities and when there 
is a Republican Senate, all Houses also have Republican majorities.  Under Republican 
presidents, a divided legislature occurs for 13,253 votes (6,183+7,070).  In the estimation 
of the models that produced the results in the previous table (Table 6-4), I do not account 
for the majority party in the House.  In the models in Table 6-6 and 6-7, I do.     
Table 6-5:  Party Configuration of National Institutions 
  Democratic President Republican President 










7,757 0 28,898 7,070 
Republican 
House 
0 16,366 6,183 10,354 
Cell numbers indicate the number of votes on cloture taken under the various configurations. 
  
Given the lack of a divided legislature under Democratic presidents, Tables 6-6 
and 6-7 replicate the models from Table 6-4 under Republican presidents (Models S-5 
through S-8), but with the addition of the House majority.
118
  The results of this initial 
analyses including the House majority simply as a control variable in Table 6-6 indicate 
that the majority party in the House is a crucial factor in the likelihood that legislators 
vote for cloture in the Senate under Republican presidents, as is evidenced by the 
statistically significant and positive coefficient on the House variable under Republican 
presidents with either a Republican majority or a Democratic majority in the Senate.  The 
positive and significant coefficient on the House majority party indicates that moving 
from a Democratic to Republican House majority party is associated with positive log 
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 The analyses restricted to successful cloture votes are not significantly different from those for all votes.  
Thus, I report votes on all motions to invoke cloture, excluding nominations, in Tables 6-6 and 6-7.   
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odds of Senators voting to close debate.  The actual meaning of this result for the pivotal 
team in each model is unclear, since it is the interactive model, where the House is a 
contingency, which is needed.     
Table 6-6:  House as a Control  in Senate Cloture Votes 
President Republican Republican 
Senate Republican Democratic 
Pivot DD RD 
Team DD 0.069 1.957*** 
  (0.054) (0.037) 
Team DR . 2.103*** 
  . (0.042) 
Team RD 1.331*** 0.179*** 
  (0.056) (0.033) 
Team RR 1.289*** .    
  (0.058) .    
Team I 0.077 0.367*   
  (0.218) (0.185) 
House Majority 0.133*** 0.136*** 
  (0.020) (0.018) 
Constant 0.062 -0.134*** 
  (0.039) (0.026) 
N 13115 31913 
Wald Chi
2
 1120.92 4933.717 
Analyses are logit with robust standard errors and p-values noted as ^p≤0.10, 
*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001, ****p≤0.0001. 
  
 Table 6-7, therefore, examines the extent to which the House majority influences 
cloture coalition formation, by including the House majority as an additional 
contingency.  In particular, the models investigate the influence of the theoretically 
expected pivotal team (DD under Republican presidents with a Republican Senate 
majority and RD under Republican presidents with a Democratic Senate majority, 
highlighted with dark gray shading), given a Democratic or Republican House majority.  
The results show that when there is a Republican president, Republican Senate majority, 
and Democratic House majority, Hypothesis 6-5 is supported, due to the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on the pivotal DD team variable.  Under this condition, 
225 
there are 14.7% (exp(0.137) = 1.147) higher odds that DD legislators vote to close debate 
with the Republican majority than do DR legislators.  The positive coefficient and 
supportive findings for Hypothesis 6-6 from the earlier estimation with regards to the RD 
pivot (Model S-7 in Table 6-4) are replicated here, but the coefficient is only statistically 
significant under a Democratic House majority.   
Table 6-7:  Cloture Votes under Republican Presidents given House 
Majorities 
DV: cloture vote (0,1) Model S-9     
all 
Model S-10      
all 
Model S-11      
all 
Model S-12      
all 
President Republican Republican Republican Republican 
Majority Republican Republican Democrat Democrat 
Pivot DD DD RD RD 
HOUSE Democratic Republican Democratic Republican 
Team DD 0.137^ -0.159* 1.969*** 1.951*** 
  (0.079) (0.074) (0.040) (0.101) 
Team DR (base) (base) 2.175*** 1.829*** 
  (base) (base) (0.048) (0.090) 
Team RD 1.017**** 1.699**** 0.206*** 0.065 
  (0.082) (0.085) (0.037) (0.079) 
Team RR 0.899**** 1.617**** (base) (base) 
  (0.087) (0.080) (base) (base) 
Team I 1.092* -0.241 -1.075** 2.078*** 
  (0.473) (0.251) (0.339) (0.434) 
Constant 0.061 0.120* -0.288*** 0.062 
  (0.064) (0.048) (0.027) (0.049) 
N 6370 6745 26379 5534 
Wald Chi
2
 273.03 855.24 4253.30 734.86 
Analyses are logit with robust standard errors and p-values noted as ^p≤0.10, *p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, 
***p≤0.001, ****p≤0.0001. 
 
Model S-10 in Table 6-6 further clarifies the unexpected result from the previous 
estimation that had excluded the House.  In particular, when there is unified Republican 
government, Republican Senators appear to court DR legislators more so than DD and 
Independent legislators, given the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the 
Team DD variable.  In other words, members from team DD in Model S-10 are 
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significantly less likely to vote for cloture than members from the pivotal team DR (odds 
ratio = 0.853, exp(-0.159)=0.853). 
 One additional finding remains to be discussed—the voting behavior of 
Independents across the estimation results.  In all but a handful of the models estimated 
across Tables 6-2 (House, Final Passage), 6-3 (Senate, Final Passage), 6-4 (Senate, 
Cloture Votes), and 6-7 (Senate, Cloture Votes with House contingency), I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the odds that Independents vote differently than 
the baseline group is zero (even if I widen the confidence intervals to 90%).  Those few 
models where the coefficient is statistically significant, though, deserve to be highlighted 
and their implications considered.  In the Model S-8 from Table 6-4 on Senate cloture 
votes, the results indicate that under a Republican president and Democratic Senate 
majority that Independent legislators are less likely to vote for cloture than the baseline 
RR team (log odds =-0.724).  A negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
Independents is evident in Model S-11 from Table 6-7 as well.  In this model of cloture 
voting given a Republican president, Democratic Senate, and Democratic House reveals 
log odds of -1.075 for Independents in comparison to RR legislators.  These results imply 
that under these particular conditions Independent legislators are not part of the cloture 
coalition.   
 Alternatively, two models from Table 6-7 demonstrate positive and statistically 
significant coefficients on the Independent legislators‘ variable (Models S-9 and S-12).  
In other words, under a Republican president and Senate with a Democratic House 
(Model S-9) or a Republican president with a Democratic Senate and Republican House 
(Model S-12), the odds ratio that Independents vote with the majority party in the Senate 
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to close debate on the floor are higher than the pivotal legislators (DR legislators in the 
first model and RR legislators in the second).  In both models, the coefficient on 
Independent legislators is larger and more precise than for the theoretically expected 
pivotal team (DD for Model S-9 and RD for Model S-12).  In other words, it appears that 
the majority party in the Senate under these particular conditions may entice Independent 
legislators to aid them on motions to invoke cloture instead of the predicted minority 
party intergovernmental team.  These findings are only suggestive, though, since the 
number of senators who identify as Independents and place votes under these conditions 
across the time span of the study is low (27 votes for Model S-9 and 144 votes for Model 
S-12, in comparison to >1,000-2,000 votes for the four intergovernmental teams for both 
models).          
 In this results section, I have estimated a number of different models assessing the 
various configurations of national institutions and theoretical pivotal intergovernmental 
teams.  Overall, I find support for five of my six hypotheses across the House and the 
Senate for how individual legislators cast their votes and the resulting policy and 
procedural coalitions.  In addition, I find the strongest evidence for the Senate in the 
examination of cloture votes, which is the basis of the theoretical argument.  The results 
are not completely supportive of the theoretical argument, however.  In particular, 
Independent legislators and unified Republican government appear to defy the theory.  
The two likely reasons for these challenges are that the individual-level theory assumes 
away Independent legislators and ignores the influence of bicameralism on policy 
coalition formation in each chamber—two potential areas of future research. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter I undertake an analysis of two separate datasets to test the 
individual-level hypotheses that emerge from the theory of intergovernmental delegation 
in Chapter 2.  Overall, I find support for the hypotheses, with one exception: when there 
is a Republican president, a Republican Senate majority, and a Republican House 
majority.  In this circumstance, DR legislators help Republicans close floor debate more 
so than do DD legislators, which were the expected pivotal legislators. 
 The results from this chapter are a useful addition to the literature on 
centralization and decentralization by providing an examination of the extent to which 
state authority allocation in national law influences policy and procedural coalition 
formation.  Specifically, hypotheses generated from a formal model focused exclusively 
on state authority allocation and intergovernmental delegation by House and Senate 
members are supported.  The consistent findings suggest the need for work on the extent 
to which this type of coalition formation and the resulting pivots influences the degree of 
decentralization in national law.  In fact, Chapter 4 does just this by examining the impact 
of these pivotal legislators on decentralization over time and across policies.  Taken 
together, then, these empirical analyses point to the likelihood that if intergovernmental 
context is overlooked in policymaking, that pivotal legislators and federal delegation 
design will be misidentified.     
 This chapter also contributes to a growing body of literature on cloture voting in 
the Senate.  Early scholars focused on why legislators would choose to incorporate 
cloture into the procedures of the chamber, the history of filibustering and invoking 
cloture, and the benefits of changing the size of policy coalitions for individual legislators 
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and minority parties (e.g., see Oppenheimer 1995, Binder 1998, Groseclose and Snyder 
2000, Wawro and Schickler 2006, and Koger 2010).  Scholars who assess, either 
theoretically, empirically, or both, which legislators vote to close debate have included 
Cox and Poole (2002) with party effects, Lee (2006) with regional coalitions, and Butler 
and Sempolinski (2010) based on non-policy determinants.  In addition, and often less 
directly, many spatial voting models such as Krehbeil (1997) or Enelow and Henich 
(1984) consider the identification of the pivotal legislator, including the filibuster pivot.  
By including a consideration of legislator‘s intergovernmental context, the filibuster pivot 
is not the legislator just beyond some median when the legislator‘s ideal points are 
aligned from left to right.  Instead, the filibuster pivot depends on which legislators are on 
the pivotal intergovernmental team.     
 The limitations of this chapter are related to the fact that I use party labels as a 
proxy for the location of the ideal points of the legislators, the state leadership, and the 
national executive branch and that the previously constructed theory ignores 
bicameralism.  A more refined measure, if incorporated into the theory, may be able to 
more specifically determine the pivotal legislators, instead of a team of potentially pivotal 
legislators, as is done here.  To be able to assess the predictive power of my theory in 
comparison to Krehbiel‘s (1998) pivotal politics theory with respect to the filibuster 
pivot, though, requires more precise estimations of ideal points across all three sets of 
actors.  Shor, Berry, and McCarty (forthcoming) may provide just such data.   
Regardless, in most of the analyses, I find the Senate majority party gains the 
additional votes needed to invoke cloture from the pivotal teams predicted by my theory 
of intergovernmental delegation.  In only one model—that of a unified Republican 
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government—is there little support in the data for the theory.  Perhaps under unified 
government, Republican senators can more easily compel DR legislators to vote 
alongside them on motions to invoke cloture when a Republican is in the White House 
and the House majority is also Republican than DD legislators.  This pressure may be 
more credible because a Republican House is less likely to balk at the provisions in a 
Republican Senate bill.  Alternatively, perhaps DR legislators, during periods of unified 
Republican national government, must strive to look more conservative, or more 
Republican-like, to retain elected office.  Underlying this alternative coalition formation 
process is the opportunity for the Republican majority to centralize authority with the 
national executive branch without having to decentralize some portions of the policy to 
appease the pivotal DD legislators (who strictly prefer to decentralize in this condition).     
 There are two problems with the aforementioned possibilities.  First, why is 
majority pressure on mismatched (DR legislators, or alternatively, RD legislators) more 
credible under unified Republican government and not under unified Democratic 
government?  Models S-3 and S-4 in Table 6-4 indicate that the Democratic majority 
under unified Democratic national government gains the support of the predicted RR 
legislators more often than RD legislators.  And, second, if Republicans are somehow 
better at pressuring these mismatched DR legislators, since in Models S-1 and S-2 from 
Table 6-4 reveal a positive coefficient on the pivotal DR legislators under a Democratic 
president with a Republican Senate majority, why do Republican majorities with a 
Democratic House (Model S-9, Table 6-7) not work in the same fashion?  In sum, this 
chapter produces almost as many questions as it addresses, particularly with respect to 
coalition formation in the Senate and bicameralism, that deserve further study.        
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 Finally, the tests included in this chapter span, not only three decades, but also 
many different policies with a broad range of degrees of decentralization of authority to 
the states.  What this study fails to do is to assess whether particular legislators vote for 
centralization versus decentralization.  There is one major reason for this omission.  In 
the intergovernmental theory in Chapter 2, coalition formation depends on the difference 
in state authority allocation between a status quo and the policy reform offered in a bill.  
Since I do not have the change in decentralization, I cannot analyze the extent to which 
different types of legislators vote for or against a bill.  This type of study deserves further 
attention.
119
       
 In conclusion, the findings in this chapter suggest that previous studies ignoring 
the intergovernmental context of coalition bargaining in Congress may overlook a 
significant determinant of policy and cloture coalition formation—bargaining over the 
degree of authority allocated to the states.  This conclusion has significant implications 
for specific policy areas, such as public health policy, including that a health policy, 
while possibly expertly crafted with respect to techniques to improve health care, public 
health outcomes, or specific prevention goals, may also need to be designed (with respect 
to the intergovernmental nature of the authority relationships in it) to deal with how the 
House majority party faces only a simple majority vote for final passage, but that the 
Senate majority party must bargain with a pivotal minority party intergovernmental team 
to successfully pass a policy.                 
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 In the empirical analyses of votes on final passage in the House and Senate, I include a control variable 
of the degree of decentralization in the law and find that the coefficient on the variable is positive but not 
statistically significant across any of the models.  This finding suggests that it is the change in state 
authority allocation that influences how individual legislators vote.     
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In my dissertation, I study the conditions under which Congress allocates more or 
less policy authority to the states.  The flexibility of the Constitution along with 
expansive judicial interpretations allow Congress to act as the principal, where the states 
along with the national executive branch act as potential agents, as they craft policy. This 
creates a federal design dilemma.  How much authority should Congress keep at the 
national level versus delegate to the states?  Although many scholars study how Congress 
delegates authority, no previous work considers how this delegation changes when the 
fifty states are also considered as agents of Congress.  Scholars in federalism and public 
policy, who provide explanations for decentralization of authority, fail to consider what I 
call the intergovernmental context—namely legislators come from specific states and 
consider how their state will implement policy if authority is delegated to the states.   
Legislation and delegation of authority provide the context for the operation of the 
public health system (Wing 2003, Turnock 2004), but the specific ways in which this 
legal framework shapes public health practice remain understudied.  Which level of 
government has policy authority is central to public health practice and the structure of 
public health systems. Whether states or the federal government are the lead, the support, 
or sole actors involved in a policy alters the ability of public health practitioners to do  
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their work.  Varying the amount of authority of federal and state bureaucracies changes  
the intent, the services, and the outputs of the underlying program. For instance, when the 
states have more authority in a program, the average number of eligible individuals tends 
to be smaller (with variance across states) than when the federal government has more 
authority (Rom, 2004).   
In this study, I carefully considered how Congress makes decisions about whether 
to give the states more or less authority in public health, health, and other national 
policies.  In Chapter 2 of my dissertation, I developed two formal models of how 
Congress (aggregate-level model) and how individual legislators in Congress (individual-
level model) intergovernmentally delegate authority to the states and the national 
executive branch.  I argued that the location of the ideal points of the actors involved and 
uncertainty over these ideal points during implementation were crucial to how legislators 
formed successful policy coalitions in the House and the Senate, and how Congress 
allocated authority to the states in national law.   
 To be able to test this theory across a sample of laws that delegate authority to 
state and national actors, I developed a novel dataset in Chapter 3.  This dataset included 
179 pieces of significant legislation from 1973 through 2009 containing over 24,000 
coded provisions. My data indicate that delegation to state level implementers occurs in 
almost every significant piece of domestic legislation passed in the time period of the 
study.  
 After constructing this dataset, I tested the hypotheses that result from the 
aggregate Congressional delegation model and found that, as expected, as the distance 
between a pivotal legislator in Congress and his state increases, less authority is delegated 
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to the states.  The results in Chapter 4 also indicate support for hypotheses about state and 
national political uncertainty.  Specifically, as uncertainty over the party that will be in 
power in the pivotal state during implementation of the law increases (state political 
uncertainty), significantly less authority is delegated to the states.  There was also 
minimal support for the fact that as national political uncertainty increases, more 
authority is delegated to the states.  I also found, unexpectedly, that as the distance 
between Congress and the national executive branch increases that delegation to the 
states also decreases.  This result, which is contrary to my theoretical argument may be 
the result of the blunt measure of either ideal points (party label) or joint partnerships 
(one category)—both of which I discuss in detail below.        
 Although the aggregate analyses exhibited support for the theory, I also relied on 
an in-depth examination of one case in order to gain insight into whether the mechanisms 
in the theory are at work in an actual case and to more fully appreciate what the large-N 
results mean in the complex world of politics and health policy.  By looking at the 
process of how legislators crafted and debated health insurance reform in 2009-2010, I 
discovered that the relationship between individual legislators and their governors was 
paramount, as was the difference in ideal outcomes of legislators and the national 
executive branch.  Congress did think of the states as potential implementers of national 
law and considered them an alternative to national executive branch agencies.  Moreover, 
changing the structure of intergovernmental delegation options offered legislators in the 
House and the Senate opportunities to coalesce around policy choices.   
 In addition to support for the underlying mechanisms of my theory, the case study 
highlighted the importance of intergovernmental context, delegation to the states, and 
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differences in the institutional rules between the House and the Senate for policy 
outcomes.  The differences in the House and Senate health insurance reform proposals 
and ultimate degree of state authority allocation in the law are consistent with the 
intergovernmental theory of federal policy design.  Namely, because of the ―razor edge‖ 
60 votes in the Senate and unified Democratic government, the Senate bill decentralized 
authority and due to the simple majority procedures in the House, the House bill 
centralized authority for the provisions in health insurance reform.  One component of the 
health insurance reform debate—the dynamics of the interaction between the House and 
Senate emerged from the interviews with key policy elites as crucial to the resulting 
policy.  I returned to these House-Senate differences at the end of the second empirical 
chapter (see below).     
 What remained in this project was to test the individual-level implications of the 
theoretical argument, given the insights afforded by the aggregate analyses and the case 
study.  In particular, the hypotheses that emerged from the theory included the 
intergovernmental team makeup of successful policy coalitions in the House and the 
Senate under different conditions.  In Chapter 6, I collect additional data on how 
individual legislators vote across the significant laws from Chapter 3, as well as how 
Senators vote on cloture across the same time frame.  I find strong support for the 
individual-level hypotheses in this final chapter.  In the House, majority party 
intergovernmental teams form successful policy coalitions more often than other groups 
of teams.   
 In the Senate, across all but one condition, majority party intergovernmental 
teams gain the votes needed from specific minority party legislators to reach 60 votes and 
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successfully invoke cloture—those from the pivotal minority intergovernmental team 
identified in my theory.  Only when there is a unified Republican government, does my 
argument fail to find support in this diverse data, leaving an interesting puzzle.  In 
particular, when there is a Republican in the White House and Republican majorities in 
the House and the Senate, Senators work to gain votes from Democrats from states with 
Republican governors (DR legislators), instead of the predicted Democrats from states 
with Democratic governors (DD legislators).  Under this particular condition, DD 
legislators prefer to decentralize authority and DR legislators are indifferent because, 
when using party label as a shortcut for preferences, the national executive branch and 
the state are located in the same place.  Why is it that Senators in a unified Republican 
government bargain or entice other legislators differently than Senators within a unified 
Democratic government?  And, why is it that when there is a Republican in the White 
House, a Republican majority in the Senate, and a Democratic majority in the House—
for which my theory predicts the same outcome as under unified Republican 
government—do I find support for my theory, since it is, in this instance, DD legislators 
whom I find vote more often for cloture with the Republicans?   
 Although this puzzle remains, overall, I find that my theory of intergovernmental 
delegation better explains how Congress chooses to delegate authority in national law 
than previous explanations, including that Republicans devolve, that partisan congruence 
between national institutions and the average partisanship of the states matters for 
decentralization of authority, that policy type determines delegation choices, and that 
election years matter.  Instead, it is a simple comparison (in the context of political 
uncertainty) by a pivotal legislator as to whether his state, the national executive branch, 
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or a combination of the two will provide an outcome closer to his ideal point that 
provides the best explanation in this new dataset.        
CONTRIBUTION 
 My contribution to the political science literature, therefore, is to incorporate a 
consideration of the intergovernmental context—namely that legislators come from 
specific states and consider how their state will implement policy if authority is delegated 
to the state level. Legislators compare potential policy outcomes at the state and national 
level to their own preferences over outcomes. These preferences along with uncertainty 
(as described below) determine their actions with respect to the federal design dilemma.  
My results demonstrate the importance of recognizing the impact of national and state 
political contexts in delegation decisions and explicitly modeling state and national 
agents theoretically and empirically.  This contribution informs scholarship in 
congressional delegation, federalism, and public policy. 
 In addition to the contribution to the political science literature, the theory, data, 
and results provide a foundation upon which additional scholarship in public health 
politics and policy can be built. Intergovernmental partnerships are increasingly common 
in public health policies. Since policy design affects implementation, it is crucial that 
public health scholars and practitioners understand the politics that create these federal 
partnerships.  This project systematically investigated how Congress makes legislative 
decisions in establishing federal-state partnerships.  I delineated the conditions under 
which Congress provides the states with more authority than the national executive 
branch in federal-state partnerships.  This project provides a first step to understanding 
congressional intergovernmental strategies—informing research about how changes in 
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policy design influence population health outcomes over time.  Without the conclusions 
of this study, public health policy scholars overlook the importance of the 
intergovernmental context of legislators in Congress in determining the national side of 
the patchwork of public health policies. 
 In both sets of literatures, political science and public health, I also contribute to a 
growing mixed methods approach to research.  In this study I rely on an intensive coding 
process of national laws, formal theoretic models, large-N aggregate and individual-level 
analyses, and in-depth qualitative work to structure an examination of how Congress 
deals with their federal design dilemma, using the strengths of each approach to address 
the others weaknesses.   
 NEXT STEPS 
 This project leaves as many, if not more, questions than it answers.  In particular, 
there are three main areas of research I would like to explore in the future.  First, I would 
like to incorporate more complexity with respect to state responses to congressional 
delegation.  Second, it is important to gain a more nuanced understanding of the design of 
joint partnership policies.  And third, intra- and inter-chamber bargaining process with 
respect to invoking cloture and designing policies should be explored further.  I discuss 
each of these next steps in more detail below. 
Passive States 
 To the extent that this project assumes the states are passive recipients of national 
dictates, I ignore the complexity and potential influence of state responsiveness to 
Congress.  Evidence from my case study provides support for my theoretical assumption 
that Congress perceives of itself as the principal and the states as one potential 
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implementation agent, but I assume away any influence the states may have on this 
process.  In addition, if the states really are only passive actors in this process, why do 
they—collectively through the National Governors Association, the National Conference 
of State Legislatures, or individually—lobby Congress (e.g. see Haider 1974)?  In 
addition, why do the states actively lobby national executive branch agencies?  The 
obvious answer is that they either want to be winners or they are afraid of losing in policy 
contests.   
 This intergovernmental lobbying activity has been described as a bargaining 
process (Elazar 1972, Ingram 1977, Chubb 1985, Agranoff 2001, Woods and Bowman 
2011).  But, bargaining between which actors and at what time—the states and Congress, 
the states and national executive branch agencies within previously formed joint 
partnership policies, or bargaining between all three?  
 Moreover, the states have more than one tool at their disposal for pressuring or 
bargaining with national institutions of government, including, federal lawsuits, ignoring 
federal-grants-in-aid, and ignoring (or attempting to redefine) national regulations.  Each 
of these instruments of state rejection of national law has been demonstrated in the 
aftermath of the national health insurance reform of 2009-2010.  The states filed federal 
lawsuits regarding the constitutionality of the individual mandate for health insurance 
coverage and burden on the states for the Medicaid expansion, many state legislatures 
and public ballot measures attempted to change the individual mandate implementation in 
their state, and many states refused to implement other portions of the law, such as the 
high-risk pool.              
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 Overall, is this bargaining done ex ante, such as lobbying or filing lawsuits before 
a policy is passed, ex post, such as lobbying during implementation, filing lawsuits after 
enactment, refusing to act as implementers, or both?  And, to what extent does bargaining 
influence how Congress delegates authority across governmental levels and how much 
discretion agents are given?  In future work, I would like to delve into this interaction 
between the states and national institutions by first conducting case studies comparing 
how the health reform implementation unfolds with other policies, such as No Child Left 
Behind or the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which also incurred state-level 
resistance.  In this project, I would like to use insights gained from the case studies to 
develop a formal theoretic model of the three sets of actors bargaining over state-level 
authority, and finally test the hypotheses that emerge on data that build on my dataset in 
Chapter 3.      
Joint Policies 
 The process of constructing the dataset in Chapter 3 revealed the variety of joint 
partnerships that Congress has crafted over the years.  As described in that chapter, 
Congress can delegate implementation to the states and use national executive branch 
agencies simply to dole out federal money, or it can delegate implementation to national-
level actors and require sub-delegation to the states, or even delegate to both sets of 
actors different aspects of a policy, among other options.  The ways in which Congress 
structures these joint policies is likely to be crucial for the ultimate policy outcomes, and, 
therefore, is an additional avenue of for future research.  In fact, initial work on 
Congress-National-State bargaining described in the previous section indicates the 
possibility that understanding these joint policies is crucial for modeling the interactions 
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between these actors (and the resulting policy outcomes).  For instance, if Congress fails 
to delineate the boundaries and timing of each agent‘s actions, there can be an unending 
cycle of strategic choices on the part of the states and the national agents resulting in no 
implementation. 
 Building on the data in Chapter 3, I plan to incorporate more information about 
the structure of joint partnership provisions.  This coding process will need to include 
how much discretion the states and the national actors have in these provisions and which 
agent acts first as defined by law.  The coding must rely on improved definitions of 
discretion and delegation from previous studies and has not yet been undertaken.       
Cloture, Bargaining, and the House 
  Although seemingly unrelated to the previous sections, Chapter 6 left us with a 
puzzle—why is it that a Republican House can change cloture bargaining in only one 
circumstance, unified Republican government, but not in others.  The two previous 
avenues for research emerge from the aggregate-level model, which in turn, relies on a 
pivotal legislator.  To identify this pivotal legislator, I utilize an individual-level model of 
legislators bargaining in the House and the Senate in Chapter 2.  I assume these chambers 
operate in a vacuum, when in fact they often interact with each other.  The results from 
Chapter 6 point to the importance of considering how the House and Senate interact may 
influence Senate bargaining and coalition formation with respect to attaining 60 votes to 
invoke cloture.  The final plan for next research steps includes a more thorough 
consideration of super-majoritarian coalition formation in the Senate, given future 
interactions with the House over the policy.   
 
244 
CONCLUSION    
 In this project, I examine what determines whether Congress keeps authority at 
the national level or sends it out to the states?  The degree of state authority in a policy is 
an issue that touches on many topics of interest; yet political science, public policy, and 
public health scholars have failed to give it serious consideration both theoretically and 
empirically.  By using multiple methodological approaches, I find that Congress allocates 
authority to the states based on their intergovernmental context—including the 
relationship between individual legislators and their states, legislators and the national 
executive branch, and uncertainty over the party that will be in power at each level during 




Agranoff R.  2001.  ―Managing within the Matrix: Do Collaborative Intergovernmental 
Relations Exist?‖  Publius 31:31-56. 
 
Chubb, JE.  1985.  "The Political Economy of Federalism."  APSR 79(4):994-1015. 
 
Elazar DJ.  1972.  American Federalism:  A View from the States. New York: Crowell. 
 
Haider D.  1974.  When Governments Come to Washington:  Governors, Mayors, and 
Intergovernmental Lobbying.  New York, Free Press. 
 
Ingram H.  1977.  ―Policy Implementation through Bargaining:  the Case of Federal 
Grants-in-Aid.‖  Public Policy 25(4):499-526. 
 
Rom MC.  2004.  ―Transforming State Health and Welfare Programs,‖  in Virginia Gray 
and Russell L. Hanson (eds) Politics in the American States:  A Comparative Analysis 8
th
 
ed. Washington DC, CQ Press. 
 
Turnock, B. J. 2004. Public Health: What It Is and How It Works. 3rd Edition. Boston: 
Jones and Bartlett Publishers.  
 
Wing, K. R. 2003. The Law and The Public’s Health. 6th Edition. Chicago: Health 
Administration Press. 
 
Woods ND and Bowman A O‘M.  2011.  ―Blurring Borders:  The Effect of Federal 
Activism on Interstate Cooperation,‖  Am Pol Res XX(X):1-26. 
 
 
 
